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 Abstract 
How people learn about options may play a more important role than their preferences in 
determining their choice. This is the bottom line of a 10-year-old research program on the gap 
between experience- and description-based choice. In this dissertation, I continue this line of 
research by studying the underlying mechanisms and applying existing knowledge to decision 
environments in the real world. Paper 1 evaluates the role of recency in the description‒
experience gap and concludes that it can be traced back to active search strategies, rather than 
to memory limitations. Paper 2 expands the investigation of recency, showing that its very 
cause—self-terminated search—poses severe methodological challenges to the study of 
recency and experience in general. Paper 3 presents evidence for an intricate connection 
between the length of active information search and preferences, which not only substantiates 
the claims of the first two papers, but also introduces yet another challenge for the study of 
experience-based choice. Namely, when a person’s preference determines her information 
search, the length and outcome of her search may be more indicative of her preference than 
the choice itself. Taking a much broader perspective, in papers 4 and 5 I apply the knowledge 
obtained on the description‒experience gap to realistic choice environments. Representing a 
proof of concept, Paper 4 establishes a connection between the description‒experience gap 
and online consumer choices based on different formats of consumer reviews. Paper 5 
extends this work by discussing the potential merits of experience-based information formats 
for private and corporate risky choices and highlights the need to better understand the often 
intricate relationships between experience and description in real-life choice situations.    
  
   
 0 Introduction 
Life is full of risk. The choices people make on an everyday basis rarely have certain 
outcomes. In order to understand human decision making, it is thus imperative to understand 
how humans deal with risk. For researchers, this means understanding how humans evaluate 
options by weighing up both the set of possible outcomes and the likelihood with which they 
occur. Buying a lottery ticket is perhaps the purest example of this. The possible outcomes are 
that a player may win the jackpot (with a low probability) or win nothing and lose the price of 
the ticket (with a high probability). Whether a person considers it worth playing will depend 
on how that person evaluates the options’ outcomes in light of their likelihoods. 
Numerous studies have investigated how risky choices are made. By analogy to the 
lottery situation, the vast majority of these studies have asked participants to choose between 
two or more fully described options with well-defined outcomes and probabilities (Holt & 
Laurie, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); for instance, to choose between:  
 
A: $4 with probability .8, and otherwise nothing 
or 
B: $3 for sure. 
 
Such decisions from description exist not only in casinos, but also in situations in 
which probabilities are obtained through the aggregation of empirical data, such as the side 
effects of drugs (Lejarraga, in preparation) or product choices (consumer ratings; Wulff, Hills, 
& Hertwig, 2014). Often however, tabulated risks are not available—for example, when 
deciding when to cross the street or where to get lunch. In these cases, decisions may be based 
on personal experience. The information provided by experience is markedly different to that 
 offered by explicit descriptions; experience is composed of many individual instances, 
distributed over time, and inherently limited in number.  
Researchers have recently begun to study risky choice in the context of decisions from 
experience (Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010). One approach that has gained 
particular popularity is the sampling paradigm (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). In 
this paradigm, no information about the available options is provided upfront. Instead, the 
options need to be actively explored by participants. To this end, participants repeatedly draw 
from the available options, each draw being one random sample from that option. As the 
draws do not entail costs (see Hertwig & Erev, 2009, for other variants), a participant is free 
to sample from the options however often and in whatever order she likes. When she is ready, 
she terminates search and indicates the preferred option for one final, consequential choice. 
 Decisions from description and decisions from experience are alternate ways of 
learning about one and the same option. Description provides all outcomes with their 
probabilities (e.g., 4 with probability .8), whereas experience provides a variable sequence of 
disaggregated outcomes (e.g., 4 ... 4 … 0 … 4 … 0). In principle, an option is the same 
whether it is presented by description or experience; however, research has repeatedly 
demonstrated that the two formats lead to systematically different choices (Hertwig et al., 
2004). In decisions from description, people choose as if they overweight low-probability 
outcomes, such as the small chance of winning nothing in option A (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). In decisions from experience, in contrast, people choose as if they underweight that 
same low-probability outcome. For the choice between A and B, these tendencies translated 
into 36% of respondents choosing option A in the description condition, compared with 88% 
choosing A in the experience condition. This difference in choice proportions is now 
commonly referred to as the description‒experience gap (Hertwig et al., 2004).    
  The discovery of the description‒experience gap has posed a great challenge to the 
understanding of how humans deal with risk. Decades of research had informed the 
construction of intricate and highly successful descriptive models of human decision making, 
most prominently exemplified by cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1997; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Yet all of these advances rest on decisions from description. 
Whether and to what extent these models translate to the context of decisions from experience 
is a matter of current inquiry. Several mechanisms have been invoked to explain the 
description‒experience gap, but the final verdict with respect to their importance and, to some 
extent, their existence is in many cases still pending. What seems clear, however, is that the 
phenomenon of decision from experience is the larger unknown in the study of how humans 
deal with risk. 
 One proposed explanation of why description and experience lead to different choices 
is that limited search alone causes the gap (Fox & Hadar, 2006). Because people have finite 
resources in terms of time and cognitive capacity, participants in the sampling paradigm must 
terminate their information search at some point. As samples are random draws from the 
options, the string of sample experiences resulting from limited search is unlikely to perfectly 
reflect population-level parameters. Thus, somebody experiencing samples from an option 
will likely not see one and the same set of outcomes as somebody else studying the 
description of an option. For instance, a person experiencing option A may by chance see the 
outcome 0 three times in ten samples, whereas the person relying on description knows that 0 
occurs on average in two of ten cases. This sampling error can lead the two to make different 
choices across the two formats, even if both decision makers have identical preferences. 
Importantly, contrary to what one might think in the light of random samples, this effect is 
highly systematic. The binomial distribution that governs the frequencies with which the 
 outcomes in the risky option A occur is skewed for all events with p ≠ .5. This implies that the 
majority of sample experiences, as for instance indicated by the median, deviate from the 
population probability in one direction. For instance, the distribution of occurrences for event 
0 in option A is highly right skewed, as a result of which most people will experience its 
relative frequency of occurrence to be smaller than the actual probability of .2. For this 
reason, most people will likely choose option A—and will thus choose as if they underweight 
low-probability events.  
The impact of limited information search on decisions from experience is not 
contested. What is unclear, however, is whether limited information search is sufficient as an 
explanation to bridge the gap between description and experience. Addressing this question, 
several studies have investigated the description‒experience gap, while ensuring that the 
information experienced accurately reflects the information presented in the description, 
either by tweaking the process that generates the samples or by forcing people to sample 
many times. The results are relatively unequivocal: sampling error diminishes the gap 
between experience and description substantially, but does not close it (e.g., Ungemach, 
Chater, & Stewert, 2009). The finding that exposure to equal information in experience and 
description does not ensure equal choices highlights the need to identify and test other factors 
contributing to the description‒experience gap.  
One of the other factors proposed to explain the description‒experience gap is 
recency. When they reported on the discovery of the gap, Hertwig et al. (2004) also observed 
that choices in the sampling paradigm seemed more influenced by later samples in the 
sequence than by earlier ones. This greater influence of later samples might not only represent 
the missing piece in closing the gap; consistent evidence for recency in the sampling 
paradigm would also imply that experience and description rely on distinct processes. To 
 date, however, recency in the sampling paradigm is neither well understood, nor has it been 
consistently demonstrated. Papers 1 and 2 in this dissertation address and substantially 
advance the issue of recency in the sampling paradigm on the empirical, methodological, and 
theoretical levels.  
Another factor that has been invoked to explain some behavioral patterns in the 
sampling paradigm—and thus the description‒experience gap—is motivation. Hills and 
Hertwig (2010) observed that the length and pattern of participants’ information search 
foreshadowed their final choices. This association, so they speculated, may reflect the goals 
with which participants approach the task. Specifically, collecting only few samples may be 
an expression of maximizing one’s winnings in the short run, whereas collecting many 
samples may be an expression of maximizing one’s winnings in the long run. These two types 
of choice tendencies, short run and long run, are of course not unique to experience—they are 
also discussed in the context of decisions from description (Lopes, 1981; Lopes & Oden, 
1999). It is thus not the tendency per se, but its link to information search that may contain the 
key to the description‒experience gap. Paper 3 of this dissertation expands on the relationship 
between choice and search and explains why it represents not only an important aspect in the 
description‒experience gap, but also a major challenge for generally inferring preferences 
from choices. 
The three papers outlined thus far constitute the first part of this dissertation. Beyond 
their individual focus, they are united by the recurrent theme of active information search. As 
will become clear, the fact that the sampling paradigm enables participants to actively decide 
when to terminate information search has profound implications for the interpretation and 
detection of recency and, for obvious reasons, for the discussion of motivational aspects in 
experience-based choice. 
 The second part of this dissertation addresses the relevance of this line of research for 
decision making in the real world. Despite many open questions, of which this dissertation 
answers but a few, enough is already known to discuss and test implications of the 
description‒experience gap for real-world situations. Papers 4 and 5 are first attempts in this 
direction. Paper 4 demonstrates that aggregated and disaggregated information displays of 
online consumer reviews can influence consumer choice in ways consistent with the 
description‒experience gap for risky choice. Taking a more general perspective, Paper 5 
discusses implications of the description‒experience gap for corporate risk management.  
   
1 The implications and challenges of active information search in experience-based 
choice and valuation 
 In the sampling paradigm of decisions from experience, participants decide when to 
stop sampling. Surprisingly, research thus far has primarily been interested in the outcomes of 
such self-terminated information search. Among other questions, studies have assessed the 
extent of limited information search (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Hertwig et al. 
2004), which factors influence the length of information search (Frey, Hertwig, & Rieskamp, 
2014; Hadar & Fox, 2009; Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzales, 2012; Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, 
& Avrahami, 2014; Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008), how accurate subsequent frequency 
judgments are (Camilleri & Newell, 2009; Lejarraga, 2010; Ungemach et al., 2009), and why 
participants are content to draw relatively few samples (Hertwig, & Pleskac, 2010; Hills & 
Hertwig, 2010). The psychological and methodological implications of leaving the decision to 
terminate search to the participant have to date received little attention, however. In paper 1, 
we show that self-terminated information search may not only explain the behavioral patterns 
constituting the recency effect, but that it may also be their very source. 
  
Paper 1: Recency exists in the sampling paradigm of decisions from experience, but 
why? 
Wulff, D. U., Mergenthaler Canseco, M., & Hertwig, R. (2014). Recency exists in the 
sampling paradigm of decisions from experience, but why? 
  
Recency in decisions from experience refers to the observation that people more 
consistently chose the option that later samples indicate to be better than the option that 
earlier samples indicate to be better (Camilleri & Newell, 2011; Hertwig et al. 2004; Rakow, 
Demes, & Newell, 2008). However, whether recency implies that later samples truly receive 
more weight, as has often been assumed (Hertwig et al., 2004; Rakow, Demes & Newell, 
2008), or whether it originates from an altogether different process, is yet unclear. In fact, it 
remains unclear whether recency is indeed a robust phenomenon in the context of choice in 
the sampling paradigm.  
To address these questions, we collected all available data sets obtained using the 
sampling paradigm and tested them for recency. These data sets included traditional studies, 
in which sampling was free, meaning that the decision to terminate search was left to the 
participants. However, they also included studies that aimed to minimize deviations 
between the information experienced and the objectively true option properties, by requiring 
participants to sample a large, fixed number of samples. We found recency to be a robust 
phenomenon, but only when sampling was free. In fixed sampling, neither earlier nor later 
samples appeared to consistently receive a greater weight. 
Recency in the sampling paradigm is commonly thought to originate from 
limitations in memory capacity, in line with Kareev’s narrow window hypothesis (Kareev, 
 2000; Kareev, Lieberman, & Lev, 1997), according to which later samples truly receive 
more weight because earlier ones are either forgotten or less activated by the time of the 
decision. If this were the case, however, memory limitations should have played out equally 
in both free and fixed sampling. Our analysis—together with other findings in the literature, 
particularly the finding that frequency judgments elicited from participants after sampling 
are generally accurate (Camilleri & Newell, 2009a; Lejarraga, 2010; Ungemach et al., 2009) 
and the lack of association between working memory and any behavioral indicators in the 
sampling paradigm (Wulff et al., 2014)—suggests that the role of memory in the sampling 
paradigm needs revision. 
Another common interpretation of recency has the potential to explain recency in 
self-terminated search, namely step-by-step belief updating. In their seminal paper, Hogarth 
and Einhorn (1992) proposed that there are at least two different modes in which sequences 
of observations can be processed: step-by-step updating, in which new observations are 
used to repeatedly update a current belief, and end-of-sequence processing, in which all 
samples are first registered and later integrated when a valuation needs to be made (see also 
Ashby & Rakow, 2014). Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) further showed that the application of 
these two modes is predominantly a function of the task. When participants were required to 
produce recurrent evaluations, they exclusively showed recency effects (and no primacy 
effects); however, when they were required to provide but a single evaluation at the end of 
the sequence, they mostly showed primacy effects—that is, they gave greater weight to 
earlier observations. Returning to the sampling paradigm, we suggest that the requirement to 
self-terminate search will also moderate the use of these two modes of processing. Free 
sampling, which requires the participant to decide when to terminate search, likely causes 
participants to evaluate the available options during search. Fixed sampling, on the other 
 hand, permits the participant to first observe the sequence of samples before processing 
them. Thus, free sampling may result in recency because the requirement to terminate 
search triggers a step-by-step updating mode, whereas fixed sampling does not lead to either 
recency or primacy effects, because participants are free to choose between the two modes. 
Convincing evidence for step-by-step updating would have important implications 
for the debate on the description‒experience gap. Those holding that experience and 
description are set apart only by sampling error would claim that the sequence of samples is 
processed into a format akin to description. For instance, the sequence, 4 … 0 … 4 … 4 … 
0, with each outcome weighted equally, would be internally transformed into 4 with a 
probability of .6, and otherwise nothing, before making a decision. Because step-by-step 
updating immediately integrates each observation with the current belief and discards the 
raw sample, such processing must be considered inconsistent with the robust finding of 
recency in the sampling paradigm.  
Yet, as we also show in this paper, a third, previously unconsidered, explanation of 
recency is consistent with both the finding of selective recency in self-terminated search and 
the assumption of description-like processing of the raw experience information. It has been 
argued that participants in the sampling paradigm rely on small samples, because small 
samples maximize the expected absolute difference between options. Implicit in this 
argument is that participants act to maximize the difference between the available options. 
What if they try to achieve this directly by terminating search whenever the difference 
between the options is large? In this paper, we demonstrate that, as much as belief updating, 
this behavior can account for recency and its dependence on self-terminated search. 
Moreover, we highlight that optional stopping does not require any assumptions about how 
the samples are processed. We argue that as long as the same mechanism is recruited for 
 search termination and the final choice, recency occurs. On a theoretical level, this proposal 
reconciles the selective recency effect with the perspective of description-like processing of 
experience. At the same time, however, it introduces a new layer in the difference between 
experience and description. If participants are more likely to terminate search when the 
options appear more distinct, then beyond the effect of limited samples, experiences will 
systematically deviate from the true options in the direction of larger observed differences. 
Crucially, our findings in paper 3 indicate that this distortion would not affect differences in 
terms of the sample mean, but in terms of utilities. For this reason, it is highly difficult to 
provide direct evidence for this new layer of the description‒experience gap. 
 Before I revisit the issue of preference-dependent, optional stopping in paper 3, I 
continue to address the question of step-by-step versus end-of-sequence processing and their 
detection in a task very similar to the sampling paradigm.  
 
Paper 2: Modeling valuations from experience 
Wulff, D. U., & Pachur, T. (2014). Modeling valuations from experience. 
  
What are the cognitive mechanisms underlying valuations based on sequentially 
experienced samples of a single option’s possible outcomes? Ashby and Rakow (2014) have 
proposed a sliding window model (SWIM), according to which people’s valuations of an 
option represent the average of a limited sample of recent experiences (the size of which is 
estimated by the model) formed after sampling has been terminated (i.e., an end-of-sequence 
process). From their results, Ashby and Rakow conclude that the SWIM performs well 
relative to alternative models based on model selection criteria. These alternative models 
included the value-updating model (VUM; Hau et al., 2008; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 
 2006), which is a direct implementation of step-by-step updating, and the summary model, 
which assumes no order effects. Further, they report that the individual window sizes 
estimated by the SWIM correlate with a measure of working memory capacity. 
Reevaluating their findings, we highlight several problematic issues in the conclusions 
drawn by Ashby and Rakow (2014). In a reanalysis of their data, we found no clear evidence 
in support of any of the models tested, but the summary model to show a slight advantage. 
Further, we demonstrated that individual differences in the window size estimated by the 
SWIM can reflect differences in judgment noise, rather than true underlying individual 
differences. In contrast to Ashby and Rakow’s evaluation of the data, we conclude that none 
of their empirical findings support the SWIM. Inspired by Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) 
work on order effects in belief updating, moreover, we argue that end-of-sequence processing, 
which the SWIM supposedly reflects, is inconsistent with the active termination of search in 
this task.   
Ashby and Rakow (2014) obtained data from 97 participants, each of whom provided 
valuations for 40 lotteries, based on samples they had actively sampled. Puzzled by the fact 
that this rather extensive setup delivered surprisingly little evidence as to which process 
governs the production of valuations from experience, we further assessed whether study 
design and methods were at all capable of producing evidence for one process or the other. In 
order to distinguish the ability of models to account for data, researchers need to work with 
data that leads to different predictions for the set of models under consideration. Further, 
when assessing models based solely on their ability to fit existing data, researchers need to 
know a model’s ability to fit data produced by a competing process. As we demonstrate in 
this paper, both these conditions are severely affected by active, self-terminated information 
search. First, as in the sampling paradigm, numerous participants sampled very few times, 
 leading to many strings of observations for which all models necessarily made identical 
predictions. Second, for reasons within the set of models, some very large sample sizes also 
led to many strings of observations that resulted in identical predictions. Each of the three 
models produces, on average, the expected value of a lottery as the valuation, which—due to 
the law of large numbers—causes the predictions to converge with increasing sample size. 
Third, the two more complex models, the VUM and the SWIM, operate with different degrees 
of precision. The VUM has a continuous parameter to account for order effects, which allows 
the model to fine-tune to observed data, especially when samples are very small. The SWIM, 
on the other hand, is discrete in that its window size is bound to take one of the discrete steps 
between a size of 1 and the maximum number of samples collected. The ability to fit any data, 
also called a model’s complexity (Grünwald, Myung, & Pitt, 2005), thus clearly grows with 
increasing samples size for the SWIM, but may actually decrease for the VUM. Thus, the 
relative complexity of the two models varies as a function of how many samples were 
collected.  
 As we demonstrate in a model recovery analysis, the sum of these issues renders it 
nearly impossible to identify the true underlying process, at least when standard fit indices are 
used (AIC and BIC; Burnham & Anderson, 2002), as was done by Ashby and Rakow (2014). 
For model comparisons where the amount of data (and the information value of that data) is 
subject to active sampling, the use of more advanced model comparison techniques 
(Grünwald et al., 2005) and richer experimental designs is advisable. We conclude by making 
a number of suggestions for methodological tools and features of the experimental design.  
Clearly, active, self-terminated search is an important aspect of a task in terms of both 
the psychological processes involved and their detection. In paper 3, I next return to the issue 
of preference-dependent search termination.  
  
Paper 3: How Short- and Long-Run Aspirations Impact Search and Choice  
in Decisions from Experience 
Wulff, D. U, Hills, T. T., & Hertwig, R. (2014). How Short- and Long-Run Aspirations 
Impact Search and Choice in Decisions from Experience. Currently under revision at 
Cognition. 
 
To what extent do people adapt their information search and subsequent decisions to 
their goals? To address this question, we investigated exploration and exploitation policies in 
choice environments that involved single or multiple plays. In single-play environments, 
where a choice leads to one random draw from the chosen lottery, the decision maker is 
forced to make a trade-off between the risk and the potential magnitude of a win. In multi-
play environments, on the other hand, the aggregation of risk over multiple draws largely 
suspends this trade-off. Thus, whereas players in the single-play environment one may feel 
compelled to choose a small, but safe option, the multi-play environment allows them to 
safely choose a risky option with a higher long-run expected value. Placing a participant in 
one environment or the other thus has the effect of switching on and off a person’s tendency 
to avoid risks. 
To test this prediction, we conducted an experiment where made several choices 
between risky options framed as either single or multi-play environments. Results showed 
that people searched more in the multi-play environment than in the single-play environment. 
Moreover, the experiences made across these environments differed systematically. Finally, 
the substantial search effort in the multi-play environment was conducive to choices 
 consistent with expected value maximization, whereas the lesser search effort in the single-
play environment was consistent with the goal of minimizing the risk of winning nothing.  
Together, these findings lend evidence to the speculation that people are more likely to 
terminate their search when, according to their goals (or preference structure), the options 
appear more distinct. This first account of preference-dependent stopping in the context of the 
sampling paradigm (see Berger & Berry, 1988, for a discussion of optional stopping in data 
collection) opens up an entire host of problematic implications. First, and as highlighted 
before, the long-run expectation in samples from experience will, in many cases, no longer 
match the expected value of the lotteries. Second, depending on the exact mechanism used to 
terminate search, the relative location of particular outcomes within the sequence may no 
longer be random. For instance, a particular undesirable event may be more likely occur 
toward the end of the sequence, because participants may tend to terminate search after 
observing it. Third, and probably most importantly, it is no longer clear how to infer the 
preference of a person in the sampling paradigm.  
Let me elaborate on the last point. According to the revealed preference approach 
(Samuelson, 1938), an individual’s preference can be inferred from her choices. Decision 
problems employing stated probabilities can easily be tailored to make different risk 
preferences discernible (e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002). In decisions from experience, though, 
inferring risk preference from choice needs to account for the random composition of 
samples; it is often the case that no two individuals face identical decision problems. For this 
reason, it has been argued that an individual’s risk preference can only be inferred on the 
basis of the individually experienced choice environment—and not the objective choice 
parameters (outcomes and probabilities) (Fox & Hadar, 2006). However, the finding that the 
environment itself is a function of preference casts doubt on whether even the subjective 
 environment can be used. Ongoing projects are further investigating the interplay of 
preference, search, and environment. Although yet unconfirmed, it must be considered a 
possibility that, in some cases, a person’s true preference cannot be reconstructed from her 
choice, but from the length and pattern of search alone.  
 
Interim discussion 
 Active sampling is clearly the key to understanding the description‒experience gap in 
the sampling paradigm. Contrary to the focus of previous investigations, however, it is not 
only the outcome of active, self-terminated search that requires attention. I was able to show 
that leaving search termination to participants has important implications for the 
psychological models generated to explain choice in the sampling paradigm as well as for the 
methods used to test those models.  
 
2 The description‒experience gap in the real world 
Except for visits to the casino, choice options in real life are rarely stated exactly as 
they are presented in laboratory situations of decisions from description. Likewise, no real-
world situation precisely matches of the sampling paradigm in every respect. Nonetheless, 
choice environments in the real world do resemble the description format, the experience 
format, and often even both, in important ways. For thousands of years of human history, all 
that was available to inform a decision was one’s own limited experience and the limited 
experience of others who may be willing to share. Nowadays, with private and public 
organizations collecting and analyzing massive amounts of data, reliable long-run probability 
information is becoming increasingly available. Yet in many cases, this information is not 
easily accessible. And whether decision makers want it or not, past experiences remotely or 
 directly related to the choice at hand are often available to them. In the light of big data and 
our knowledge of the description‒experience gap, it is thus becoming increasingly relevant to 
ask how people do and should navigate this multitude of information formats.    
 Towards these questions, paper 4 attempts to establish a direct link between the two 
laboratory formats of risky choice and the world of online consumer choice.   
  
Paper 4: Online Product Reviews and the Description–Experience Gap 
Wulff, D. U, & Hills, T. T., & Hertwig, R. (2014). Online Product Reviews and the 
Description–Experience Gap. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 
 
 Not long ago, buying a book, a music player, or a pair of shoes required consumers to 
visit their trusted local brick-and-mortar store. Nowadays, many such products are bought 
online. One driving force behind this development was the invention of online 
recommendation systems. The initial skepticism associated with anonymous shop personnel 
and lack of physical contact with the product is now countered by the hundreds of reviews 
provided by fellow customers. In order to manage the huge numbers of customer reviews, 
online retailers have developed various formats to summarize the information provided. 
Amazon.com, for instance, presents customers with a bar plot showing the number of 1- to 5-
star ratings a product has been given. In addition, they provide a list of individual star ratings. 
These two formats, the summary bar plot and the individual ratings, clearly parallel the 
distinction between description and experience. If consumer choice based on consumer 
ratings were in any way comparable to risky choice, the two formats could thus have a similar 
impact on choice. 
  Assuming that consumer choice based on consumer ratings and risky choice are 
identical in essential aspects, we tested whether the two formats not only lead to different 
choices, but do so for the same reasons proposed in previous studies on the sampling 
paradigm. To this end, we conducted a study in which participants made hypothetical 
consumer choices based either on an aggregate bar plot of consumer ratings or on a sequence 
of actively sampled ratings. The results showed that choices differed considerably between 
the formats. Importantly, they differed due to small sample sizes and recency. These findings 
establish a promising link between the fields of risky choice and online consumer choice. 
Research on online consumer choice, although flourishing, is selectively concerned with 
correlative observations regarding sales figures. The perspective of risky choice can enable 
the field to go beyond such analyses to study the processes relevant for actual consumer 
choice. Both the literature on risky choice in general and research on the description‒
experience gap in particular offer numerous starting points. 
 Online consumer choice is but one example of real-life situations in which multiple 
information formats are available. Paper 5 attempts to generalize the implications of the 
description‒experience gap to decision making in the corporate and financial domain.  
 
Paper 5: Risky Choice: The Gap between Experience and Description 
Hertwig, R., & Wulff, D. U. (2014). Risikoentscheidungen: Die Kluft zwischen Erfahrung 
und Beschreibung. Controlling – Zeitschrift für erfolgsorientierte Unternehmensführung. 
  
 In private and business matters alike, one often can choose how to acquire information 
about the options at hand. Naturally, the preferred format is always the one that is most 
beneficial for the decision maker—the format that maximizes the decision maker’s goals. But 
 which format is that? It is tempting to assume that formats offering reliable probability 
information (i.e., descriptions from description) are superior to those offering limited 
sequential information (i.e., decisions from experience). In the light of the consistent 
overweighting of low-probability outcomes in decisions from description (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), however, this assumption must be questioned.    
 In this paper, we discuss consequences arising for private and corporate financial 
decision making from recent findings on the description‒experience gap. In particular, we 
highlight that the sequential experience of nonlimited information may help to counteract 
tendencies that often prevent people from making the most beneficial choice. It has been 
found that, relative to judgments based on description, experience may actually lead to less 
biased beliefs about the probability of certain events—of course, only if the sequence is a 
good reflection of the true probabilities (Kaufman, Weber, & Haisley, 2013; Lejarraga, 2010). 
For both private and corporate decisions makers, this implies that simulation tools affording 
the sequential observation of many unbiased samples may help to achieve an objective 
assessment of the choice environment, which can be considered a prerequisite for good 
decisions.   
 Ignoring situations in which the information format is under the control of the decision 
maker, we further argue that both private and corporate decision makers need to always 
consider the existence of experiences pertinent to a given choice. Experiences may entail 
accurate judgments of probabilities, but they can still be limited and hence misleading. Little 
is yet known about the interaction of description and experience, but the few existing studies 
suggest that the influence of experience is difficult to eliminate, even in the face of clear 
descriptive warnings in the opposite direction (Barron, Leider, & Stack, 2008).      
 
 3 General discussion 
The modern information society collects and aggregates information at a higher rate 
than ever, yet researchers have only begun to understand how people’s choices are affected by 
described aggregate information formats as opposed to individual sequential experience. 
Limitations in human memory capacity were long believed to separate choice in one format 
from the other. Yet the findings presented in this dissertation indicate that the impact of 
memory in the description‒experience gap appears to be smaller than has previously been 
suggested. Far less research attention has been paid to the impact of self-terminated search. I 
hope I have made a convincing case that the psychological processes involved in experience, 
the outcome of limited search, and finally the ability to detect certain psychological processes 
are all strongly impacted by active search termination.  
 More research is required to fully understand the intricate relationships between 
search, the experienced environment, and choice. However, if it holds that a person’s 
preference is expressed not only in her choice, but also in her search behavior in terms of 
preference-dependent stopping, then the research community’s image of decisions from 
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Life often requires choices between options with uncertain outcomes. How we make these 
choices has been said to depend on how we evaluate risks. However, recent research has 
demonstrated that whether we learn about the options available to us through the description 
of probabilities and outcomes or through the experience of a sequence of individual 
outcomes also has a considerable influence. One central element in the debate on why 
experience and description lead to different choices is the recency effect: Recent 
experiences impact our choices more strongly than earlier ones do; this influence applies 
only in sequential experiences. In this study, we reanalyze existing data sets to examine the 
robustness of the recency phenomenon across different variants of the sampling paradigm 
and different testing methods. Contrary to previous beliefs that recency reflects memory 
limitations, we find that the recency effect is robust only when participants are required to 
actively terminate their information sampling. We further demonstrate that this finding is 
consistent not only with step-by-step belief updating, as has been previously proposed, but 
also with optional stopping. Which of the two provides the more viable explanation is 
difficult to discern, but—as we discuss—of critical importance for the interpretation of the 
description‒experience gap.  
 
Keywords: description‒experience gap, decisions from experience, information sampling, 
risky choice, recency, optional stopping 
  




If you had the choice between one option offering $4 with probability .8, or otherwise 
nothing, and another option offering $3 for sure, how would you choose? Recent research on 
choices between monetary gambles has demonstrated that, apart from your personal 
preferences, your choice would depend on the format in which you learned about the options 
available (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). The main finding 
is this: When the outcomes and probabilities of a given option are explicitly described, as 
above, people tend to choose as if they overweight low-probability outcomes, such as the 
chance of winning nothing in the first option (Kahneman & Tverksy, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). When the same option is directly experienced, however—that is, observed 
in terms of a sequence of individual outcomes—people tend to choose as if they underweight 
low-probability outcomes. Over the past decade, numerous studies have demonstrated this 
choice disparity, known as the description‒experience gap (Hertwig et al. 2004; Hertwig & 
Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010). Yet the debate as to why this gap occurs and whether 
choices in the two information formats require independent sets of psychological theories is 
far from settled. This holds particularly for the sampling paradigm of decisions from 
experience. In the sampling paradigm, participants first explore initially unknown options in a 
self-directed sampling phase, taking individual draws from the available options for as long as 
they like. Once the participant has decided to terminate search, one final, consequential choice 
is made. In this article, we reevaluate existing data gathered using the sampling paradigm, 
focusing on one particular causal factor in the description‒experience gap, namely recency. 
As we explain, recency plays a key role in the debate on the description‒experience gap in the 
sampling paradigm because it implies psychological processes that are not relevant in the 
context of decisions from description.  
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The description‒experience gap in the sampling paradigm has been attributed 
predominantly to limited information search. In the sampling paradigm, a given option (e.g., 
$4 with probability .8, or otherwise nothing) is experienced through the sequential 
observation of a limited number of random draws (e.g., 4, 0, 0, 4, 4, … , 4). Unlike decisions 
from description, where long-run probabilities are given, repeated random draws are subject 
to stochastic variation. Consequently, the average of multiple sampling sequences will reflect 
the true underlying probabilities, whereas as individual sequences will not. It is this stochastic 
error that, for the following reason, leads to the systematic underweighting of low-probability 
events (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010): How often an 
event occurs, given a certain probability and sample size, is governed by the binomial 
probability distribution. For events with probabilities smaller than .5, the binomial 
distribution is right skewed, resulting in most people experiencing the event fewer times than 
expected and fewer people experiencing it more often than expected. The majority of decision 
makers will thus give the event less weight than it deserves according to its true probability, 
because they experience the low-probability event fewer times than expected.    
The effect of limited information search on choice in the sampling paradigm is 
consistent with the underweighting of low-probability events: the less people search, the more 
likely they are to underweight rare events. However, it is unclear whether limited information 
search is sufficient to fully explain the description‒experience gap. One prominent position 
holds that it does (Fox & Hadar, 2006). According to this approach, participants use the 
observed relative frequencies to internally construct a description-like representation of an 
option, which is then subject to the same choice processes that operate in decisions from 
description. Consistent with this position, studies have found that cumulative prospect theory, 
the benchmark model of decisions from description (Erev et al., 2010; Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979), is relatively successful in describing choices in the sampling paradigm (i.e., choices 
based on the relative frequencies found in subjective experience), but entirely fails to describe 
choices based on the objectively true probabilities (Fox & Hadar, 2006). What is implicit in 
this position and specifically the reliance on relative frequencies, however, is the assumption 
that each of the outcomes experienced receives equal weight, regardless of when it was 
experienced. In other words, the argument assumes no order effects. 
Recency implies that observations made later in the sequence receive more weight 
than do those made earlier. When some observations are given more weight than others, this 
has the effect of reducing the effective sample size. For illustration, let us assume that all 
weight is placed on a subset of samples. In this case, the sample size will effectively be 
reduced by the number of samples receiving no weight. Thus, recency causes underweighting 
of low-probability events for the same reasons that limited information search does. 
Importantly, however, by reducing the effective sample size, the effect of recency is that of 
the effect of limited information. That is, even if the true probabilities are accurately reflected 
in the total sequence of samples, this will not necessarily be the case for the subset of samples 
on which choices are based. 
Like underweighting of small probabilities, weighting in the recency phenomenon is 
not directly measured; it is inferred from the pattern of choices. Specifically, when earlier 
samples indicate that one option is better but later samples indicate that the other is better, 
choices consistent with later samples are said to reflect recency. The debate as to which 
psychological processes cause recency—and indeed whether the phenomenon exists at all—is 
currently ongoing. The empirical findings to date are mixed (see Table 1). Some studies, 
including the original study by Hertwig et al. (2004), have shown recency. However, an equal 
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number of studies have found no effects, and a few studies have found choices to be more 
consistent with earlier samples, implying the opposite of recency, which is called primacy.  
 
Table 1. Summary of Previous Findings on Order Effects (see Appendix A for Study-by-Study 
Details)  
 Sampling type (n data sets)  







Recency 5 ‒ 3 42 
No effect 2 4 3 47 
Primacy ‒ ‒ 2 11 
 
Note. Free, matched and fixed sampling are variants of the sampling paradigm. Free sampling 
refers to the version introduced thus far. In matched sampling samples are not randomly 
generated, but from an underlying algorithm that aims to minimize the difference between the 
objective problems and the subjective experience. Fixed sampling includes all free and 
matched sampling procedures, in which the sample size is predetermined by the experimenter. 
Further explanations follow below in the text.    
 
To clarify the role of recency in the sampling paradigm, we reanalyze the existing data 
obtained using different variants of the sampling paradigm and different methods to test for 
recency. If our findings show that recency is a robust phenomenon across these conditions, 
then this indicates that decisions from experience and decisions from description are set apart 
by more than mere sampling error. If, in addition, we find evidence for one of the more 
psychologically grounded explanations of recency, this will call for the development of 
independent theories for the two information formats. Against this background, we next 
review the empirical evidence for three different theoretical explanations of the phenomenon 
of recency in the sampling paradigm: memory limitations, step-by-step belief updating, and 
optional stopping.  
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1. A review of previous explanations of and evidence for recency 
Explanations of recency in the sampling paradigm have focused primarily on the role 
of memory limitations (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Murdock, 1962). In particular, Kareev’s 
narrow window hypothesis (Kareev, 2000; Kareev, Lieberman, & Lev, 1997) assumes that 
inferences about multiple pieces of information are based on as many pieces as can be held in 
working memory at a single point in time. Because working memory is known to be limited 
(Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956), the narrow window hypothesis leads to the prediction that 
participants either constrain their sampling effort to their working memory capacity or 
consider only the most recently collected information in making their choice.   
 In support of the limited capacity explanation, Rakow, Demes, and Newell (2008) 
found that the length of information search was positively related to working memory span, 
suggesting that participants adjusted their information search to their processing capacities. 
Further, Rakow and Rahim (2010) found that children, whose working memory capacity is 
presumably not yet fully developed, showed more pronounced recency effects than did 
adolescents or adults. However, the evidence against a memory-based interpretation of 
recency in the sampling paradigm weighs heavier. First, Rakow et al. (2008 found that 
participants with different working memory spans did not differ in the extent to which they 
showed a recency effect. Second, other studies measuring working memory capacity have 
been unable to replicate a correspondence of working memory and search behavior in the 
sampling paradigm (Wulff, Hills & Hertwig, 2014a; Wulff, Hills, & Hertwig, 2014b). Third, 
studies that probed participants’ memory by asking them to estimate the observed frequency 
of outcomes after sampling found high levels of accuracy (Camilleri & Newell, 2009a; 
Lejarraga, 2010; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009). Last but not least, in variants of the 
sampling paradigm created to rule out the effect of sampling error, recency was found to be 
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substantially diminished. Table A1 in Appendix A presents these findings in detail. In 
matched sampling, where underlying algorithms ensure that the observed outcomes match the 
true probabilities, all studies that tested for recency failed to find an effect. In fixed sampling, 
where sample size is predetermined by the experimenter, findings were mixed, with some 
indicating recency and others primacy. The lack of recency in matched sampling is likely an 
inevitable consequence of the method, with no conceptual implications.1 Importantly, 
however, memory limitations should have been observed in fixed designs. Although Rakow 
and colleagues (2008) argued that liberating participants from terminating search may have 
reduced the necessary effort and, consequently, the constraining effect of memory, it seems 
more plausible that the role of memory limitation in the sampling paradigm is itself limited.  
 Another class of explanations focuses on the sequential nature of information 
processing in decisions from experience. Most prominently, Hertwig et al. (2004) proposed 
that recency may arise from a process of step-by-step belief updating. According to models of 
this class, new observations are not stored explicitly in memory, but are directly integrated 
with the running value of the respective option by means of an anchoring-and-adjustment 
process (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; March, 1996). Specifically, such models first determine 
the difference between the current belief, which serves as the anchor, and the new 
observation. They then update the belief by computing a weighted average of this difference 
and the current belief. As shown by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992; see also Anderson & 
Hovland, 1957), updating in this way always leads to recency if the new observation receives 
a weight larger than zero. What is appealing about this alternative explanation for recency in 
the sampling paradigm is that the mechanism is not assumed to be universally applied. 
                                            
1 Experiments using matched sampling may well have failed to find an effect because the 
hidden sampling algorithm ensures that all subsets of samples are equally representative of 
the underlying true probabilities, which renders the predictions of early and late samples 
indistinguishable (Camilleri & Newell, 2011b). 
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Updating in this way is thought to capture behavior only if participants engage in step-by-step 
processing of the observed information, which may be because they chose to or because they 
are required to provide intermediate valuations. Precisely this circumstance may reconcile the 
conflicting findings for free and fixed sampling. When sampling is free, and participants 
themselves decide when to terminate sampling, they are likely to form valuations of the 
available options during sampling to choose an appropriate place to stop. In other words, 
unless participants internally apply a fixed sampling regime, they need to assess whether they 
have collected enough information, most likely by repeatedly determining some utility and/or 
uncertainty measure for the available options (see Wulff & Pachur, 2014, for a more extensive 
argument). This reasoning clearly implies that self-terminated search requires some form of 
online processing, which could be implemented as a step-by-step belief-updating process. 
When sampling is fixed, however, and participants do not have to decide when to terminate 
search, they are free to merely observe the incoming information until they are required to 
make their choice. According to the belief-updating framework of Hogarth and Einhorn 
(1992), such end-of-sequence processing gives rise to primacy, rather than recency. This very 
freedom to choose one strategy or the other may explain why studies in which sample size 
was fixed by the experimenter found evidence for both recency and primacy.  
 Both of the explanations for the recency phenomenon presented thus far—memory 
limitations and belief updating—focus on what information from a sequence of samples is 
integrated, and how. A third, as yet unexplored explanation, is that the true reason for recency 
lies not in information processing, but in the process of information search. Investigating the 
reasons for relatively early search termination in the sampling paradigm, Hertwig and Pleskac 
(2010) argued that participants might capitalize on the fact that the expected absolute 
difference between the means of the observed options is larger for small than for large sample 
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sizes. In other words, people may restrict their search to a few samples because it makes 
choice easier. By the same token, it seems plausible that participants may also terminate their 
search when a choice appears easy. As we demonstrate in detail below, such optional stopping 
tendencies will show up as recency in all existing methods devised to test for recency. 
Importantly, because optional stopping requires the participants to terminate search 
themselves, this will play out only in free sampling, but not in fixed sampling. 
 To summarize, we have outlined three potential explanations of recency: memory 
limitations, step-by-step belief updating, and optional stopping. The mixed results for fixed 
sampling methods favor the latter two explanations. However, it remains unclear whether 
recency is indeed a robust phenomenon in the sampling paradigm and, specifically, whether it 
is predominantly found for free as opposed to fixed sampling (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In a 
first step to close this gap in the research, we next reanalyze all existing data sets using the 
sampling paradigm. 
 
2. A meta-analysis of recency in the sampling paradigm 
Data collection 
To evaluate the robustness of recency and test the proposed explanations of recency, 
we sought to collect all existing data sets using the sampling paradigm. To this end, we first 
searched through all articles that the Web of Science (Thomson Reuter’s) and Google Scholar 
(Google Inc.) identified as citing one of the three original articles addressing the impact of 
experience on risky choice: Barron and Erev (2003), Hertwig et al. (2004), and Weber, Shafir 
and Blais (2004). We found a total of 1234 articles. Of these, we selected all those that 
fulfilled the following criteria: (1) Prior ignorance: Prior to search, no information about the 
underlying probabilities was available. (2) Active search: Participants engaged in active 
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information search (i.e., participants’ behavior was the cause for the generation of individual 
draws from the selected options). (3) Inconsequential search: Aside from inevitable 
opportunity costs, the length or the order of search was not associated with either costs or 
benefits. (4) Probabilistic options: At least in the eye of the participant, the probabilities of 
the available options were distributed across at least two outcomes. Application of these 
criteria left us with a total of 27 articles. We contacted the authors of these articles to request 
the original data and obtained usable data for 23 studies. In three cases, the study did not 
record the sequence of samples drawn by participants. In one case, the data had apparently 
been lost. To obtain a comparable set of studies, we further reduced the set to studies that 
required active exploration of two two-outcome lotteries. This led to the exclusion of one 
study in which the number of outcomes per option ranged from three to five, and to the 
exclusion of two studies in which the risky option, but not the safe option, had to be actively 
explored. We further added the data from one unpublished study by the first and third authors 
(Wulff & Hertwig, 2014) that aimed to replicate the original study by Hertwig et al. (2004) in 
an online sample acquired through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010).  
The final set of 21 articles was then split into 53 units of observation for the analyses. 
Units were either independent studies within an article or meaningfully different conditions 
within a study. For instance, we separated out the subsamples in Frey, Hertwig, and Rieskamp 
(2014) in which different moods were induced prior to application of the sampling paradigm. 
In total, we identified 31 units using free sampling, 4 units using matched sampling, and 18 
units using fixed sampling. Table 2 gives an overall summary, and Table A2 in Appendix A 
provides details of the studies and the units, including the number of participants, the type of 
lotteries used, and the median sample size drawn by participants.  




Table 2. Summary of Data Used for the Reanalysis of Recency 
 Units Articles N  Participants 
N  
Trials 
Free 31 16 1611 12336 
Matched 4 2 226 977 
Fixed 18 5 688 2700 
 
Data analysis 
Four methods have been used to test for recency effects in the studies identified, three 
of them inferring recency from choice in similar ways. The general principle is this: If a 
choice is consistent with the better option in later samples, it is said to reflect recency. 
Analogously, if a choice is consistent with the better option in earlier samples, it is said to 
reflect primacy. Of course, this raises two questions: (a) What is considered to be the better 
option? (b) What counts as early and late samples? All three methods identify the better 
option as the one offering the higher mean in the respective subset of samples. The methods 
differ, however, in how they assign samples to early and late subsets. As illustrated in Figure 
1, the option-split method, which is predominant in the literature (see Table 1A), splits the 
samples option-wise. That is, the first half of the samples for each option is used for the 
primacy prediction, the second half for the recency prediction. The problem-split method 
splits the samples in half across the entire sequence. That is, if 12 samples were collected, the 
first 6 are used for the primacy prediction and the later 6 for the recency prediction. The 
switch-split method splits the sequence of samples along transitions (switches) between 
options. Samples around the first switch (i.e., all samples before the second switch) are used 
for the primacy prediction; samples around the last switch (i.e., all samples after the second-
to-last switch) are used for the recency prediction. 





Figure 1. Illustration of the methods applied to infer recency in the sampling paradigm. 
Primacy predictions are based on beige cells, recency predictions on turquoise cells. 
 
Despite their similarities, the three methods have different advantages and 
disadvantages. The option-split method is robust against variations in sample size; separate 
predictions can be made for recency and primacy for most sequences. However, it is highly 
sensitive to the order in which samples are taken. For instance, if a participant samples only 
once, the samples used to derive the primacy prediction for one option may have been 
collected after those used to derive the recency prediction for the other option. This issue is 
solved when samples are split problem-wise in the problem-split method. With this method, 
primacy and recency predictions are always cleanly separate from each other. The downside, 
however, is that it is only possible to make predictions for either recency or primacy if the 
participant switched only very few times. Finally, the switch-split method combines the 
virtues of the other two methods; it is computable for all sequences and nicely separates 
primacy from recency in terms of time. The problem with this method is that the number of 
samples used to derive primacy and recency predictions may differ drastically depending on 
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the switching pattern. See Appendix B for an algorithmic description of the three methods, 
including the handling of overlaps and failures. 
In the following, we use each of these methods to evaluate recency effects in the 
existing data. One reason we use all three methods is to test for robustness. If recency is found 
using all three methods, then its detection or lack thereof cannot be attributed to the 
downsides of any of the methods. Another reason is that the differences between the methods 
may help to illuminate previous findings in the literature. For instance, using the option-split 
method, Rakow and Rahim (2010) found that the degree of primacy was related to how 
frequently people switched between options during search. This finding might be explained 
by the fact that, in the option-split method, both recency and primacy rely on different subsets 
of the sequence for frequent and infrequent switchers. This suggests that the inferred order 
effect may not be found consistently across the methods. Moreover, Camilleri and Newell 
(2011b) found recency in a fixed design when using the problem-split method, but not when 
using the option-split method, suggesting that it is a sample’s absolute and not relative 
position that determines its weight. Finally, two articles have suggested yet another possible 
reason for the finding of recency, namely that participants perform a two-step exploration of 
the options, acquiring an overview of the options before actually estimating the probabilities 
of the outcomes (Camilleri & Newell, 2009a; Rakow et al., 2008). Such a two-step 
mechanism would presumably best be detected by the switch-split method, because the 
samples around the first switch would likely be used for exploratory purposes only. Thus, if 
participants do take a two-step approach, more extreme findings should emerge for the 
switch-split method than for the other two. 
A fourth method that has been used to test for recency is the value-updating model 
(VUM; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2006). It 
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differs from the previous three models in that it represents a more complex measuring model, 
allowing for more fine-grained differences in recency or primacy. It rests on the same logic as 
the option-split method. Where the option-split method weights the sample of one option 
according to a step-function ranging from 0 to 1, however, the VUM weights outcomes in a 
gradually increasing or decreasing manner. Moreover, instead of assuming particular weights, 
as done by the other three methods, the VUM can be fitted to the data. Clearly, the VUM has 
desirable properties. Because it is based on an option-wise assessment of recency and primacy 
that is already covered by the option-split method, however, we decided not to include it in 
the analysis. In contrast to results from the VUM, results from the option-split method are 
directly comparable to those obtained by means of the other two methods, predominantly 
because it also has no free parameters. 
Using the three methods—option-split, problem-split, and switch-split—we analyzed, 
for each individual participant and decision problem, whether the choice was consistent with 
the higher mean in samples assigned recency and/or in samples assigned primacy. For the 
statistical analyses, we then aggregated the findings on the level of participants, by computing 
the difference between the percentage correctly predicted by recency and primacy, 
respectively. For the display in Figure 2, we computed the same difference, but on the level of 
the unit.  
 
Results 
Figure 2 shows the results of our recency analysis. The top panel lists the studies that 
applied the free, matched, and fixed variants of the sampling paradigm, in the left, middle, 
and right column, respectively. The other three panels show the results for the three methods, 
in terms of the difference score reflecting the difference in percentage points between the 
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recency and primacy prediction. Values higher than 0 indicate a recency effect—that is, that 
recency accounted for more choices than primacy did—and vice versa. Each point represents 
a unit of observation; its color indicates the respective article. The gray boxplots to the left 
summarize the results for the respective combination of recency method and sampling variant.   
 
 
Figure 2. Unit-level results of the meta-analysis on recency. The top panel indicates which 
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other three panels show the results of the analyses for the three methods applied, separately 
for the three sampling variants. Points reflect unit-level difference scores that are summarized 
in the adjacent boxplot.  
 
Is recency a robust phenomenon? The results indicate that it is. The data collected 
under free sampling show that the majority of data points lie above 0, indicating a recency 
effect. In sum, the three methods led to a median advantage of 4.8 to 6.5 percentage points for 
recency over primacy across the three methods. Linear mixed-effects analyses that regressed 
the difference in percentage points for each individual on a general intercept, while 
accounting for repeated measurements at the level of the unit and article through random 
intercepts, indicated significant deviations from zero for free sampling in all three methods 
(see Table 3). The same pattern, but somewhat reduced in magnitude, was also found for 
matched sampling: Median advantages for recency amounted to 3.3 to 5.5 percentage points, 
which corresponded to significant deviations from 0 in the option-split and switch-split 
method. 
Critically, did the same pattern also hold for fixed sampling? No, the data indicate that 
fixed sampling led to neither a robust recency effect nor a primacy effect. On aggregate, the 
data indicate a meager advantage of 0.7 to 0.9 percentage points for recency, which did not 
correspond to a significant deviation from 0 in any of the methods. It must be noted, however, 
that fixed sampling led to considerably larger variation than did free or matched sampling. In 
themselves, individual units deviated clearly from 0, the point of indifference, particularly the 
units of Rakow and Rahim (2010). This finding may suggest that recency or primacy is 
possible under fixed sampling if certain conditions are met. On the other hand, the age groups 
in the three experiments that make up the units of observation in Rakow and Rahim (2010) 
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are comprised of relatively few participants relative to other units (see Table A2 in Appendix 
A), which may also account for the high variation in results for fixed sampling.  
 
 The analysis showed no clear evidence that the different methods led to different 
results. For instance, although the problem-split method made predictions for notably fewer 
cases (61% to 69%) than the other two methods did (89% to 97%; see Appendix B for details 
of strategy implementation), no marked differences between the methods were observed. The 
lack of an impact of the method used was further confirmed when we computed the results 
only for cases in which all three methods led to valid predictions. As shown in the last column 
of Table 3, this approach generally resulted in an increased recency effect, but it did not show 
that one method was consistently more sensitive than another.  
 




(acc. Fig. 2) 







Free Option-split 5.1 t(11) = 4.56 p = .002 92 8.3 
 Problem-split 6.5 t(24) = 5.40 p < .001 65 7.4 
 Switch-split 4.8 t(13) = 5.44, p < .001 91 7.4 
Matched Option-split 5.5 t(648) = 2.65 p = .008 97 6.9 
 Problem-split 3.3 t(188.9) = 1.68 p = .095 61 4.2 
 Switch-split 3.9 t(224) = 2.40, p = .017 96 5.8 
Fixed Option-split 0.9 t(648) = .18 p = .860 91 0 
 Problem-split 0.7 t(588.6) = ‒.15 p = .880 69 -2.6 
 Switch-split 0.9 t(4) = .26, p = .806 89 1.1 
 





Our analysis using three established methods to test for recency showed a robust 
recency effect for free and matching sampling, but not for fixed sampling. As has been 
speculated in the literature, recency thus occurs in the sampling paradigm only in self-
terminated search. When considering only the two classic interpretations of recency—
memory limitations and step-by-step updating—this finding must be seen as evidence of step-
by-step updating. If memory limitations were involved in producing recency, consistent signs 
of recency should also have been found for the fixed sampling variants. As additional 
analyses revealed, even in those studies that required participants to sample up to 80 to 100 
times (specifically, Camilleri & Newell, 20011a; Hau et al., 2008; Ungemach et al., 2009), an 
aggregate advantage of just 0.1 percentage points was found for recency by the option-split 
method. Thus, the argument of reduced effort in fixed sampling, which has been put forth to 
save limited memory capacity as a viable explanation of recency (Rakow et al., 2008), does 
not seem to hold either. 
Finally, we found no evidence for the two minor ideas that the absolute position of a 
sample is more important than its relative position, or that initial samples are discarded for the 
final evaluation, as implied by the proposed two-step exploration process (Camilleri & 
Newell 2009a; Rakow et al., 2008).  
 
3. Optional stopping as an alternative interpretation for recency 
 Before we can conclude that recency is a result of step-by-step updating, however, we 
need to address another interpretation outlined in the introduction: optional stopping. What 
distinguishes free from fixed versions of the sampling paradigm is not only that the free 
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version can be expected to elicit information processing before search ends, but also that 
participants can decide when to terminate search. Thus far, the literature on the sampling 
paradigm has largely neglected to consider when participants terminate search—as reflected 
by the assumption that the binomial distribution can explain the aggregate pattern of 
experiences due to limited search (Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). The 
binomial distribution only provides the probability distribution of the number of occurrences 
given a particular sample size. That is, in order to apply the binomial distribution, researchers 
need to presuppose a certain sample size, which translates into assuming that participants 
terminate search either at random (as explicitly assumed by Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011 or at a 
fixed, predetermined point in the sequence. Contrary to this assumption, however, research 
has found that sample size scales with the variance of lotteries, which implies that participants 
adapt their sample size as a function of what is observed (Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 
2012). In this case, which experiences lead to the termination of search? Neglecting variance 
sensitivity for now, one obvious possibility that resonates with the amplification effect 
proposed by Hertwig and Pleskac (2010) is that participants terminate search when the 
difference between options seems large. The amplification effect proposes that participants 
sample only little, because small samples tend to maximize the absolute difference 
experienced between options. Thus, if participants act to maximize the difference between the 
options, they may well do so by stopping when the difference seems large.  
 To see how optional stopping could lead to recency, let us consider a person who has 
experienced the sequence illustrated in Table 4 and is about to collect one more sample from 
option A. If she samples one more time, the most likely outcome is 4, which will, given that 
she was about to terminate search, probably amount in the choice of option A. But what if the 
other event occurs, and she makes the surprising observation of 0 in the last sample? What 
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will she do now? One possibility is that she terminates search nonetheless and chooses A, 
which is still the better choice in terms of sample means. In that case, her choice will be 
consistent with primacy. However, it seems much more likely that she decides not to 
terminate search, but to collect more samples. In that case, the outcomes of the additional 
samples will strongly influence her choice. Importantly, irrespective of whether the next few 
outcomes speak in favor of A or B, she will likely choose in accordance with them, leading to 
a choice consistent with recency. Thus, one way or another, recency will prevail if final 
samples that go against a previously formed opinion lead to more information search.  
 
Table 4. Exemplary Sampling Sequence for a Choice Between $4 with p = .8, and Otherwise 
Nothing, Versus $3 for Sure 
Option  Samples 
A    4 4 4     4 4 ? 
B 3 3 3    3 3 3 3    
 
Against this background, we conducted a simulation to test the effect of random and 
optional stopping on the results of the option-split method. Specifically, we generated for both 
sampling strategies 10,000 agents that each played the sampling paradigm six times, once for 
each of the problems introduced by Hertwig et al. (2004). To lend the simulation some 
realism, we implemented random sampling not according to a uniform distribution, but 
dependent on the number of samples collected so far. Specifically, an agent in the random 
sampling condition initially drew one sample from each option and then decided sample-by-
sample whether to terminate search according to: ! !"#$%&'!" = 1− !!.!" ,    (1) 
where n denotes the current sample size. This implementation not only reflected the heavily 
right-skewed sample size distribution found for empirical data, it also ruled out any 
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differences between optional and random stopping due to variable stopping points. For agents 
in the optional stopping condition, we based the decision to terminate search on the 
exponential choice rule (Rasch, 1980) that also eventually determines the agent’s final choice: 
 !(!ℎ!!"#!!) = 1+ !(!!!!!) !!,     (2) 
where !! denotes the sample mean for option A and !! the sample mean for option B. This 
rule, which is used by both conditions to terminally decide between the options, converges to 
a probability of 1 when !! grows relative to !! and to 0 when !! grows relative to !!. Search 
termination for optional stopping thus becomes more likely, the larger the differences 
between the options are. To prevent search being terminated each time the first two samples 
contain a positive value for one option and a 0 for the other option, we scaled the difference 
of sample means with n/100. The impact of the difference between sample means thus grows 
linearly with sample size, from 1/100 times the difference for a sample size of 1 up to the 
absolute value of the difference for a sample size of 100—by which time  most agents will 
have terminated search already. The process to terminate search thus first determines the 
probability that the agent would choose option A given the difference in sample means and 
the sample size (note that pB = 1‒pA):  
!! = 1+ ! !∗(!!!!!)!"" !!.     (3) 
The agent then evaluates the extremity of that choice probability and terminates search 
according to: ! !"#$%&'!" = 2 ∗ (max !!, 1− !! − .5),   (4) 
which is 0 when the choice probabilities for both options are identical and 1 when the choice 
probability for one of the options is also 1. Note that this implementation of optional stopping 
is consistent with example presented in Table 4, but not a verbatim reflection; we will return 
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to this issue in the Discussion. After search has been terminated, agents choose according to 
the probabilistic choice rule given by (2). 
 Figure 3 plots the results for random stopping and optional stopping alongside the 
empirical results of three studies that implemented the six Hertwig et al. (2004) problems in a 
free sampling paradigm (Hau et al., 2008; Hertwig et al., 2004; Wulff & Hertwig, 2014). 
Specifically, the figure shows the predictive accuracy of primacy and recency samples 
according to the option-split method. Random stopping clearly had no specific effect on 
recency and primacy. In line with our speculation, however, optional stopping had a 
pronounced effect, which lay in a similar range as the aggregate effect found for the three 
empirical studies. Thus, although previously neglected, optional stopping is a viable 
alternative account for recency in the sampling paradigm of decisions from experience.   
 
Figure 3. Results of the random and optional stopping simulation: predictive accuracies of 
primacy and recency predictions. The first two pairs of bars show the results of the 
simulation; the last pair shows empirical results from three studies using the same set of as 




























 In this investigation, we evaluated and interpreted the existing evidence for recency in 
the sampling paradigm of decisions from experience. To this end, we first identified 
previously reported findings and evaluated their implications for the two established 
explanations of recency: limited memory capacity (Kareev, 2000; Kareev, Lieberman, & Lev, 
1997) and step-by-step updating (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; March, 1996). Although the 
overall evidence was mixed, the type of sampling (i.e., self-terminated vs. fixed) appeared to 
play an important role. Specifically, individual studies indicated that recency occurs only 
when the decision to terminate search is made freely by participants themselves. To test 
whether this represents a general pattern, we compiled all available data obtained using the 
sampling paradigm in its three variants—free (self-terminated), matched, and fixed—and 
tested for order effects. The result was a clear recency effect for free and matched sampling, 
irrespective of which of three methods was applied to test for recency, and no recency effect 
for fixed sampling. 
 Together with the additional limitations highlighted in our literature review—in 
particular, the absence of an association between recency and working memory (Rakow et al., 
2008) and the finding that frequency judgments are, in general, very accurate (Camilleri & 
Newell, 2009a; Lejarraga, 2010; Ungemach et al., 2009; see also Zacks & Hasher, 2002)—
our results cast considerable doubt on the role of memory limitations for order effects in the 
sampling paradigm. Specifically, if memory limitations played a role in producing recency, 
one would expect signs of recency in the fixed sampling variants, especially given that some 
of the fixed data sets required the participant to sample multiple times (specifically, Camilleri 
& Newell, 2011b; Hau et al., 2008; Ungemach et al., 2009). 
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The step-by-step updating account is more consistent with selective recency for self-
terminated sampling. Drawing on the work of Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), we argued here 
and elsewhere (Wulff & Pachur, 2014) that the requirement to terminate search likely elicits 
information processes akin to step-by-step belief updating, whereas fixed sampling does not 
necessarily do so. Because step-by-step updating is believed to lead to recency under most 
conditions, whereas its counterpart, end-of-sequence processing, does not, this provides an 
attractive explanation that connects the fields of belief or impression updating with decisions 
from experience.  
Equally consistent, however, with the finding of selective recency is the optional 
stopping account introduced here. In its core, optional stopping proposes that recency occurs 
simply because participants stop sampling when the difference between the options is large. It 
represents a conceptually very different explanation to the other two (limited memory 
capacity and step-by-step belief updating) both of which explain recency on the level of how 
a given sequence is processed. Optional stopping requires no such assumptions. In fact, we 
would claim that any valuation mechanism, be it limited by memory or akin to a CPT-like 
evaluation, can lead to recency when search is terminated based on the same mechanism that 
is terminally used to make a decision. To support this claim, we repeated the simulation using 
utilities derived from CPT (based on the formulation and parameter values observed by 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and found identical results.  
Returning to the debate on whether decisions from experience, as exemplified by the 
sampling paradigm, and decisions from description require independent sets of theories, it 
thus seems that our investigation may not only provide answers, but also raises new 
questions. Clearly, recency is a robust phenomenon in the sampling paradigm. However, 
whether it implies that information processing takes different paths in decisions from 
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experience versus decision from description due to the format in which the information is 
available remains an open question.  
If optional stopping did prove to be the most plausible explanation of recency in the 
sampling paradigm, a new level of differences between decisions from experience and 
decisions from description would be introduced. One additional consequence of optional 
stopping must be that the experience of options is considerably distorted. Indeed, although we 
did not implement it in exactly that way, optional stopping in the sampling paradigm is 
essentially identical to maximizing a particular test statistic by optionally stopping in data 
collection (Berger & Berry, 1988). As optional stopping in data collection results in more 
extreme effect sizes, the differences between the experiences of the two options will also 
become more extreme. Because the possible outcomes are predetermined, more extreme 
observed differences must imply systematic deviations between the observed probabilities 
and the true probabilities.  
Unfortunately, optional stopping in the sampling paradigm is an elusive beast. We 
made several attempts to establish optional stopping with the present data; however, we were 
not able to arrive at conclusive results. One important reason for this is that optional stopping 
most likely depends on the preference structure of a given person, such as the degree of risk 
or loss aversion (Kahneman & Tverksy, 1979; Lopes & Oden, 1999). For instance, someone 
who is extremely averse to risks may take many more samples after a desirable rare event in 
order to reduce its perceived likelihood of occurrence. Someone with a greater tendency to 
seek risks, however, may stop at that point or take only a few further samples. Elsewhere, we 
present indirect evidence for exactly this behavioral pattern (Wulff et al., 2014b). This kind of 
preference-dependent optional stopping complicates matters, because it is impossible to tell 
whether a person stopped at a suitable point in time—where the options appeared sufficiently 
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distinct in respect to sample size—without knowing how that person evaluates the available 
options.  
 Additional analyses and, probably, additional data are thus needed to determine 
whether optional stopping or step-by-step belief updating provides the more plausible account 
of recency in the sampling paradigm. The two explanations are currently on a par, as both are 
equally consistent with the pattern of results presented here, but both are also purely 
hypothetical at the present point. One potential avenue to gain additional insights would be to 
analyze the relationship of switching patterns and recency. Rakow et al. (2008) have made a 
compelling argument that those who switch frequently between options engage in more step-
by-step processing. If future studies confirm such a relationship between recency and 
switching, it could be regarded as evidence in favor of step-by-step processing. With respect 
to optional stopping, future studies should attempt to measure the constituents of preference 
(e.g., risk and loss aversion) independently of behavior shown in the sampling paradigm. This 
would make it possible to evaluate whether participants are more likely to terminate search 
when, in their eyes, the options are more distinct. Moreover, it needs be considered that the 
exact nature of optional stopping may differ from the one implemented here. It is also 
possible to approach the process from the opposite angle by assuming that participants start 
out with a fixed sample size in mind and only decide to collect additional samples if they 
deem it necessary. Thus, optional stopping may in fact be “optional sampling.” Although 
generally consistent with our implementation of optional stopping, in which the likelihood of 
terminating search increased monotonically with sample size, optional sampling would be 
more discrete and harder to detect. Generally, we consider it highly important to address the 
possibility of optional stopping in future investigations using the sampling paradigm. For 
instance, another possible consequence of optional stopping or optional sampling might be 
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not only that aggregate properties of the options are falsely reflected in experience, but also 
that particular samples occur at nonrandom points in the sequence. Starting points for the 
development of models of optional stopping are given by recent research on self-directed 
learning (Gureckis & Markant, 2012; Markant & Gureckis, 2014) and hypothesis generation 
(Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Lange, Thomas, & Davelaar, 2012; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & 
Harbison, 2008). 
Last but not least, at least one limitation of this study warrants consideration. Although 
all studies included in the meta-analysis applied nearly identical methodologies, they used 
different manipulations and may also have differed in other relevant aspects (e.g., sample 
population, number of problems, tasks completed before introduction of the sampling 
paradigm). Importantly, not only was it impossible to balance the manipulations across the 
sampling variants, but the amount of data for free, matched, and fixed sampling also differed 
considerably (see Table 2). Both aspects could have influenced the pattern of results. 
Critically, however, the three studies with high fixed samples sizes did not involve a 
meaningful manipulation, but still failed to produce recency for fixed sampling (Camilleri & 
Newell, 2011b; Hau et al., 2008; Ungemach et al., 2009). While we see this as strong 
evidence against recency under fixed sampling, more data would be helpful, as would 
attempts to align the findings of the studies with respect to the manipulations used.    
 In sum, we have demonstrated that recency is a real and robust phenomenon in the 
sampling paradigm when, and only when, participants terminate search actively. We have 
also demonstrated that, alongside step-by-step belief updating, optional stopping is equally 
capable of explaining the current pattern of results, as both are consistent with recency in free 
sampling, but not in fixed sampling. We leave it future studies to judge which of the two 
provides the more viable explanation of recency. For the debate on the description‒experience 
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gap, our investigation highlights that decisions from experience, as implemented by the 
sampling paradigm, call for at least one additional conceptual ingredient beside limited 
information search. Whether or not this ingredient is an altered style of information 
processing due to differences in the formats of experience and description, however, depends 
on which mechanism proves to be the best explanation for recency. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, our investigation indicates that the role of memory in the sampling paradigm 
needs to be revised. The fact that the predominant computational models for the sampling 
paradigm—the primed sampler model (Erev et al., 2010) and the Instance-Based Learning 
model (IBL, Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011)—interpret recency as a function of memory highlights 
that some rethinking is required in the literature on the sampling paradigm of decisions from 
experience.  
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1st vs. 2nd half) 
Interpretation 
(as reported) Sampling type Notes 
Hertwig et al. 
(2004) 
Option-split 59% vs. 75% Recency Free Same data 
(VUM reported 
in Hertwig et 
al., 2006) 
Value-updating 
model φ = .29 Recency Free 
Rakow et al. 
(2008) Option-split 66% vs. 76% Recency Free  
Hau et al. 
(2008) Option-split 58% vs. 60% No effect Free  
Ungemach et al. 
(2009) 
Option-split 65% vs. 59% No effect Free  
Option-split 42% vs. 48% No effect Matched  
Camilleri & 
Newell (2009a) Option-split 56% vs. 61% No effect Matched  
Rakow & 
Rahim (2010) 
Option-split 69% vs. 55% Primacy Fixed Adults, Exp1 
Option-split 64% vs. 64% No effect Fixed Adolescents, Exp2 
Option-split 64% vs. 56% Primacy Fixed Adolescents, Exp3 




Option-split 50% vs. 56% Recency Fixed Children, Exp1 
Option-split 60% vs. 66% Recency Fixed Children, Exp2 
Camilleri & 
Newell (2011a) 
Problem-split 63% vs. 49% Recency Fixed Same data Option-split ‒ No effect Fixed 
Camilleri & 
Newell (2011b) 
Option-split 39% vs. 65% Recency Free  
Option-split 47% vs. 54% No effect 
Matched Same data (Exp1) Problem-split ‒ No effect 
Option-split 57% vs. 51% No effect 
Matched Same data (Exp2) Problem-split ‒ No effect 
Wulff et al. 
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Table A2. Units of Data Sets used in the Analysis Ordered by Year of Publication 







Hertwig et al. (2004) HBWE04 1 50 4G, 2L 4 3 Free 17.2  
Hau et al. (2008) HPKH 1 42 4G, 2L 4 6 Free 10.6 Study 1 
2 39 4G, 2L 4 6 Free 33.5 Study 2, High incentives 
3 40 4G, 2L 4 6 Fixed 100 Study 3 
Rakow et al. (2008) RDN08 1 80 9G, 3L 9 6 Free 15.3  
Camilleri &  
Newell (2009a) 
CN09a 1 80 4G, 4L 8 2 Matched 25.2 Frequency judgment after choice 
2 80 4G, 4L 8 2 Matched 27.2 Frequency judgment before choice 
Camilleri &  
Newell (2009b) 
CN09b 1 20 7G, 3L 10 10 Free 9.1 Experience first 
2 20 7G, 3L 10 10 Free 11.5 Description first 
Hadar & Fox (2009) HF09 1 23 2G, 1L 2 3 Fixed 20 Complete information,  
sampled amounts 
2 31 2G, 1L 2 3 Fixed 20 Incomplete information,  
sampled shapes 
3 30 2G, 1L 2 3 Fixed 20 Incomplete information,  
sampled amounts 
4 27 2G, 1L 2 3 Fixed 20 Complete information,  
sampled shapes 
Ungemach et al. (2009) UCS09 1 25 4G, 2L 4 6 Free 21.2  
2 25 4G, 2L 4 6 Fixed 21.2 Yoked design 
3 197 4G, 2L 4 1 Fixed 80  
Rakow & Rahim 
(2010) 
RR10 1 26 4G 4 4 Fixed 20 Study 1, 5‒6 years old 
2 25 4G 4 4 Fixed 20 Study 1, adults 
3 38 6G 6 6 Fixed 20 Study 2, 5‒6 years old 
4 37 6G 6 6 Fixed 20 Study 2, 16‒17 years old, experience 
first 
Note. Short: Abbreviation of the article used in Figure 2. N: Number of participants in the unit. Problems: Number of problems using gain 
(G), loss (L), and mixed (M) decision problems. Certain: Number of problems containing a sure event option.  
Table A2 continued. Data sets used in the analysis 
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Rakow & Rahim (2010) 
continued 
RR10 5 40 6G 6 6 Fixed 20 Study 2, 16‒17 years old, 
description first 
6 19 2G, 4M 6 6 Fixed 20 Study 3, 12‒13 years old, 
experience first 
7 20 2G, 4M 6 6 Fixed 20 Study 2, 16‒17 years old, 
experience first 
8 17 2G, 4M 6 6 Fixed 20 Study 3, 12‒13 years old, 
description first 
9 17 2G, 4M 6 6 Fixed 20 Study 2, 16‒17 years old, 
description first 
Hertwig & Pleskac (2010) HP10 1 88 8G, 4L 8 12 Free 10.9  
Lejarraga (2010) L10 1 85 4G, 3L 3 3 Free 35 Exp2, self-selected 
Erev et al. (2010) TPT10 1 39 20G, 20L, 
20M 
60 30 Free 10.5 Technion prediction 
competition, estimation 
2 40 20G, 20L, 
20M 
60 30 Free 13.7 Technion prediction 
competition, estimation 
Camilleri & Newell (2011a) CN11a 1 40 2G, 2L 4 4 Fixed 100  
Camilleri & Newell (2011b) CN11b 1 31 7G, 3L 10 10 Matched 10.1 Pseudo-random 
2 35 7G, 3L 10 10 Matched 11.6 Pseudo-random 
3 36 5G, 3L 8 8 Fixed 20  
Glöckner, Fiedler, Hochman, 
Ayal, & Hilbig (2012) 
GFHAH12 1 22 37G 0 37 Free 33.5 Eye-tracker, target problems 
2 22 22G 0 22 Free 28.8 Eye-tracker, filler problems 
Hills, Noguchi, & Gibbert (2013) HNG13 1 32 1G 0 1 Free 4.5 One-to-many 
2 32 1G 0 1 Free 5.5 Many-to-one 
Frey et al. (2014) FHR14 1 27 5G, 4L 5 9 Free 33.1 Mood induction: Happy 
2 28 5G, 4L 5 9 Free 30.6 Mood induction: Sad 
3 29 5G, 4L 5 9 Free 50.4 Mood induction: Fearful 
4 28 5G, 4L 5 9 Free 34.1 Mood induction: Angry 
5 23 2G, 2L 4 4 Free 51.2 Field: Dental surgeon 
Note. Short: Abbreviation of the article used in Figure 2. N: Number of participants in the unit. Problems: Number of problems using gain 
(G), loss (L), and mixed (M) decision problems. Certain: Number of problems containing a sure event option.  
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Frey et al. (2014) 
continued 
FHR14 6 26 2G, 2L 4 4 Free 4.9 Field: Comedy show 
Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, 
&Avrahami (2014) 
PHKA14 1 36 21M 0 5 Free 20.9  
2 142 21M 0 3 Free 1.7 Social competition 
Mehlhorn, Ben-Asher, Dutt, & 
Gonzalez (2014) 
MBDG14 1 294 8G, 8L 16 2 Free 3.5 Mechanical Turk 
Wulff, Hills, & Hertwig (2014) WHH14 1 41 16G 9 16 Free 19 Single-play framing 
2 42 16G 9 16 Free 24.9 Multi-play framing 
3 41 16G 9 16 Free 19.6  
Wulff & Hertwig (2014) WH99 1 59 4G, 2L 4 6 Free 15.3 Mechanical Turk, experience 
first 
2 78 4G, 2L 4 6 Free 10.7 Mechanical Turk, description 
first 
3 41 4G, 2L 4 6 Free 14.8 Mechanical Turk, experience 
first, US only 
4 40 4G, 2L 4 6 Free 8.7 Mechanical Turk, description 
first, US only 
Note. Short: Abbreviation of the article used in Figure 2. N: Number of participants in the unit. Problems: Number of problems using gain 
(G), loss (L), and mixed (M) decision problems. Certain: Number of problems containing a sure event option.  
 




The three methods used to test for recency were implemented as follows (see Fig. 1): 
Option-Split. Each option was split in half with respect to the number of samples 
drawn from it. For example, if six samples were drawn from one option, the first three 
samples were used for the primacy prediction and the second three for the recency prediction. 
If the number of samples from an option was uneven, the middle sample was used for both 
predictions. The primacy prediction was determined by calculating the means for the primacy 
subsamples of each option and selecting the option with the higher mean. If the means for 
both options were identical, no prediction was made and the case was excluded from the 
analysis. The recency prediction was determined analogously.  
Problem-Split. Each problem was split in half with respect to the number of samples 
drawn in total. For example, if 12 samples were drawn in total, the first six samples were used 
for the primacy prediction and the second six for the recency prediction. If the number of 
samples from an option was uneven, the middle sample was used for both predictions. The 
primacy prediction was determined by calculating the means for the primacy subsamples of 
each option and selecting the option with the higher mean. If the means for both options were 
identical or if samples were available for only one option, no prediction was made and the 
case was excluded from the analysis. The recency prediction was determined analogously. 
Switch-Split. For each problem, the transitions from one option to the other (switches) 
were determined. For the primacy prediction, all samples around the first switch were used—
that is, all samples before the second switch. For the recency prediction, all samples around 
the last switch were used—that is, all samples after the second-to-last switch. In cases where 
the primacy and recency subsamples overlapped, which occurred when participant switched 
exactly once or twice, the samples were used for both predictions. The primacy prediction 
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was determined by calculating the means for the primacy subsamples of each option and 
selecting the option with the higher mean. If the means for both options were identical, no 
prediction was made and the case was excluded from the analysis. The recency prediction was 
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What are the cognitive mechanisms underlying valuations based on sequentially experienced 
samples of an option’s possible outcomes? Ashby and Rakow (2014) have proposed a sliding 
window model (SWIM), according to which people’s valuations represent the average of a 
limited sample of recent experiences (the size of which is estimated by the model) formed 
after sampling has been terminated (i.e., an end-of-sequence process). Ashby and Rakow 
present results from which they conclude that the SWIM performs well compared to 
alternative models based on model selection criteria (value-updating model, summary model). 
Further, they report that the individual window sizes estimated by the SWIM correlate with a 
measure of working memory capacity. We highlight several problematic issues with the 
conclusions drawn by Ashby and Rakow. In a reanalysis of their data, we find no clear 
evidence in support of any of the models tested, but with a slight advantage for the summary 
model. Further, we demonstrate that individual differences in the window size estimated by 
the SWIM can reflect differences in judgment noise. Model recovery analyses reveal that the 
flexibility of the models tested by Ashby and Rakow depends on a complex interplay of 
sample size and noise, precluding unequivocal conclusions regarding the underlying 
mechanism on the basis of the data presented. We discuss several approaches to improve 
model comparisons in valuations from experience.  
Keywords: valuations from experience, active sampling, cognitive modeling, model 
complexity, monetary gambles.  
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Modeling Valuations From Experience 
When a valuation of an object is formed on the basis of sequential experiences, not all 
experiences with the object necessarily contribute equally to the valuation. Instead, more 
recent experiences tend to have a stronger impact than do less recent ones (e.g., Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). How can experience-based valuations, in particular potential recency effects, 
best be modeled? A common assumption is that more distant experiences have a gradually 
decreasing influence, in line with the idea that memory traces decay with time (Ebbinghaus, 
1885; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996). A prominent instantiation of this notion in decision research is 
the value-updating model (VUM; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2006), according to 
which a valuation v after experiencing n outcomes is determined as follows:  
!! = 1 − !! ! !!!! + !! ! !!.    (1) 
The parameter φ either gives more weight to earlier samples (φ > 1, primacy) or to later 
samples (φ < 1, recency), or weights all samples equally (φ = 1; for related models, see 
Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2006).1 
Ashby and Rakow (2014) recently proposed an intriguing alternative way of modeling 
a stronger influence of more recent experiences. Rather than assuming a gradually decreasing 
impact, they postulated an all-or-nothing mechanism that considers all experiences in a recent, 
typically limited window and that can exclude more distant experiences. Specifically, the 
sliding window model (SWIM) predicts that a valuation vn is formed by averaging ζ out of n 
total experiences xi:  
                                            
1 Consistent with the original specification in Hertwig et al. (2006), Ashby and Rakow (2014) 
applied a nonlinear transformation to the experienced outcomes (xn.88 instead of xn1). As we do 
not include this peripheral aspect of the model in our analyses for matters of model 
comparability, we display the model with linear outcome weighting. 
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!! = ! !ζ !!!!!!!!!ζ       (2) 
If the size of the window ζ is smaller than the total number of experiences n, the SWIM 
implements recency effects, by assuming that some (namely, n minus ζ) of the earliest 
experiences are completely dropped from consideration; all experiences within the window 
contribute equally to the valuation. This account of recency is in line with models of working 
memory that posit a fixed, limited storage capacity, and where an item is currently either 
activated in memory or not (e.g., Cowan, 2001).  
Ashby and Rakow (2014) highlighted that the SWIM should be interpreted as an end-
of-sequence mechanism, where an evaluation is formed only after the sampling process has 
been terminated. This deviates from the assumption in the VUM (and other models; e.g., 
Bush & Mosteller, 1955; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; March, 1996) of a step-by-step 
mechanism, where an evaluation is continually formed and updated on-line during the 
sampling process. (Hastie and Park [1986] made a related distinction between memory-based 
and on-line judgments.)  
Ashby and Rakow (2014) reported two empirical studies in which they pitted the 
SWIM against the VUM as well as the summary model (SUM; Hills & Hertwig, 2010; Wulff, 
Hills, & Hertwig, 2014), which calculates an average across all experiences (thus assuming no 
recency). They concluded “that for many individuals not all information is used and that the 
amount of information integrated is, in part, related to individual differences in cognitive 
abilities such as memory span” (p. 1160). This conclusion is based on several findings. First, 
the SWIM showed a better average fit on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 
1973). Second, the window size estimated for individual participants using the SWIM was 
consistently smaller than the average number of samples the participant had drawn. Third, 
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there was a higher correlation between sample size and response times for people better fit by 
the SWIM than for those better fit by the VUM or SUM, in line with the assumption of an 
end-of-sequence process (which predicts that the more experiences that can be retrieved, the 
longer the response should take). Fourth, for participants better fit by the SWIM, the 
estimated window size was positively related to working memory capacity, as measured by a 
digit span task. 
The SWIM represents an attractive addition to the growing literature on models of 
experienced-based judgment and decision making (e.g., Hertwig, in press; Hertwig & Erev, 
2009), and the empirical findings presented by Ashby and Rakow (2014) are intriguing. 
Moreover, the proposed all-or-nothing nature of the consideration of sampled outcomes has 
nice conceptual similarities with the limited capacity assumption in prominent conceptions of 
working memory (Baddeley, 2012), and thus promises to reinforce the link between decision 
making and working memory research. In this paper, however, we argue that the evidence 
presented may not yet warrant the conclusion that experience-based valuations are based on 
an all-or-nothing, end-of-sequence evaluation process, as assumed in the SWIM. 
In the first part, we critically reevaluate the model comparison conducted by Ashby 
and Rakow (2014), finding that if the data do support one particular model, it is the SUM 
(which assumes no recency at all) rather than the SWIM. We then show that under a process 
where all experiences contribute equally to a valuation, different amounts of noise are 
reflected in SWIM as different amounts of recency; it is therefore unclear whether individual 
differences in window size estimated by the SWIM indeed reflect the amount of information 
considered in the judgment—or individual differences in unsystematic responding. This 
possibility may complicate the interpretation of Ashby and Rakow that correlations between 
the SWIM window size estimates and working memory capacity support the specific 
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processes assumed by the model. Finally, we scrutinize the assumption of an end-of-sequence 
process on a conceptual level, pointing out that the requirement to conduct and terminate 
search actively must elicit some form of step-by-step process, which is at odds with the idea 
of a pure end-of-sequence process. 
In the second part, we examine valuations from experience and the proposed models 
with respect to two potential explanations for the inconclusive pattern of results presented in 
the first part: a mixture of different processes and low model discriminability. Finding 
evidence for both, we conclude that it is practically impossible to identify the underlying 
recency process when comparing the SUM, VUM, and SWIM on the basis of the design used 
by Ashby and Rakow (2014). Finally, we derive implications and suggestions for the study of 
valuations from experience that are relevant for the success of future investigations using this 
paradigm, but also for the field of experience-based decision making in general (see Hertwig 
& Erev, 2009).  
Reanalysis of Ashby and Rakow (2014) 
Model Comparison 
A key basis for Ashby and Rakow’s (2014) conclusion regarding the viability of the 
SWIM was its performance in a model comparison pitting it against the VUM and the SUM. 
The authors used two popular measures to evaluate the three models: the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) and the AIC. Both indices penalize for model 
complexity based on the number of free parameters.2 Ashby and Rakow considered two 
                                            
2 BIC approximates the marginal likelihood of the data given a specific model and AIC 
approximates the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the true and the evaluated model. 
Which of the two measures is to be preferred is debated (for overviews, see Burnham & 
Anderson, 2002, 2004; Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010; Vrieze, 2012). 
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aspects of model performance: the number of participants best accounted for by each model 
(according to BIC and AIC), and each model’s median and average (across participants) BIC 
and AIC. According to BIC, the VUM and the SUM performed best in Studies 1 and 2, 
respectively, in terms of the number of participants. According to AIC, SWIM accounted for 
the largest number of participants. However, statistical tests showed no significant differences 
in the percentages of best model fit for either BIC or AIC. Based on the average BIC and AIC 
values, SWIM emerged as the best model, although no attempt was made to substantiate these 
differences statistically.  
There are several issues with using the results of the model comparison as conducted 
by Ashby and Rakow (2014) to draw conclusions regarding the viability of a mechanism as 
assumed in the SWIM. First, the SWIM assumes a linear value function for the outcomes, 
whereas the VUM, as implemented by Ashby and Rakow, assumes a nonlinear value function 
(i.e., xα with α = .88). Moreover, the VUM allowed for primacy, whereas the SWIM did not. 
These differences complicate the recovery of the underlying recency mechanism because 
other, noncentral aspects may cause the model to perform well or poorly.  
Second, the models were not fit with equal precision. This issue concerns the two-
stage fitting procedure applied by Ashby and Rakow (2014). To simplify the estimation of 
parameters, they first determined the best fitting standard deviation of the noise distribution 
implemented to derive likelihoods, before then estimating the recency parameters and the 
maximum likelihood of the models. Importantly, this pre-estimation of the standard deviation 
was done using a model that equated to the SUM. This approach thus reduced the flexibility 
in the SWIM and VUM relative to the SUM, although all models were punished alike for 
estimation noise.  
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Third, the confinement of outcomes and valuations to the doubly bound interval 
between 0 and 4, as done in Ashby and Rakow (2014), strongly suggests the use of a 
truncated error distribution. However, Ashby and Rakow used an untruncated normal 
distribution to account for deviations from the models’ predictions. The consequence of an 
untruncated error distribution is that predictions close to the boundaries (i.e., close to 0 and 4) 
receive generally less weight, as in such cases greater portions of the probability mass are cut 
off by the boundaries.3 
To address these concerns, we reanalyzed the data of Ashby and Rakow (2014) using 
a more refined approach to model estimation and evaluation. Specifically, (1) we used a linear 
value function for all models, (2) we fitted two versions of the VUM, one allowing for 
recency only, which we refer to as VUMr (φ = [0, 1]), and one allowing for both recency and 
primacy (φ = [0, Inf]), (3) we estimated all model parameters simultaneously, (4) we used a 
combination of grid search and subsequent optimization using quasi-Newton minimization, 
(5) we used a truncated normal distribution to model noise and thus properly match the 
doubly bound valuation interval between 0 and 4, and finally (6) we used the AICc,4 which 
                                            
3 Furthermore, when we recalculated the models’ AICs using the fits reported in the 
supplementary material, we obtained somewhat different results. Specifically, it appears that 
Ashby and Rakow (2014) subtracted the penalty term of the AIC instead of adding it, which 
strongly favors the two more complex models, VUM and SWIM. When this is corrected, the 
SWIM is no longer superior. Additionally, there were some minor inconsistencies in the BICs 
and likelihoods. A recent erratum should, however, have corrected these issues. 
4 The AIC is known to penalize insufficiently for model flexibility at small sample sizes. For 
this reason, Burnham and Anderson (2002) have recommended the use of an adjusted index, 
the AICc, which corrects for this bias (for large samples, AICc approaches AIC) and is defined 
as follows:  !"#! = −2!" ! + 2k+ !!(!!!)!!!!! .      
with L being the likelihood, k the number of parameters, and n the number of data points used 
to calculate the likelihood. Given that each participant in Ashby and Rakow’s (2014) studies 
provided only a modest number of data points (valuations of 40 lotteries; moreover, for some 
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provides more accurate approximations of the Kullback-Leibler divergence for finite data 
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002) than does the AIC.  
In Figure 1, we first plot pairwise model comparisons of individual participants’ AICc 
values (results for BIC values are qualitatively the same). As can be seen, for three 
participants, the fit was much better for the VUM and SWIM than for the SUM, with AICc 
differences of 123, 217, and 387—far beyond the next biggest absolute difference of 18. We 
excluded these three participants from all following analyses (unless indicated otherwise).5 
 
Figure 1. Scatter plots showing pairwise model comparisons of individual participants’ AICc 
values. VUMr is the recency-only VUM with φ constrained to the interval [0, 1]. The white 
square in the upper left shows the majority of participants on a more fine-grained scale 
between 0 and 120. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
participants, trials were excluded), the AICc seems a more appropriate index of model 
performance in the present case.  
5 Further analyses indicated that the three participants excluded from the analysis provided as 
the final valuation the last observed sample in at least 95% of the lotteries (although these 
participants drew, on average, more than one sample before making a valuation). Thus, these 
participants are likely to have applied a qualitatively different strategy than assumed by the 
SUM, VUM, or SWIM, which provides further grounds for their exclusion. 
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Figure 1 also shows that the three models had very similar fits to the data. 
Summarizing this, Table 1 shows the percentage of participants in Ashby and Rakow (2014; 
aggregated across both studies) best accounted for by each model (including ties), separately 
for BIC and AICc. According to both BIC (which usually punishes more strictly than AICc for 
the number of free parameters) and AICc, most participants were best accounted for by the 
SUM. Table 1 also presents the mean and median BIC and AICc. These aggregate measures 
essentially show no differences between the models. 
 
Table 1. Model Fits Aggregated over Study 1 and 2 of Ashby and Rakow (2014). Shown Are 
the Number of Participants Best Fit by Each Model and Model Evaluation Criterion as well 
as the Mean and Median Criterion Value for Each Model. 
 BIC AICc 
 % best fit Mdn Mean 
% best 
fit Mdn Mean 
SUM 75 83.1 76.5 62 82.2 75.9 
VUM - 85 78.1 - 82.5 76.3 
VUMr 7 85.3 78.3 10 82.7 76.5 
SWIM 18 83 77.3 27 81.2 75.6 
Note. Calculation of the AICc led to an infinite criterion value for one participant, who appeared to have 
provided valuations for only three lotteries. We excluded this participant from the AICc results. 
 
 In sum, whereas Rakow and Ashby (2014) derived from their analysis support for the 
mechanism assumed by the SWIM, a reanalysis of their data using a more refined model 
comparison approach shows a rather different pattern, with model performance depending 
considerably on the measure used for model evaluation (proportion best fit vs. median or 
mean information criterion value). Overall, there is little evidence that one model consistently 
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outperforms another. Consistent with the original results and the fact that the BIC punishes 
more strictly for model complexity (Burnham & Anderson, 2004), SUM receives more 
support from the BIC than the AICc values. Inconsistent with the conclusions drawn by Ashby 
and Rakow, if the data do support one particular model, it is the SUM, which considers all 
experiences in the sample, rather than the SWIM.  
Interpreting Noise as Forgetting?  
Ashby and Rakow’s (2014) conclusion that valuations from experience (sometimes) 
follow an all-or-nothing, end-of-sequence process that considers only a limited number of the 
outcomes experienced was also based on findings beyond the results of the model 
comparison. First, the window sizes estimated by the SWIM were, on average, smaller than 
the number of samples drawn. Second, the estimated window size was related to a measure of 
working memory capacity, and this relationship was present for participants better fit by the 
SWIM, but absent for participants better fit by the VUM. This finding seems to support the 
interpretation that participants better fit by the SWIM integrate only as many samples as their 
working memory size permits. Third, in Study 2, participants better fit by the SWIM 
exhibited a more strongly positive relationship between window size and response time than 
did the other participants, as would be expected if the elements within the window were 
processed at the end of the sequence.  
 Assuming that at least some participants relied on a mechanism akin to the SWIM and 
were identified as such, a key requirement for this set of findings is that the window size 
estimated by the SWIM veridically reflects the number of experiences on which the valuation 
is based. As a critical test of this assumption, we simulated data using a special case of the 
SWIM where the true window size matches the samples. This allowed us to directly test 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 in Ashby and Rakow (2014), which propose that the window size should 
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undershoot the actual sample size as a result of memory limitations, against an alternative 
hypothesis that this undershooting occurs solely due to noise in the data. Note that the SWIM 
must underestimate the window size (on average): point estimates from noisy data will always 
err to some extent, and with ζ = n they can err only in the direction of smaller window sizes, 
not in the direction of larger window sizes.6 To examine the extent of this noise-related 
undershooting, we examined how accurately the SWIM recovered the true window size (= 
sample size) over increasing levels of noise. Specifically, for each of various combinations of 
sample size and judgment noise, we generated 1,000 agents completing the task that Ashby 
and Rakow (2014) gave their participants. These agents first took a fixed number of samples 
for each of the 40 lotteries and then provided valuations based on a truncated normal 
distribution centered on the respective sample mean. Each agent’s sample size and judgment 
noise were varied broadly, such that 95% of mean sample sizes and standard deviations found 
in the original data were covered (i.e., sample size = [1, 40] and σ = [.01, 1.15]). We then fit 
the SWIM to the each agent’s data using an untruncated normal distribution (see Appendix A 
for details). We chose to use an untruncated normal distribution to establish comparability 
with the window sizes reported by Ashby and Rakow (2014).7  
                                            
6 If a model has a free parameter and this parameter is estimated from data containing noise, 
then the parameter estimate will most likely deviate from the actual parameter value. If this 
parameter can err in both directions (i.e., be larger or smaller than the true parameter value), 
then the estimation can still be unbiased. If, however, a parameter can err only in one 
direction, as is the case for the window size parameter with true ζ = n, the estimator will on 
average not reflect the true parameter value, as it will be pulled exclusively to the one 
available direction. In the case of ζ = n, this means that the estimate of ζ is expected to be 
smaller than n. 
7 With a truncated normal distribution, the results became considerably more extreme. One 
explanation for the more moderate results for the untruncated normal distribution is this: The 
untruncated normal distribution punishes observations whose predictions lie close to the 
boundaries of 0 and 4, as greater portions of the error distribution for such values are cut off 
by the boundaries. Such extreme predictions are generally more likely for small window sizes 
than for large window sizes due to the law of large numbers and the specific problem 
structure used by Ashby and Rakow (2014). Thus, the untruncated normal distribution favors 





Figure 2. Window size estimated by the SWIM for various levels of actual sample size and 
different levels of noise (with the SUM as the generating mechanism). The red line represents 
the mean noise level for the data of Ashby and Rakow (2014). The dashed lines labeled by the 
model acronyms represent the mean sample size of participants best fit by the respective 
model according to the classifications made by Ashby and Rakow. 
 
Figure 2 plots the simulation results, showing the average estimated window size, as 
determined for data generated by the SUM, as a function of the sample size (i.e., the actual 
window size). The different lines represent different levels of noise (the standard deviation of 
the untruncated normal distribution). Note that the SUM is nested under the SWIM, because 
SWIM and SUM are identical for ζ = n. If the window size estimated by the SWIM (i.e., ζ) is 
a valid measure of the window size of experiences that underlie a valuation, the estimate 
                                                                                                                                        
larger window sizes and as such tends to lead to more moderate predictions that lie further 
away from the boundaries. 
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should coincide with the actual sample size (i.e., the line should lie on the diagonal). As the 
figure reveals, however, noise leads to a systematic underestimation of the actual window 
size. Note that this result obtains even though the implementation of the SWIM allows noise 
to be captured. The red line in Figure 2 shows the mean noise level estimated for the data of 
Ashby and Rakow (2014). For instance, when the actual sample size is 14 (roughly the 
average sample size reported in Ashby and Rakow), the estimated window size is, on average, 
11.6. Depending on the noise level, the average window size estimate when 14 observations 
contribute to the valuation can vary between 14 (noise = .01) and 9.8 (noise = 1.15).8 The 
finding interpreted by Ashby and Rakow in support of the SWIM that the estimated window 
size undershoots the sample size is thus not necessarily an indicator that only a subset of 
experiences are considered.  
The finding that noise can systematically influence the window size estimated by the 
SWIM thus calls for a reconsideration of the correlations between estimated window size and 
working memory capacity and response times reported by Ashby and Rakow (2014). Note 
that measures of working memory capacity can also reflect attentional control (Kane & Engle, 
2003; Kane et al., 2007) and correlate with measures of general intelligence (e.g., Ackerman, 
Beier, & Boyle, 2005). Therefore, the reported correlations with working memory capacity 
may simply be due to the fact that people with lower cognitive capacities have a tendency to 
respond less systematically.  
                                            
8 In an additional analysis, we determined the estimated window size from our simulation for 
the individual observed sample size and noise levels—that is, we matched each participant in 
Studies 1 and 2 to the conditions in our simulation that were closest in terms of sample size 
and noise level. The average simulated window size of 9.5 is very close to the reported 
estimated window size across both studies (window size of 9). Hence, individual differences 
in window size estimated by SWIM may actually reflect individual differences in the level of 
noise, rather than (or in addition to) actual forgetting. 
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Finally, if window sizes estimated by the SWIM are not necessarily a valid measure of 
actual information use, how is it possible to account for the finding that the reported 
correlations were mainly present for participants better fit by the SWIM? Here, another 
finding might provide an answer. Across both studies in Ashby and Rakow (2014), 
participants better fit by the SWIM drew substantially more samples than did those better fit 
by the VUM (see Fig. 2). Now note that the impact of noise on the amount of underestimation 
increases with sample size; specifically, the lines in Figure 2 are not linear, but deviate more 
from the actual window size as the actual sample size increases. To illustrate, with an actual 
sample size of 6 (the average sample size of the people best fit by the VUM), and a noise 
level of 0.8, the underestimation is 15% (5.5 out of 6), whereas with an actual sample size of 
16 (the average sample size for people best by the SWIM), the underestimation is 20% (12.8 
out of 16). As a consequence, for a given range of noise levels, the variability in estimated 
window sizes will be larger for large sample sizes than for small sample sizes—and thus also 
for participants better fit by the SWIM than for those better fit by the VUM. Consistent with 
this possibility, the variance of the window size estimates for the participants in Study 2 who 
were better fit by the SWIM (according to the original results) was larger than the variance for 
participants who were better fit by the VUM, with average standard deviations of 18.9 and 
4.4, respectively, F(15, 35) = 7.62, p < .001. The smaller variance for the participants 
classified as VUM users may thus have concealed the pairwise relationships between window 
size, working memory, and response times that were found for participants identified as 
SWIM users. That the relationship between working memory capacity and estimated window 
size was present in the latter, but absent in the former, does thus not necessarily mean that the 
two groups of participants relied on different processes.  
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 In summary, the potential confound of window size estimated by the SWIM and 
judgment noise along with the finding that model performance depends considerably on 
sample size challenge Ashby and Rakow’s (2014) conclusion in favor of an all-or-nothing, 
end-of-sequence process in valuations from experience.  
Conceptual Issues with End-of-Sequence Processing in Self-Terminated Search 
Beyond the statistical issues addressed so far, it is also instructive to assess the notion 
of an end-of-sequence evaluation process in valuation from experience on a conceptual level. 
In the sampling paradigm used by Ashby and Rakow (2014), participants sequentially draw 
samples from an initially unknown payoff distribution, and it is up to them to decide when to 
stop sampling. Should one expect decision makers to construct a valuation only after 
sampling has been terminated—as predicted by a strict interpretation of an end-of-sequence 
process? Note that, according to this approach, information processing takes place only after 
all information has been collected. This implies that a decision about the number of samples 
drawn should be unrelated to the sampled outcomes. Based on the evidence presented by 
Ashby and Rakow, however, this does not seem very plausible. In particular, sample size was 
found to be correlated with the variance of the lotteries (for similar findings, see Lejarraga, 
Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012; Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012): in lotteries with a larger 
variance, participants drew a larger number of samples. Clearly, in order for sampling effort 
to be sensitive to the characteristics of individual lotteries (e.g., their variances), some form of 
on-line processing has to occur.  
 Another reason that speaks against end-of-sequence processing is Ashby and Rakow’s 
(2014) finding that the data in the sampling paradigm display a recency effect (i.e., that more 
weight is given to more recent experiences; see also Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012; Wulff, 
Hills, & Hertwig, 2014). Reviewing studies with paradigms that encourage end-of-sequence 
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processing (i.e., where people were presented with a sequence of evidence and asked for an 
evaluation at the end of the sequence), Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) reported that 34 of 54 
studies (63%) showed a primacy effect, not a recency effect. Recency effects, by contrast, 
were found predominantly in studies explicitly enforcing step-by-step processing (in 20 of 22 
studies; 91%). Based on these findings in the literature on valuations from experience, if 
Ashby and Rakow’s participants had indeed relied on an end-of-sequence process, one would 
have expected a primacy effect to occur.  
Given that people are not explicitly instructed to conduct step-by-step processing in 
the sampling paradigm, one may ask what leads to reliance on such a process. One interesting 
possibility is that a step-by-step process is triggered by the requirement in the sampling 
paradigm for the decision maker to decide when to stop sampling (note that in typical end-of-
sequence studies, participants are presented with a sequence of outcomes of fixed length—
that is, they do not have decide when to terminate search; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). If this 
were the case, end-of-sequence processing should be more dominant in a modified sampling 
paradigm in which participants are presented with a sequence of outcomes of fixed length.  
Interim Summary 
 First, a more refined approach to the model evaluation conducted by Ashby and 
Rakow (2014) provided support for the SUM, rather than the SWIM. Second, under realistic 
levels of noise, the window size estimated by the SWIM substantially undershot the number 
of samples drawn, casting doubt on the conclusion that small window sizes reflect forgetting 
or constraints of working memory capacity. Third, the notion of a strict end-of-sequence 
process is inconsistent both with the finding of variance-sensitive sampling in the present and 
previous investigations (e.g., Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012) and with a large body of 
research on belief updating (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  
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 Despite a reasonably large sample containing 96 participants and numerous data points 
per participant, suggesting considerable power to identify the underlying mechanisms, none 
of the tested models received clear support. We next consider two candidate explanations for 
this result. 
What Underlies the Results of Ashby and Rakow (2014)? 
Individual Differences in the Valuation Process 
Our reanalysis of Ashby and Rakow’s (2014) model evaluation showed that most 
people were best fit by the SUM, but that the aggregate AICc and BIC values essentially 
showed no differences between the models. This finding suggests that some people may in 
fact have relied on processes akin to the VUM and the SWIM, while the majority relied on 
the SUM. One way to assess whether there is evidence for such a split in processes is to 
evaluate the evidence for the three models not on the aggregate level, but on the individual 
level. Another way to test whether classifications are valid is to inspect the sampling and 
valuation behavior of individuals with respect to their model classification. The previous 
analyses have highlighted that (a) noise levels were generally high and (b) model 
classification may hinge on the number of samples taken (see Fig. 2). Because none of the 
models is theoretically linked to high noise or particular sample sizes, findings indicating that 
those classified confidently exhibit peculiar behavior in terms of extreme noise or sample size 
may thus further qualify the classification.  
First, we assess the evidence based on BIC and AICc values on the level of the 
individual. To this end, we examine the evidence for the three models (i.e., SUM, VUM, and 
SWIM) using model weights. Model weights are defined as  
!! = !!!!!!"#$!!!!!!!"#$!! !,        (3) 
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where Δcrit is the difference of model M to the best performing model (among the set of 
competing models) on the respective information criterion (i.e., AICc or BIC; see 
Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010). Model weights vary between 0 and 1, with values of 1/Nmodels 
and 1 indicating chance and perfect performance, respectively. Model weights can be 
evaluated by evidence categories proposed for Bayes factors (Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 
1995; Wagenmakers, 2007), as both are directly related: 
!! = !!!!"!" = !!!!!!!(!"#$!!!"#$!),       (4) 
where BFMN denotes the Bayes factor for model M over a competing model N. Table 2 shows 
the evidence categories for the three competing models (adapted from Kass & Raftery, 1995). 
In extending the evidence categories to the comparison of three models, some rescaling was 
necessary to ensure that a Bayes factor of 1 equates to a model weight of .33, which denotes 
chance level. 9,10 
 
 
Table 2. Evidence Categories for Bayes Factors and Model Weights (Wm) for the Comparison 
of Three Models. Adapted from Kass and Raftery (1995, see also Wagenmakers, 2007). 
                                            
9 Because Bayes factors express the relative evidence for the comparison of only two models 
and not three as for our model weights, a simplifying assumption needed to be introduced to 
link the two together. We chose to assume identical Δcrit for the second and third best 
models. Thus, we linked a particular Bayes factor, say BF = 3, to the model weight that would 
be obtained if both the second and third placed models deviated from the best model by 
exactly the Δcrit that would lead to a Bayes factor of 3 in pairwise comparisons.  
10 Although these evidence categories originate from a Bayesian framework of model 
evaluation, we apply them to BIC and AICc alike. This is justified because model selection 
based on AICc, despite its information-theoretic origins, can be rendered perfectly consistent 
with a Bayesian analysis by assuming a savvy prior that reflects the number of parameters and 
data points (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). 
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Bayes factor wM Evidence 
1–3 .33–.6 Weak 
3–20 .6–.83 Moderate 
> 20 .83–1 Strong 
 
Figure 3 displays the model weights for each participant in both studies by Ashby and 
Rakow (2014), ordered by and highlighting the highest model weight for a given participant. 
As can be seen, model weights for the SWIM and VUMr vary considerably across 
participants, showing strong evidence for some participants and very weak evidence for 
others. Importantly, the model weights are at least moderate for the SWIM for only eight 
participants and for the VUMr for three participants, allowing an unequivocal classification of 
these participants to the respective models (for both BIC and AICc). Aside from these eleven 
participants, unequivocal classifications to either VUM and SWIM are not possible (given the 
level of evidence). Thus, participant-level model weights only appear to provide evidence for 
the use of the SWIM and VUMr in a few of the cases.  




Figure 3. Model weights for each individual participant in Ashby and Rakow (2014). Panel 
(A) and panel (B) show model weights calculated for BIC and AICc, respectively. Levels of 
evidence were adapted from Kass and Raftery (1995; see Table 2). 
 
For the SUM, on the other hand, many model weights indicate good evidence. Note 
that because the SUM is nested within the SWIM and VUMr, there is an upper bound on 
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model weights in favor of the SUM (.76 for BIC and .6 for AICc).11 Thus, although only few 
participants could be confidently assigned to the VUMr or the SWIM, the proportion of 
participants best fit by the SUM reaches levels close to the theoretical maximum. The analysis 
of individual model weights thus provides some evidence that participants may have relied on 
different strategies.  
Now we turn to the second analysis to assess whether some of those classifications 
have potentially been confounded with the behavior exhibited by the participants. To this end, 
we plot in Figure 4 the observed mean sample sizes against the estimated standard deviation 
of the judgment error distribution (based on the respective best fitting models); participants 
for whom the evidence for a respective model is at least moderate in respect to BIC are 
highlighted. The figure shows that the majority of participants identified as SUM users either 
sampled very little, or exhibited very high levels of judgment noise, or both. Under such 
conditions, it is questionable whether the SUM classification is valid, as it is unlikely that 
recency can take effect in so few samples. That is, a potentially true VUMr or SWIM with 
recency may not have been able to influence data such that it could be recovered. Importantly, 
11 participants sampled only once at every lottery, rendering the superiority of the SUM a 
statistical necessity in these cases (as recency was impossible). Similar reservations hold for 
very high levels of judgment noise. For a different set of 11 participants, the estimated noise 
level was so high (larger than 1.15) that basically all possible valuations (ranging between 0 
and 4) were equally likely. In these cases, the SUM necessarily wins because all models fit 
equally poorly and the SUM is punished less severely for its number of free parameters.  
                                            
11 The fact that the SUM is nested within the VUMr and SWIM allows the VUMr and SWIM 
to fit the data equally well. This naturally reduces possible differences on AICc and BIC to the 
value the respective criteria assigned to having one additional parameter (i.e., about 2.22 for 
the AICc and 3.69 for the BIC, based on 40 data points). The model weights resulting from 
these values, .6 for AICc and .76 for BIC, place upper bounds for all model weights in favor 
of the SUM. 




Figure 4. Sample size and judgment noise measured as the estimated standard deviation under 
the best fitting model for the participants in both studies by Ashby and Rakow (2014). Colors 
show model classifications based on at least moderate evidence provided by model weights 
calculated for BIC. 
 
In sum, many participants who seriously explored the lotteries (as indicated by sample 
sizes larger than 1) and whose valuations exhibited some correspondence to the experienced 
mean (as indicated by standard deviations smaller than 1.1) could not be classified as relying 
on one of the three tested valuation processes (although we used the rather lenient criterion of 
at least moderate evidence in BIC-based model weights). Thus, the analysis of individual 
model weights supported the hypothesis that participants may have relied on different 
processes. However, it also failed to provide clear evidence for one of the models in terms of 
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discrimination between models is generally hampered due to lack of information in the data 
and complexity differences in the models.  
Model Complexity 
The ability to discriminate between models and thus the ability to identify the 
underlying process depends on the design, the data created by it, the set of models under 
consideration, and the measures used to assess their performance. To enable discrimination 
between models, a design must generate data such that the models often make different 
predictions. For valuations from experience using the sampling paradigm, this is difficult to 
achieve, as people’s active search can lead to uninformative data when search is terminated 
before more than two different outcomes have been observed. If search is stopped after only 
one outcome has been sampled, then no matter how models are compared, it is impossible to 
discriminate between them. To illustrate, with the two-outcome lotteries used by Ashby and 
Rakow (2014) and the observed distribution of mean sample sizes over both studies, this 
occurred in 34% of trials (matching its expectation of 32% as determined by simulation). 
More importantly, for participants who sampled no more than twice (on average), it is 
expected to happen in almost 89% of trials. Hence, for these participants, only 4 of the 40 
lotteries can be used to potentially discriminate between the models. But even if two or more 
different outcomes are observed, the sequence of samples can still make it impossible to 
discriminate between models—for instance, when outcomes are relatively evenly 
distributed.12  
                                            
12 When outcomes are distributed relatively evenly across the sequence, different degrees of 
recency, no recency, or primacy will lead to very similar valuations. For illustration, the 
sequence {1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1} will lead to highly similar predictions irrespective of whether, 
for instance, the valuation is based on the three most recent outcomes alone (as in the SWIM), 
or on a gradual weighting over all outcomes (as in the VUMr). In the context of the SWIM, it 
is, analogously, very difficult to discern which subset of the sequence underlies the valuation. 
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Model discrimination can also fail for reasons lying within the formulation of the 
models. For the present analysis at least two issues deserve mentioning. First, all three models 
predict the expected value of the lottery. Due to the law of large numbers, the models will 
thus make increasingly similar predictions with growing sample sizes.13 Because models 
making identical predictions can be distinguished only on the basis of the number of 
parameters, the SUM is increasingly likely to emerge as the winner as sample size goes up. 
Second, the complexity of the VUMr and the SWIM clearly depends on the sample size. To 
illustrate, in the simple case of just two observed values, e.g., {1, 3}, the VUMr can perfectly 
fit any valuation between 2 and 3 by shifting the φ-parameter between 0 and 1. The SWIM, 
on the other hand, can only make exactly two predictions with two samples, i.e., 2 (ζ = 2) and 
3 (ζ = 1). For very small sample sizes, the VUMr can thus be expected to perform much better 
in fitting empirical data than the SWIM. For large sample sizes, however, the reverse may be 
true. The VUMr is required to use all samples for any φ larger than 0, which may place a 
large restriction on the range of valuations it can fit. Due to its ability to ignore entire subsets 
of the data, the SWIM may prove to be more flexible here.  
To examine the extent to which each of the models can nonetheless be correctly 
identified, we conducted a model recovery analysis based on the setup of Ashby and Rakow 
(2014). Specifically, we simulated 1,000 agents for every combination of 20 levels of sample 
size and 20 levels of judgment noise (size = [2, 40], noise = [.2, 1.1], both covering 95% of 
                                            
13 For the VUMr and SUM, this holds immediately. For any given recency parameter that is 
larger than 0, the prediction of the VUMr will approach the prediction of the SUM with 
increasing sample size. For the SWIM, the same holds when recency in the SWIM is 
conceptualized to be proportional to the total sample size. Although not explicitly formulated 
in that way, the high positive correlation between window size and sample size reported by 
Ashby and Rakow (2014) suggests such a proportional relationship. The convergence in the 
limit implies that recency mechanisms are less likely to be detected for larger sample sizes, 
because under these circumstances the predictions of the simpler SUM will lie closer to those 
of the VUMr and SWIM. 
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the observed values) for each of the models as the generating process. For the VUM and the 
SWIM, we assumed levels of recency that match the median parameter estimates obtained 
from the Ashby and Rakow data (VUMr: φ = .77; SWIM: ζ/n = .73). Given the empirical 
finding that window and sample sizes are strongly correlated, for the SWIM the window size 
producing the valuation was determined as a fraction of the agent’s sample size. We then fit 
the SUM, VUMr, and SWIM to each agent’s data, and recorded their relative performance in 
terms of model weights based on AICc and BIC. 
Figure 5 shows median model weights for the three models when the SUM (upper 
panel), the VUMr (middle panel), or the SWIM (lower panel) was the generating mechanism, 
separately for the different levels of noise (shown on the x-axis). The line types and 
transparent shapes illustrate the effect of varying sample sizes. The dashed and solid lines 
represent mean sample sizes of 2 and 40, respectively. The transparent shapes illustrate the 
range (minimum to maximum) of observed median model weights for mean sample sizes 
between 4 and 38. The white background highlights the range that covers 90% of the 
observed noise levels for the participants in both studies by Ashby and Rakow (2014).  
As evidenced by many misclassifications, the results in Figure 5 highlight that using 
the Ashby and Rakow (2014) design to identify the underlying model for valuations from 
experience can be a rather thorny endeavor. Specifically, model recovery not only seems 
error-prone, but its accuracy seems to differ considerably across the models and to depend on 
the behavior of the agents. First, for the vast majority of conditions implemented in our 
simulation, the SWIM appears to be more flexible than the VUMr, particularly when the 
sample size of observations is large. As a result, valuations generated by the VUMr are more 
likely to be incorrectly attributed to the SWIM than vice versa. The only exceptions occurred 
with a sample size of 2, due to the fact that the VUMr can perfectly mimic the two possible 
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predictions of the SWIM for a sample size of 2 (by assuming φ = 1 or φ = 0). Second, with 
that same exception, the true model is generally much better identified when sample size is 
small. This implies that nondiagnostic data, which are more likely to occur for small samples, 
present a smaller problem than the issues of sample size-dependent flexibility and converging 
predictions between the SUM, VUMr, and SWIM for increasing sample sizes. Importantly, 
this further implies that the observed inaccuracies cannot be easily solved by design 
improvements—for instance, by increasing the number of problems or forcing people to 
sample more. Instead, this finding calls for methods that properly account for the models’ 
actual flexibility, an issue to which we return later.  
 




Figure 5. Model recovery as a function of criterion, judgment noise (standard deviation), and 
sample size. Panels in the upper, middle, and lower rows show the fits for data generated by 
the SUM, VUMr, and SWIM, respectively. Panels on the left show fits expressed as median 
model weights based on BIC; panels on the right, based on AICc. The solid lines indicate the 
performance for a sample size of 2; the dashed lines, for a sample size of 40. The transparent 
shapes show the range of performance for mean sample sizes between 4 and 38. 
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In sum, based on the results of the model recovery, we can conclude that it was not 
SUM alone that generated the data in Ashby and Rakow’s (2014) studies—otherwise, as can 
be seen from the recovery analysis for the SUM, it would have been the clearly dominating 
model for every participant. However, it is nearly impossible to discern whether few, some, or 
all participants actually relied on the SUM, the VUM or the SWIM. Thus, any conclusion 
regarding whether the SUM, the VUM, or the SWIM is the best model that is drawn on the 
basis of Ashby and Rakow’s study design and standard indices such as BIC and AIC/AICc 
must be treated with great caution.  
Challenges for Studying and Modeling Valuations from Experience 
Reducing Noise, Improving Fit 
Our analyses highlighted that it was often virtually impossible to infer whether 
participants relied on the SUM, VUM, or SWIM in the Ashby and Rakow (2014) data. The 
foremost reason was very high levels of noise. Future studies should thus aim to identify the 
source of noise and attempt to reduce it.  
One way to achieve this would be to make sure that participants completely 
understand the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964), 
an issue that has been discussed in the pertinent literature (Irwin et al., 1998; Krahnen, Rieck, 
& Theissen, 1997; James, 2007; Safra, Segal, & Spivak, 1990). Given that noise reflects 
unsystematic behavior, another avenue would be to test the use of other noise distributions 
(e.g., a beta distribution or Student’s t distribution) that can handle extreme valuations more 
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easily.14 Moreover, judgment noise has also sometimes been found to depend on the lottery 
(e.g., Stott, 2006); the precision of a model might thus be improved by implementing noise 
such that it is sensitive to the characteristics of a lottery (e.g., its variance), rather than 
assuming a constant error. 
 However, the sheer magnitude of noise found for the Ashby and Rakow (2014) data 
suggests the existence of factors beyond unsystematic behavior (i.e., a trembling hand). To 
illustrate this, we plot in Figure 6 the predicted distribution of valuations for the SUM under 
noise levels matching the first, second, and third quartile found in the data. Clearly, with such 
noise levels, many valuations are rendered consistent with the model. This implies in turn that 
many marked deviations from the models’ predictions had to be accommodated, which led to 
increased standard deviations. In fact, the mean absolute deviations for the best fitting models 
across all valuations amounted to .73 for the SUM, .67 for the VUM, and .66 for SWIM.  
                                            
14 We tested a beta, truncated t distribution in two parameterizations (t1: μ and ν; t2: μ and σ 
with ν = 1) and found that the beta based on maximum likelihood outperformed the t and 
normal distributions for the data of Ashby and Rakow (2014).  
 




Figure 6. Illustration of judgment noise for noise levels matching the first, second, and third 
quartile of the noise levels found for the Ashby and Rakow (2014) data for a mean prediction 
of 1.78, which is the expectation across all lotteries.  
 
Future studies should thus attempt to reduce noise by improving the models. In so 
doing, it is important to consider that both subjective expected utility and memory-based 
recency have found various formalizations in recent literature. For the sake of simplicity and 
to match Ashby and Rakow’s (2014) investigation, we have not parameterized weighting of 
probability and outcome. Clearly, including parameters for outcome and probability 
transformations may help increase the fit of the models to the data (Fox & Poldrack, 2009; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Similarly, we have not attempted to implement other forms of 
recency. Particularly promising would be the construction of a valuation of experience model 
based on ACT-R principles (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; see, e.g., Erev et al., 2010; Gonzales 
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implemented here, ACT-R offers a process informed by memory research, in which the 
retention and hence the utilization of a sample is a function not only of its absolute position, 
but also of its relative position to other sampled outcomes. 
Another potentially relevant set of strategies may be given by the three participants 
excluded at the outset of our reanalysis of the Ashby and Rakow data (2014). Those three 
participants reported one of the observed values in almost all trials, despite sample sizes 
larger than one. Future studies should also consider that the reliance on the SUM, VUM, and 
SWIM or any other strategy may change from trial to trial.  
Active Sampling 
 Yet, for at least three reasons, the most important aspect in understanding valuations 
from experience is the participant’s active role in sampling. First, by requiring a person to 
decide when to stop sampling, active sampling requires processing of the sampled 
information during sampling, as evidenced by the correlation of variance and sample size 
(Ashby & Rakow, 2014; Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012). Such on-line processing is probably 
not independent of the processes recruited to form a final valuation. Rather it can be assumed 
to either inform or replace final end-of-sequence processes.  
Second, if people are free to sample as much or as little as they want, leading to 
individual variability as well as variability across trials in search, it can be very difficult to 
correctly identify the underlying processes in valuations from experience. As shown for the 
VUM and the SWIM, the amount of sampling can affect the relative complexity of models 
(Grünwald, Myung, & Pitt, 2005). As a consequence, one model can outperform the other for 
small sample sizes, but be outperformed for large sample sizes, relatively irrespective of 
which of the two is the true underlying process. 
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Finally, active sampling hampers the recovery of the underlying processes in 
valuations from experience by affecting the diagnosticity of the data. If a person samples only 
a few times, the chances are high that only one of the lotteries’ outcomes is observed, which 
renders predictions of the models identical and their discrimination impossible. Problems also 
arise if a person samples too many times. Models such as the SUM, VUM, and SWIM with 
identical expectations will converge in their prediction when sample size gets large, resulting 
in the same problem as for model discrimination. In addition, the stochastic aspect of 
sampling can render sequences of any length more or less informative for a given set of 
models. For instance, sequences in which outcomes are relatively evenly or symmetrically 
distributed are consistent with recency and primacy of the same degree, and will likely fail to 
result in different predictions for all-or-nothing versus gradual forms of recency, as 
implemented by the SWIM and VUM, respectively.  
In sum, active sampling strongly influences the psychological processes involved, as 
well as the methods applied to uncover them. The statistical issues can largely be addressed 
by more advanced designs and methods. We highlight potential measures in the next section. 
The impact of active sampling on the cognitive process triggered, however, needs to be 
considered theoretically. A useful starting point is given by recent research on self-directed 
learning (Gureckis & Markant, 2012; Markant & Gureckis, 2014). This research aims to 
explain why and how active information search (as opposed to passive observation) can lead 
to different and often better performance (e.g., in category learning). Recent attempts to 
model the process of hypothesis generation during the processing of fixed sequences of 
information may be equally relevant (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Lange, Thomas, & Davelaar, 
2012; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008). 
Improving Model Discriminability 
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We see three avenues for improving experimental designs testing models of valuations 
from experience. First, a larger number of lotteries could be used, as this will increase the 
chance of observing diagnostic sequences. Second, participants could be motivated to sample 
more (to increase the chance of observing more than one outcome or reducing convergence in 
predictions), for instance, by means of incentives (see Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 
2008). Third, instead of using the common two-outcome lottery, researchers could use multi-
outcome or even continuous lotteries (Wulff et al., 2014). This will not only reduce the 
occurrence of sequences in which the same outcome is drawn multiple times, but also 
increase the richness of sequences of all lengths. Naturally, all three measures may change 
participants’ behavior in complex ways. 
To address the issue of model discriminability, future investigations should consider 
applying more advanced model comparison methods, such as Bayes Factors (BF; Kass & 
Raftery, 1995; see Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2013, for practical 
applications) or Normalized Maximum Likelihood (NML; Myung, Navarro, & Pitt, 2005; see 
Kellen, Klauer, & Bröder, 2013). These methods are better able than comparisons based on 
BIC and AIC to take model complexity into account. In fact, BIC and AIC are constrained 
solutions of the Bayesian and information theoretical frameworks, respectively. Admittedly, 
applying BF and NML can be difficult, as computing the marginal likelihood (for BF) 
requires integration over the parameter space, and determining model complexity (for NML; 
Grünwald et al., 2005) requires integration over the data space. Approximate methods have 
been developed (Gamerman & Lopes, 2006; Grünwald et al., 2005; Kass & Raftery, 1995).  
Complementing these formal approaches, Monte Carlo methods similar to the 
approach taken in this paper have been developed to shed light on model mimicry, recovery, 
and optimal study design (e.g., Navarro, Pitt, & Myung, 2004; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, 
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Gomez, & Iverson, 2004). One particularly intuitive and easily implemented method is 
landscaping (Navarro et al., 2004). Similar to a model recovery approach, landscaping 
addresses the issue of model complexity by evaluating a model’s performance on real data 
relative to its performance on data generated by multiple models under many different 
parameter combinations. Importantly, Navarro and colleagues (2004) have also demonstrated 
how this method can be applied to assess the discriminability of design variants. Thus, future 
studies could assess the impact of our suggestions for design improvement without collecting 
actual data, while at the same time properly controlling for the models’ true complexity.  
Conclusion 
With the SWIM, Ashby and Rakow (2014) proposed an interesting alternative to the 
traditional approach to model recency in valuations from experience, and its assumption that 
more distance experiences have a gradually decreasing influence on the valuation of an 
object. We welcome their proposal as it highlights the overdue need to develop and rigorously 
compare models of experience-based judgment and decision making. To this end, our analysis 
highlights a number of challenges in current approaches to testing and implementing models 
of valuations from experience. We suggest several improvements to address these challenges, 
some of which will admittedly not be easy to implement in every situation. We nevertheless 
hope that future research will take up the challenge, as active information search prior to 
valuation or choice is a ubiquitous real world scenario. 
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Monte Carlo Simulation and Model Recovery 
Simulations were based on the following data generation and estimation procedures. 
Data Generation 
For each in a set of lotteries—in Ashby & Rakow (2014), the set was 40 lotteries—a 
simulated participant first drew n samples. A valuation for the current lottery was then 
determined based on the sampled outcomes according to the generating model. The valuation 
resulted from a draw from a normal distribution that was truncated to prevent valuations 
smaller than 0 or larger than 4, with a mean equaling the prediction of the generating model 
and a standard deviation that was a function of the respective noise level, v ~ Ntrunc(vmodel, 
σnoise). To match the modeling in Ashby and Rakow, we assumed noiseto be constant across 
the lotteries.  
Parameter Estimation 
The models were fitted to the valuation for each simulated participant by maximizing 
log-likelihood over all J lotteries using a normally distributed noise: 
!! = log! !! !!!! !!!! !!!!!! !! !,!!,! !! !,!!,!      (A1) 
with mj being the predicted valuation of the model, vj being the data, and Φ being the 
cumulative normal probability distribution. VUM and SWIM were implemented as defined in 
Equations 1 and 2. The predicted valuation of SUM at the nth sample, based across all n 
samples, was defined as 
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!! = ! !! !!!! .      (A2) 
The VUM parameters σ and θ (see Equation 1) were jointly estimated using R (R Core Team, 
2013) via a quasi-Newton minimization procedure from the PORT library (Fox, 1997). The 
same approach was applied for the SUM. To estimate the SWIM parameters, we used a 
different approach, as stable estimates were obtained only when the starting points for the 
window size were close to the true window size. Instead, we performed an exhaustive search 
for the window size θ and optimized the LL for each discrete value of θ to find the optimal 
value of σ, again using PORT routines. In the rare cases (less than 1% of runs) in which 
multiple window sizes led to the same optimal fit, the smaller value was chosen as it 
represents a more conservative assumption. To avoid local minima, we repeated the fitting for 
several start values for σ and θ. 
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Abstract 
To what extent do people adapt their information search policies and subsequent decisions 
to the long- and short-run consequences of choice environments? To address this question, 
we investigated exploration and exploitation policies in choice environments that involved 
single or multiple plays. We further compared behavior in these environments with behavior 
in the standard sampling paradigm. Frequently used in research on decision from 
experience, this paradigm does not explicitly implement the choice in terms of the short or 
long run. Results showed that people searched more in the multi-play environment than in 
the single-play environment. Moreover, the substantial search effort in the multi-play 
environment was conducive to choices consistent with expected value maximization, 
whereas the lesser search effort in the single-play environment was compatible with the goal 
of minimizing the risk of winning nothing. Furthermore, choice and search behaviors in the 
sampling paradigm predominantly echoed those observed in the single-play environment. 
This suggests that, when not instructed otherwise, participants in the sampling paradigm 
appear to favor search and choice strategies that embody short-run aspirations. Finally, the 
present findings challenge the revealed preference approach in decisions from experience, 
while also suggesting that information search may be an important and potentially even 
better signal of preference or aspirations than choice. 
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1. Introduction 
Choices between uncertain options can be interpreted as representing either one-shot or 
repeated decisions. A lottery ticket, for instance, represents a single-play decision; its entry 
price entitles the player to exactly one play of the lottery. A choice to buy car insurance, on 
the other hand, guarantees against repeated plays of a gamble that is realized each time the car 
is driven. More generally, decisions to buy products that will be consumed either once (e.g., a 
dinner in a gourmet restaurant) or many times (e.g., a pair of running shoes) involve different 
time horizons. These may, in turn, prompt differences in the decisions made as well as in the 
information needed to render a decision. For illustration, consider the offer that Nobel-prize 
winning economist Paul Samuelson (1963) once made his lunch partners: “to bet each $200 to 
$100 that the side of the coin they specified would not appear at the first toss” (p. 50). One 
colleague, whom Samuelson identified as a distinguished scholar but otherwise granted 
anonymity, responded to the offer by saying: “I won’t bet because I would feel the $100 loss 
more than the $200 gain. But I’ll take you on if you promise to let me make 100 such bets” 
(p. 2). Samuelson (1963) considered his colleague’s preference to be inconsistent with 
expected utility theory and, by extension, to be irrational (a fallacy of large numbers): “… no 
sequence is acceptable if each of its single plays is not acceptable” (p. 3). 
More recent analyses, however, have concluded that models of expected utility 
theory—by many considered the normative theory of individual decision making—can in fact 
capture the colleague’s preference for safety in numbers, assuming that the 100 bets are 
aggregated to a single choice. Ex ante aggregation brings the final distribution of potential 
outcomes of a gamble much closer to its expected value and accordingly reduces the 
likelihood of losses (Aloysius, 2007; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Wedell, 2011; see also 
Peköz, 2002). Thus, in decisions under uncertainty, single-play and multi-play choice 
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environments effectively entail different payoff distributions. More importantly, in decisions 
under risk where options’ outcomes and probabilities are explicitly described (e.g., $5000 
with probability .09, otherwise $0), people favor choices consistent with expected utility 
maximization in multi-play environments, but less so in single-play environments 
(Montgomery & Adelbratt, 1982; Wedell, 2011).  
What is less well understood—and the focus of this article—is how people respond to 
single- and multi-play environments in which they first have to search for information before 
making a choice. We address this question by implementing the two choice protocols 
described in Samuelson’s anecdote within the sampling paradigm, a popular design used in 
research on decisions from experience (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & 
Erev, 2009). In the sampling paradigm, people first explore the possible outcomes of risky 
options in a self-directed and self-terminated sampling process before making a decision 
based on their sampled experience.  
By clearly separating information search and choice, we can add search as a new 
dimension to the analysis of the effects of single-play and multi-play choice environments 
(DeKay & Kim, 2005; Montgomery & Adelbratt, 1982; Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992; see 
Wedell, 2011, for a brief review). In particular, information search can uncover differences in 
the motivational approach to single- and multi-play choice environments in the form of short- 
and long-run aspirations. Our investigation will also permit us to further analyze a recently 
discovered relationship between information search and choice that may originate from of the 
pursuit of short-run versus long-run aspirations (Hills & Hertwig, 2010). Finally, systematic 
differences in information search between single- and multi-play environments will help us to 
further understand how preferences, as revealed by choices, are further impacted by the 
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search that precedes them—a problem that generalizes to all tasks in which the actually 
experienced environment is a function of the organism’s information search. 
In the following, we first review pertinent empirical literature about expected utility in 
relation to single- and multi-play decisions. We then review findings on information search in 
decisions from experience, before describing how we link these lines of research.  
 
1.1 Aspirations and the importance of expected utility in single- and multi-play decisions 
References to expected utility often invite one to say, subtly and under one’s breath, ‘long-
run’ expected utility. Some may argue that the addition of ‘long-run’ is redundant. Given the 
broad class of single-play decisions where expected utility does not immediately apply 
(Lopes, 1981), however, we would not agree. An offer to pay $5 to play once a gamble that 
pays off $100 with probability .1 and $0 otherwise will leave the gambler poorer by $5 nine 
times out of ten (Figure 1). This is true regardless of the amount of the non-zero payoff, be it 
$100, $1,000, or even $100,000. However, the opportunity to play this gamble 100 times 
increases the probability of coming out ahead to above 50% (by ‘coming out ahead,’ we refer 
to the short-run aspiration of winning any non-zero amount). Anyone with a strict 
requirement of more than a non-zero return on their investment should avoid the single-play 
gamble, because in most realizations it will lead to losses. Recognizing this regularity, 
modern investment theory considers the time at which investment returns will be needed as a 
critical parameter in portfolio selection. 
LONG- AND SHORT-RUN DECISION MAKING 6 
 
Figure 1. The influence of 1 play versus 100 plays on the probability distribution of outcomes 
at the end of play. Results for a single-play gamble costing 5 to play and promising an 
outcome of 100 with a probability of .1 and otherwise 0. The results for the multi-play gamble 
reflect the expected outcome per single play (each costing 5) of that gamble. 
 
The importance of achieving a minimal aspiration and its role in explaining many 
choice anomalies has been well explored (Koop & Johnson, 2012; Lopes, 1996; see also 
Lopes & Oden, 1999). The key argument is that many of the mathematical prosthetics added 
to expected value theory (e.g., polynomial utility functions and subjective probability curves) 
are unnecessary if one considers that in many situations it may not be rational to pursue the 
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(Lopes, 1981, p. 377)1. Indeed, studies investigating peoples’ choices of single- and repeated-
play gambles have found fewer violations of expected utility theory when people play 
repeatedly than when they play once (Camilleri & Newell, 2013; Keren, 1991; Keren & 
Wagenaar, 1987; Liu & Colman, 2009; Wedell & Böckenholt, 1990).  
Behavioral ecologists have likewise discussed aspirations in relation to risk sensitivity 
analysis (i.e., the life and death consequences of decisions), noting that foragers adaptively 
change their preferences depending on the short-run requirements of their internal state. An 
animal that requires regular food to avoid starvation (e.g., a vampire bat’s weight decays 
exponentially following a meal; Wilkinson, 1984) should favor those options that maximize 
the probability of acquiring food over those options that maximize long-run returns because 
the latter may leave it to starve in the meantime (e.g., Caraco, 1980; Houston & McNamara, 
1999; Stephens, 1981, 2001; Stephens, Brown, & Ydenberg, 2007; see also Weber, Shafir, & 
Blais, 2004). 
In the remainder of the manuscript, we conceptualize the contrast between single-play 
and multi-play in terms of aspirations, with short-run aspirations indicating an increased 
preference for the option that is most likely to come out ahead and long-run aspirations 
favoring the option offering the higher expected value. Yet, let us emphasize that aspirations 
are not the only way to conceptualize behavior in single-play and multi-play choice; there are 
numerous other accounts (Aloysius, 2007; Langer & Weber, 2001; Lopes, 1996; Tversky & !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!The short-run aspiration of maximizing the chance of coming out ahead has sometimes been 
used interchangeably with the aspiration of maximizing some percentile of the outcome 
distribution (e.g., the median). Although both criteria would essentially produce identical 
predictions in our study, we focus on the aspiration of coming out ahead for two reasons. 
First, for two-outcome gambles as used in our study, the median is not well-defined. Second, 
the aspiration of maximizing the chance of coming out ahead corresponds more closely to the 
short-run criteria implemented in the literature on risk-sensitive foraging that we reference 
(e.g., Stephens, 2001). !
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Bar-Hillel, 1983; Wedell, 2011). Specifically, any mechanism explaining risk aversion, that 
is, the preference for the option with the lower variance, is under most circumstances also 
capable of explaining differences in choice (but not in search), even when the expected values 
of single- and multi-play scenarios are the same (as in Fig. 1). Such explanations include non-
linear transformations of outcomes and non-linear transformations of probabilities 
(Kahneman & Tverksy, 1979; see Wedell, 2011). The important point here is that the 
influence of both aspirations and non-linear weighting is diminished in multi-plays and the 
organisms can thus more ‘safely’ aim for the expected value.  
In what follows, we turn to a choice environment in which—in contrast to Samuelson’s 
(1963) described option—the properties of the choice options (i.e., outcomes and 
probabilities) are not explicitly stated. Instead, people have to gather information prior to 
making a choice. This choice environment is representative of the myriad situations in which 
humans, and certainly other animals, need to make decisions based on experienced 
information samples rather than on symbolic descriptions of the world. Using this 
environment, we explore to what extent single- versus multi-play gambles affect search and 
choice when people make decisions from experience. 
1.2 The relation between aspirations and information search 
Assuming that decision makers have different aspirations in single- and multi-play 
environments, the question is whether and how the process of information acquisition differs 
across these environments. If decisions and decision rules implementing these different 
aspirations require more or less information, then adaptive search strategies that meet such 
differential demands can foster better decisions by increasing efficiency. Consistent with the 
idea of adaptive information search, Hills and Hertwig (2010) found that specific information 
search policies in decisions from experience are associated with specific decision policies. 
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Individuals who took more samples and switched less often between options were more likely 
to choose options associated with maximizing expected utility, whereas individuals who took 
fewer samples and switched more frequently between options tended to choose options that 
won most of the time. Specifically, individuals who showed frugal search and avid switching 
appeared to accomplish this by comparing the promised return on the options between 
switches and choosing the option that won most of the time. Individuals who showed avid 
search and frugal switching, on the other hand, appeared to choose the option with the higher 
mean return computed from all collected samples. Though important for understanding the 
interplay of information search and choice, these findings are correlative. Consequently, they 
cannot discern between two possibilities: Do search policies sway later decision strategies, or 
do preselected decision strategies shape subsequent search policies?  
Hills and Hertwig (2010) speculated that the correspondence between search and 
decisions could be driven by different aspirations (e.g., in line with risk sensitivity analysis in 
behavioral ecology). However, it is also plausible that the cognitive control of attention drives 
search, irrespective of top-down aspirations. Specifically, the sampling paradigm in research 
on decisions from experience has participants make a choice between two payoff distributions 
(hereafter referred to as options) after they have had the opportunity to explore (sample) them 
(Hertwig et al., 2004). A person may sample the outcomes $0, $0, $0, and $32 for one option 
and $3, $3, and $3 for the other. Following a choice, the person would receive the value of 
one randomly drawn outcome for the payoff distribution he or she decided on. Using this 
sampling paradigm, Rakow, Demes, and Newell (2008, see also Ashby & Rakow, 2014) 
observed that total sample size and subsample sizes (samples between switches) were 
positively correlated with working memory span, a measure proposed to be associated with 
attentional control (e.g., Conway, Cowen, & Bunting, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2000). 
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Consequently, it is unclear to what extent cognitive control of attention, short-term versus 
long-term aspirations, or both drive search in this paradigm. 
Apart from being a matter of theoretical interest, which mechanism—aspirations, 
cognitive control of attention, or both—drives search has important methodological 
implications. The key element in research on decisions from experience (involving the 
sampling paradigm) is that the experience one makes is a function of the amount of search. In 
particular, limited search carries the risk of systematically missing rare, but potentially 
consequential outcomes. If aspirations drive search, aspirations—that is, preference 
structures—determine not only what decision makers choose, but how they search for 
information prior to choice. This means, in turn, that their preference structure may not be 
uniquely identified on the basis of their choices, an issue with notable consequences that we 
will revisit in the discussion.  
1.3 Testing the impact of short- and long-run aspirations on decisions from experience 
Most previous studies of decisions from experience (with the sampling paradigm; see 
Hertwig, in press) left it to the individual to pursue either long-run aspirations (thus aiming to 
maximize expected value in each problem by always choosing the option with higher 
expected value or, as a proxy, the option with the higher experienced mean) or short-run 
aspirations (thus aiming to maximize the probability of winning anything in each problem by 
always choosing the option that promises a greater chance of coming out ahead). In order to 
determine which aspirations people pursue spontaneously in the sampling paradigm, without 
explicit instructions, we compared it with conditions that highlight the short-run versus long-
run consequences of decisions (similarly to Camilleri & Newell, 2013; Wedell & Böckenholt, 
1990). Specifically, we informed participants that their final payoff depended either on a 
single, randomly chosen outcome from one of their chosen payoff distributions, multiplied by 
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100 (single-play condition), or on 100 random draws from one of their chosen distributions 
(multi-play condition). Except for these payoff instructions, both conditions were identical. 
Because search in the sampling paradigm is entirely self-directed, with participants free to 
sample from the payoff distributions for as long as and in whatever order they like, this set-up 
means that—apart from the influence of sampling—both conditions rest on the same choice 
environment. As in many real-life decisions, it is left to participants to infer the consequences 
of a single play or multiple plays. This set-up allows us to directly evaluate and compare 
patterns of information search and choices across a total of three implementations of the 
sampling paradigm: the single-play condition, the multi-play condition, and the standard 
implementation (where a single draw from each chosen payoff distribution determines the 
final payoff).  
 Furthermore, we designed decision problems with a structure often employed in the 
decisions-from-experience literature, requiring a choice between a risky option (with two 
outcomes) and a safe option. As we demonstrate shortly, these problems have the property 
that the number of samples needed to detect the option that promises the larger probability of 
coming out ahead is less than the number of samples needed to detect, with the same 
precision, the option with the larger mean.  
We expect that assigning short- and long-run consequences to otherwise identical 
choice environments will lead to individuals adapting their information search and choice 
policies to their aspirations. In other words, people may not only be adaptive decision makers 
(Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993), but also adaptive information searchers. Furthermore, we 
predict that aspiration-induced differences in search will prompt systematically different 
experiences of identical options. Specifically, in the single-play condition, relative to the 
multi-play condition, fewer people will experience the rare event—because of smaller sample 
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sizes. By extension, we predict that participants in the multi-play condition, relative to the 
single-play one, will more likely choose the option with the higher expected value. 
Furthermore, we expect that behavior in the standard sampling paradigm will lie somewhere 
in between that of respondents in the single-play and multi-play conditions, both in search and 
choice, thus reflecting the interindividual heterogeneity of potential short- and long-run 
strategies previously observed (Hills & Hertwig, 2010).  
Finally, in order to evaluate the potential role of attentional control on information 
search, we also measured each participant’s operation span. Operation span is a complex 
working memory span measure that taps into a person’s ability to store and retrieve a 
sequence of individual tokens over intermittent distractor tasks. Alternative to or in addition 
to short- and long-run aspirations, attentional control may determine search. Based on 
previous findings (Rakow et al., 2008), we expect higher operation spans to be associated 
with taking more samples and with fewer switches between the options. Moreover, one may 
speculate that attentional control is also linked to choice. The short- and long-run choice 
policies suggested by Hills and Hertwig (2010) are likely to require different levels of 
cognitive effort. Specifically, the short-run policy may be less cognitively demanding, 
requiring the simple tallying, across multiple comparisons, of the number of wins for each 
option. The long-run policy of choosing the option with the higher mean, on the other hand, 
requires the integration of all observed information in combination with the weighting of the 
returns by the total sample size; both of these processes may require more attentional control. 
Consequently, the coupling of search and choice may also be caused and explained by 
individual differences in attentional control capacities (vs. differences in short-run and long-
run aspirations).  
2. Method 
LONG- AND SHORT-RUN DECISION MAKING 13 
2.1 Participants  
We collected data from 124 students of the University of Basel, with a mean age of 24 years. 
Participants were rewarded with either course credit or a fixed payment of approximately $13. 
In addition, participants received a performance-based bonus as a result of their choices. 
2.2 Materials  
We designed 12 decision problems (Table 1). The two options within each problem offered 
the opportunity to maximize either the long-run expectation (higher mean or expected value) 
or the probability of coming out ahead (higher median). Each problem presented a choice 
between a high-outcome rare event (p ≤ .15) in the higher expected value option (otherwise 0) 
and a small but relatively secure outcome (p ≥ .7) in the lower expected value option 
(otherwise 0). All problems share the property that more samples are required to spot the 
option with the higher mean than the option with the higher probability of coming out ahead. 
To demonstrate this, we simulated 10,000 decisions for each problem and determined how 
many samples would be needed to identify the option with the higher mean versus the higher 
chance of coming out ahead, given some level of precision. Identifying the latter with a 
probability of, for instance, at least 80% requires a much smaller sample than identifying the 
higher mean option (on average, about 4 vs. 34 draws per option). Of course, we do not 
expect our participants to know in advance the underlying distributions; however, they may 
rapidly develop an understanding of these distributions once sampling begins. Sample sizes 
will reflect this grasp. 
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Table 1. Decision problems employed in the three conditions 
Problem H L 
1 921 with p = .05 3 with certainty 
2 34 with p = .05 1 with certainty 
3 120 with p = .05 5 with p = .70 
4 44 with p = .05 2 with p = .70 
5 70 with p = .10 4 with certainty 
6 16 with p = .10 1 with certainty 
7 54 with p = .10 4 with p = .75 
8 23 with p = .10 2 with p = .75 
9 35 with p = .15 3 with certainty 
10 21 with p = .15 2 with certainty 
11 48 with p = .15 5 with p = .80 
12 9 with p = .15 1 with p = .80 
Note: H = option with the higher expected value (as calculated by probability × monetary 
value); L = option with the lower expected value. 
1 In order to provide identical incentives across conditions, we matched the expected returns 
across conditions by multiplying each randomly drawn outcome in the standard condition by 
a factor of 6. 
 
In order to prevent participants from inferring that the option with the rare and 
consequential event always promised the higher expected value, we intermixed four problems 
with a different structure (Appendix, Table A1), resulting in a total of 16 decision problems. 
All were included in our analysis, because the predictions for the search and decision 
strategies are qualitatively independent of the structure of the decision problems. To measure 
individuals’ working memory capacity, we used the automated version of the operation span 
task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). This computer-based task measures people’s 
ability to remember sets of letters (e.g., E A D) that appear, one letter at a time, following 
simple math problems (e.g., [1 × 2] + 1 = ?). The operation span score was determined as the 
sum of all correctly recalled letter sets (over a series of sets with lengths ranging from 3 to 7).  
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2.3 Procedure  
Problems were presented on a computer screen. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the three conditions. In the multi-play condition, they were instructed that their payoff 
would be determined by randomly selecting one of their final choices and then taking 100 
random draws from the selected option (e.g., 100 draws from selected option H in Problem 1: 
92 with probability .05; Table 1). In the single-play condition, participants were instructed 
that one of their chosen options would be randomly selected; a single random draw from this 
option would then be taken, and the resulting outcome would be multiplied by a factor of 100. 
This procedure renders the magnitudes of the expected values in the single- and multi-play 
conditions identical. Finally, the standard condition implemented the payoff modality used in 
past studies (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004). Specifically, a random draw from each chosen option 
across the 16 problems determined the payoff. Because this meant that 16 draws were 
incentivized in the standard condition, relative to 100 draws in the other two conditions, we 
matched the expected returns across conditions by multiplying each randomly drawn outcome 
in the standard condition by a factor of 6.  
Before participants turned to the 16 decision problems (presented in a random order), 
they worked on three practice trials. For each problem, they were able to sample from the two 
options as extensively and in whatever fashion they liked. Once search was terminated, they 
proceeded to their final choice by clicking a button. The operation span measure was 
administered once all choices were completed. At the end of the experiment, participants 
received a bonus as a result of their choices, paid out one-to-one in accordance with the 
conditions’ payoff scheme. 
For the purpose of data analysis, we set the threshold that participants had to sample at 
least once from both options in at least half of the problems; five participants (of 124; 4%) 
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failed to meet this criterion and were removed from the analysis. Additionally, all trials in 
which a person sampled only a single option were removed. The following analyses are thus 
based on 95% of all trials provided by 119 participants.  
3. Results 
3.1 The influence of single-play and repeated-play on search and switching 
As Figure 2 shows, amount of search in the repeated-play condition was very different from 
that in the single-play condition. On average, participants in the former condition took about 
10.6 samples more than those in the latter condition (total sample size: t[77] = 2.37, p = 0.02, 
d = 0.53).2 This difference was mainly driven by larger samples from the risky or riskier 
option (option H in Table 1) accounting for 7.1 of the additional 10.6 samples, t(77) = 2.13, p 
= .04. However, there also was more extensive search in the safe or safer option (option L in 
Table 1; t[77] = 2.43, p = .02). Because participants in all conditions took, on average, about 
two samples from option H for every one sample from option L (nH/nL = 1.75‒2.05), it 
appears that participants in the multi-play condition increased their search effort about equally 
for both options. What about search in the standard sampling condition? Sample size was 
different from that achieved in the multi-play condition, t(77.1) = 2.26, p = .03, but almost 
identical to that in the single-play condition, t(78) = .1, p = .95. 
Previous studies found that sample size and switch rate were correlated in the standard 
sampling paradigm (Hills & Hertwig, 2010; Rakow et al., 2008). Moreover, Hills and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Global tests of significance were omitted due to clear hypotheses for the pairwise group 
comparisons. All reported t values were derived from mixed effects analyses predicting the 
outcome variable on the problem level while controlling for the subject variable via the 
inclusion of a random intercept. Tests were performed using the statistical software R (R 
Development Core Team, 2008) and the packages lme4 and lmerTest. Specifically, Gaussian 
linear models were estimated using REML and Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of 
freedom, the default method in lmerTest. The effect size d is a standardized measure, and d = 
.2, .5, and .8 denote small, medium, and large effects, respectively (Cohen, 1988).  !
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Hertwig (2010) found that switch rate was inversely correlated with the choice of the option 
with the higher expected value. These observations invite the question as to whether decision 
strategies govern switch rate. Our results suggest they do not. The number of switches per 
sample was not significantly different between conditions, t(77) = 0.33, p = .75 (see Fig. 2B). 
This finding contradicts Hills and Hertwig’s (2010) suggestion that frequent switching may 
be caused by the aspiration of short-run maximization. Moreover, switch rate in the standard 
paradigm was not statistically different from that in the multi-play (switch rate: t[77] = 0.06, p 
= .95) or single-play condition (switch rate: t[78] = 0.23, p = .77). To summarize, the single- 
versus multi-play instructions markedly affected sample size; the switch rate, in contrast, 
appeared to be less sensitive to the difference in aspiration. 
 
 
Figure 2. Total sample size (A) and switch rate (B), separately for the three conditions: 
single-play, multi-play, and the standard sampling paradigm. In panel A, bars are further split 
into samples taken from the H and L options (see Table 1). Error bars represent the standard 
error of the mean. 
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One key characteristic of the sampling paradigm is that an individual’s sample size inevitably 
shapes his or her experience of the events’ probabilities. In particular, rare events are often 
not encountered when sample sizes are small; and even if they are observed, the number of 
people who experience them less frequently than expected exceeds the number who 
experience them more frequently than expected (as a consequence of the skewness of the 
binomial probability distribution for small ns and small ps; see Hertwig et al., 2004). The 
large difference in sample size observed for the multi-play and single-play conditions is thus 
likely to translate into different experiences: Specifically, participants in the multi-play 
condition are, ceteris paribus, more likely to be cognizant of the rare positive outcome in 
option H than are participants in the single-play condition; furthermore, the former can be 
expected to have experienced the rare event more often than the latter. Is this indeed the case? 
In terms of awareness of rare events, our findings showed that participants in the 
single-play condition were 1.3 times more likely to miss the rare event than were participants 
in the multi-play condition (33% vs. 26%). Although this difference was in the expected 
direction (in light of the different sample sizes; see Figure 2A), it was not significant (logit 
link: z = 1.42, p = .16). But did the frequency with which people experienced a rare event 
(given that it was encountered once) differ between conditions? Figure 3A shows that the rare 
event was encountered 1.5 times more often in the multi-play condition than in the single-play 
condition, t(77) = 2, p = 0.049, d = .45.  
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Figure 3. Percentage of participants who missed (A) and frequency of encountering (B) the 
rare positive outcome in option H, separately for the three conditions: single-play, multi-play, 
and standard sampling paradigm. Analysis based on the 12 decision problems involving a rare 
positive event in option H. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Why were people in the single-play condition not markedly more likely to miss the 
rare event than people in the multi-play condition? One possible explanation relates to 
optional stopping. To the extent that sample size (i.e., number of draws) is determined at the 
outset of the sampling process, the binomial probability distribution governs the sampling 
process; furthermore, it implies a smaller chance to observe the rare event with smaller 
sample sizes (see Hertwig et al., 2004, and Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). Alternatively, however, 
stopping may be controlled by the actually experienced outcomes, thus rendering the binomial 
distribution an inappropriate model (see, e.g., Berger & Berry, 1988, for a discussion of 
optional stopping in statistical inference). Our data indicate that experience matters for the 
decision to stop. Figure 4A plots the differences between the observed probabilities of the rare 
events and their true probabilities in the multi-play, t(37.2) = 4.66, p < 0.001, and single-play 
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frequently than expected, consistent with outcome-dependent stopping—in other words, 
people appear to have stopped shortly after observing a rare event.  
 
 
Figure 4. Observed probability minus true probability of the rare positive outcome in option 
H, separately for the three conditions: single-play, multi-play, and standard sampling 
paradigm. Analysis based on the 12 decision problems involving a rare positive event in 
option H. Relative frequencies are displayed in comparison to the expectation, i.e., the 
respective true probability. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Fewer samples in total and fewer observations of the rare event in option H relative to 
the multi-play condition (Fig. 3A; multi-play vs. standard: t[77.2] = 2.04, p = 0.04) suggest 
that participants in the single-play and the standard sampling condition mustered experiences 
that were similar. This did not hold for every dimension, however. Participants in the standard 
condition experienced rare events more often than those in the single-play condition (see Fig. 
3B; t[77.2] = 2.04, p = 0.04). They also experienced a larger mean difference in returns in 
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play and the standard condition were alike in terms of sample size and switching, the samples 
on which they based their choices were not identical. 
 
3.3 The influence of single-play and repeated-play on choice  
We started out, among other hypotheses, by predicting that induction of long-run aspirations 
would lead to favoring the option with the higher expected value. Do our data support this 
hypothesis? Figure 4 plots the proportion of choices of option H. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, the proportion of choices of option H in the multi-play condition was 63%, 
substantially higher than the 49% observed in the single-play condition (z = 3.16, p = 0.002, 
OR = 1.92). Relatedly, the proportion of choices of option H in the standard condition was 
51%, which was not statistically different from that observed in the single-play condition (z = 
0.67, p = 0.5), but was different from that observed in the multi-play condition (z = 2.66, p = 
0.01).3 These similarities and differences thus suggest that long-run aspirations are conducive 
to expected-value maximization and that respondents appear to perceive the standard 
paradigm as a one-shot decision, notwithstanding the opportunity to aggregate choices across 
the sequence of decision problems in the experiment (Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 1999).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!A mixed effects regression indicated that H choices were not influenced by the presence or 
absence of certainty in the L option (z = 1.53, p = 0.13). Because none of the following 
analyses were influenced by a comparison of safe and risky options, the following results are 
collapsed across both. !
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Figure 5. Proportion of choices of the higher expected value option H (A) and choices 
consistent with the higher experienced sample mean (B), separately for the three conditions: 
single-play, multi-play, and standard sampling paradigm. 
 
However, there is an important caveat to this interpretation. As spelled out before, 
differences in choices between single- and multi-play conditions could also be due to the 
different information people experienced. One and the same payoff distribution, once filtered 
through experience, can take on many different ‘phenotypes.’ It is possible that respondents in 
both conditions maximize the same quantity, but that the quantity is the experienced mean 
reward, rather than the expected value. In other words, all the difference in choice might 
reside in the difference in the sampled information (see Fig. 2, 3, and 4) and thus in the 
experienced phenotype rather than in different proclivities to maximize. In order to test this 
possibility, we next calculated the proportion of choices of the option with the higher 
experienced mean (in those cases where participants experienced the rare event; 71% of 
cases) while accounting for the observed difference in means. Figure 4B shows the results. 
Individuals in the multi-play condition continued to be much more likely to choose options 
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p < .001, OR = 2.67). This effect was not reduced by the inclusion of the actual difference in 
means between the options (z = 2.8, p = 0.01, OR = 2.68). This suggests that differences in 
choices are not a mere function of sampling error (see Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Moreover, in 
further support of the notion that participants tend to view the standard paradigm as a short-
run scenario, the standard condition did not differ from the single-play condition (z = 0.76, p 
= 0.44), but did differ from the multi-play condition (z = 2.54, p = 0.01).  
Finally, let us unpack one finding reported in Figure 4. Although choices in the single-
play condition were much less likely to maximize expected value (4A) and experienced mean 
(4B) than were those in the multi-play condition, people still chose the higher mean option in 
58% (versus 76%) of cases. This is of course not perfectly compatible with the notion that 
people in the single-play option tended to maximize the chances of coming out ahead (i.e., the 
median reward). However, people in the single-play condition also chose the option with the 
higher experienced chance of coming out ahead in 56% of cases (in 23% of cases, the options 
with the higher experienced mean and the higher chance of coming out ahead were identical). 
In contrast, people in the multi-play condition did so only in 44% of cases. One interpretation 
of this finding is that people in the single-play condition find themselves halfway between the 
two goals, with some betting on the rare but attractive gain, and others trying to come out 
ahead. In the multi-play environment, in contrast, the predominant course of action is 
maximization of the experienced mean.  
3.4 The role of working memory capacity 
Based on a previously observed association between search and working memory (Rakow et 
al., 2008), we hypothesized that attentional control may serve as plausible explanation for the 
dependency between search and choice. To test this relationship, we measured participants’ 
operation span and evaluated its association with sample size, switch rate, choices of the 
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higher expected value option H, and choices of the option with the higher experienced mean. 
Table 2 shows the results of independent mixed effects analysis predicting these variables by 
operation span score. None of the effects were significant, suggesting that—if at all—
attentional control plays a limited role in explaining search and choice in the sampling 
paradigm.  
 
Table 2: Mixed-effects regression of search and choice on operation span 
 Sample size Switch rate H choices Higher mean choices 
Single-play b = 3.14,  p = 0.14 
b = 0.03,  
p = 0.2 
b = 0.01,  
p = 0.6 
b = 0.02,  
p = 0.66 
Multi-play b = 2.65,  p = 0.52 
b = 0.01, 
 p = 0.82 
b = 0.05,  
p = 0.19 
b = 0.04,  
p = 0.29 
Standard b = 0.25,  p = 0.91 
b = 0.03,  
p = 0.32 
b = 0.02,  
p = 0.41 
b = 0.02,  
p = 0.6 
Note: Estimates (b) correspond to the change in the respective variable given a change of one 
standard deviation in the operation span score. Higher mean choices include only those 
choices where the rare event was observed. 
 
4. General discussion 
Following up on Samuelson’s anecdotal observation (1963), we investigated the suggestion 
that people making decisions from experience may choose differently when playing a gamble 
once versus multiple times (Lopes, 1996; Wedell, 2011). Using the sampling paradigm, we 
found differences in both choice and information search between single- and multi-play 
conditions. In the multi-play condition, individuals sampled more and were more likely to 
choose options with the higher expected values than did participants in the single-play 
condition. These differences were not mediated by experiencing different choice 
environments (and sampling error; see Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hertwig et al., 2004). Instead, 
they appear to stem from changes in decision strategy that were foreshadowed by changes in 
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information search, an outcome consistent with the idea of adaptive information search as 
proposed by Hills and Hertwig (2010).  
4.1 Implications for single- and multi-play choices 
Our results add to the descriptive debate on single- and multi-play choices. The normative 
debate—i.e., whether people should have stable preferences across single- and multi-play 
situations—has cooled off, but the discussion of how to best conceptualize the psychological 
processes involved in single- and multi-play situations is still ongoing. The first of two major 
positions is exemplified by Lopes’ security potential and aspiration theory (SP/A; Lopes & 
Oden, 1999; see also Wang & Johnson, 2012; Payne, 2005) and proposes that (at least) two 
separate processes are executed in sequence: First, prospects are qualitatively compared 
against some aspiration level. When, and only when, the aspiration level is satisfied, the 
individual engages in a second, more systematic valuation of the prospect. If this is the case, 
the evaluation process of single- and multi-play situations could differ markedly, because 
multi-play prospects are more likely to surpass the aspiration level and trigger a systematic 
valuation than are single-play prospects (Wedell, 2011). The second position, exemplified by 
cumulative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), proposes that just one 
process operates for single- and multi-play prospects alike: Outcomes and probabilities, once 
acquired and before being integrated into a single utility value, undergo non-linear 
transformations that allow single-play and multi-play versions of the same prospect to yield 
different utilities. Without making additional assumptions, this position implies identical 
evaluation processes for single-play and multi-play scenarios. Previous investigations using 
fully described single- and multi-play prospects have found evidence for differences in the 
behavioral patterns of choice and information acquisition (Joag, Mowen, & Gentry, 1990; Su 
et al., 2013), as well as in post-hoc verbal reports (Wedell & Böckenholt, 1990). Our 
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investigation using decisions from experience adds to this debate by showing that the amount 
of information sampled prior to choice and the resulting experience varies in response to 
single- and multi-play instructions. Consistent with theoretical accounts assuming multiple 
processes, this finding suggests that the valuation process indeed differs between single- and 
multi-play choices.  
4.2 Implications for search and choice in decisions from experience 
Our findings also provide new insights into the psychology underlying the standard sampling 
paradigm often used in recent research on decisions from experience. Behavior in this 
paradigm most resembled that observed in the single-play environment. This finding may be 
somewhat surprising, given that the standard condition, like the multi-play condition, offered 
multiple draws—one draw for each of the 16 choices. Participants in the standard condition 
could thus also aggregate the risk by bracketing the choices together (see Read et al., 1999). 
The results, however, suggest that participants evaluated each choice individually. This is 
consistent with previous research using decisions from description showing that people 
usually tend to segregate prospects when the cumulative nature of multiple prospects is not 
made apparent (Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992). Thus, one explanation may be that participants 
did not realize that they could aggregate the risk across their multiple choices (see DeKay & 
Kim, 2005, for the role of perceived fungibility in multi-play choices). An alternative 
explanation may reside in computational complexity of the respective choice strategies. Short-
run maximization is likely to be simpler—in terms of its computational and memory 
demands—than long-run maximization. For options like those presented here, an individual 
could simply count the number of zeroes that occur during sampling and choose the option 
with fewer zeroes (assuming approximately equal sample sizes per option). Computing the 
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means, in contrast, requires additional steps that involve, at the least, adding non-zero 
numbers (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008).  
The finding that choice and search behavior in the standard condition resembled 
behavior in the single-play condition is of particular relevance to the discussion of as-if 
patterns of underweighting of rare events, and to what has been termed the description‒
experience gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). In contrast to the regularity of low-probability events 
tending to be overweighted in decisions from description (Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), it has been inferred from choices that rare events tend to receive less 
weight than they deserve in decisions from experience (Camilleri & Newell, 2011; Hertwig et 
al., 2004). Studies using yoked experiences and direct probability judgments by participants 
have revealed that such underweighting also occurs when the subjective representation of the 
prospect accurately reflects its objective properties (Camilleri & Newell, 2009; Ungemach, 
Chater, & Stewart, 2009). The use of short-run strategies that maximize the chance of coming 
out ahead by inherently ignoring rare events may offer a new angle from which to address the 
persistent puzzle of why such underweighting occurs.  
Our results also inform previous hypotheses regarding frugal search efforts in decisions 
from experience (see Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). Two main arguments have been invoked to 
explain the relatively modest sample sizes observed. First, working memory limitations may 
provide a natural stopping rule for search (Hertwig et al., 2004; Rakow et al., 2008; see also 
Kareev, 2000). Second, Hertwig and Pleskac (2010) have suggested that small samples 
amplify the difference between the expected earnings associated with the different payoff 
distributions, thus making the options in question more distinct and, consequently, choice 
easier. The present investigation identifies a third contributing factor: Search is a function of 
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people’s aspirations, and if many or even most people tend to pursue short-run aspirations (in 
the sampling paradigm), frugal search follows naturally.  
Further, our results suggest that different components of explorative behavior may be 
under different control processes. The lack of a difference in switch rate across all conditions 
appears to indicate that this property is not part of a participant’s top-down aspiration level 
and associated decision strategy. Rather, switching may be under the control of more implicit 
processes, such as those associated with working memory (Hills & Pachur, 2012; Rakow et 
al., 2008; see also Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2010). Yet the complete independence between 
our measure of working memory and both search and choice variables throws into question 
working memory’s potential role as a stopping rule as well as its previously suggested role 
(Rakow et al., 2008) as a common cause for search and choice policy (for similar findings, 
see Wulff, Hills, & Hertwig, 2014). One reason for the absence of a link may lie in the high 
complexity and difficulty of the operation span task relative to the simple digit span task used 
by Rakow et al. (2008). Yet, it could also mean that models for decision from experience that 
simplify information integration and choice, thereby taxing working memory less, may be 
good candidate models for experienced-based decision making. One particular class, often 
labeled as associative learning models (see Hertwig, in press; Sutton & Barto, 1998), assumes 
a continuous updating of a single utility value per option and thus requires the storage of far 
less information. Similarly, the maximization of the experienced mean could be achieved by 
recruiting a simple heuristic such as the natural mean heuristic (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). 
Future investigations should explore how short- and long-run aspirations may be captured in 
choice models based on an associative learning mechanism. In this context, attention should 
also be paid to the diversity of executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000), of which only some 
may be involved in experienced-based risky choice.  
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Our results also shed light on an aspect of information search in decisions from 
experience that has largely been overlooked, namely, optional stopping. Deliberations into the 
statistical effects of small samples have often assumed that search is randomly terminated or 
is terminated once a preplanned size is reached (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Gonzales & Dutt, 2011; 
Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). Our investigation suggests that termination of 
search may also be subject to strategic concerns (for related findings, see Lejarraga, Hertwig, 
& Gonzales, 2012; Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, & Avrahami, 2014). 
4.3 The problem of inferring risk preference in decisions from experience 
Last but not least, our findings highlight a thorny inference problem concerning risk 
preferences in experienced-based choices. Following the revealed preference approach 
(Samuelson, 1938), researchers often infer an individual’s preference directly from her 
choices in described and stable choice environments (decisions from description). Decision 
problems employing stated probabilities can easily be tailored to make different risk 
preferences discernible (e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002). In decisions from experience, though, 
inferring risk preference from choice is much more problematic. Due to variable sample sizes 
and the random composition of samples, it is often the case that no two individuals face 
identical decision problems. For this reason, it has been convincingly argued that the 
individual-specific experienced choice environment—and not the objective choice parameters 
(outcomes and probabilities)—is the appropriate foundation for inferring the individual’s risk 
preference (Fox & Hadar, 2006). Our findings, however, suggest that even inferring 
preferences contingent on experience is problematic. For illustration, consider a person with a 
strong preference for coming out ahead in the short term. She takes relatively few samples in 
each problem. Consequently, she may be faced with a decision between an apparently safe 
and modest positive outcome and an apparently safe zero outcome. This ‘trivial’ (dominated) 
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choice reveals little about this person’s risk preference. Now, consider a person with a weak 
preference for coming out ahead in the short term. She may sample a bit more than the first 
person, and even encounter the rare but attractive outcome. Because of her preference, she 
decides against the option offering this dicey but attractive outcome. This person will be 
‘revealed’ to be risk averse, whereas the other appears, if anything, to be risk neutral. Of 
course, this is a constructed example (ignoring, among other factors, the role of optional 
stopping), but it illustrates a simple but consequential point: In environments that people 
experience and ‘construct’ through active sampling, inferences from choice to preference are 
problematic because the experienced environment can arise from the preference or aspiration 
level itself. Depending on which environment emerges, choices may or may not be 
informative about the underlying preferences or aspirations. The good news, however, is that 
decisions from experience paradigms offer an observable psychological dimension that 
appears to afford researchers another window onto preferences or aspirations: the appetite for 
information (see also Denrell, 2007).  
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Appendix 
Table A1.  
Additional Decision Problems  
Problem H L 
1’ 1 with p = .75 0 with certainty 
2’ 1 with certainty 0 with certainty 
3’ 3 with p=.75 9 with p=.10 
4’ 2 with certainty 7 with p= .10 
Note: H = option with the higher expected value (as calculated by probability × monetary 
value); L = option with the lower expected value. !
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ABSTRACT
People can access information about choices in at least two ways: via summary descriptions that provide an overview of potential outcomes
and their likelihood of occurrence or via sequential presentation of outcomes. Provided with the former, people make decisions from descrip-
tion; with the latter, they make decisions from experience. Recent investigations involving risky choices have demonstrated a robust and sys-
tematic description–experience gap. Specifically, when people make decisions from experience, rare events tend to have less impact than what
they deserve according to their objective probability. Here, we show that this description–experience gap generalizes from choices involving
monetary gambles to choices based on (hypothetical) online product ratings. We further show that causes that have been identified in the con-
text of risky choice also contribute to the description–experience gap in choice based on online product ratings: reliance on relatively small
samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information (recency). We conclude with a discussion of the practical impli-
cations of our results and identify promising directions for cross-disciplinary investigations. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Neoclassical theory of consumer behavior (e.g., Marshallian
demand) conceives consumer choice as choice under cer-
tainty. Challenging this conception, Savage (1954/1972) em-
phasized the importance of uncertainty in decisions about
consumer products:
Jones is faced with the decision whether to buy a certain
sedan for a thousand dollars, a certain convertible also for a
thousand dollars, or to buy neither and continue carless.
The simplest analysis, and the one generally assumed, is that
Jones is deciding between three definite and sure enjoy-
ments, that of the sedan, the convertible, or the thousand
dollars. Chance and uncertainty are considered to have
nothing to do with the situation. […] however, it is not diffi-
cult to recognize that Jones must in fact take account of many
uncertain future possibilities in actually making his choice.
(pp. 83–84)
One source of uncertainty—and the one that is the con-
cern of the present article—is the degree to which the con-
sumer will be satisfied with his choice. Is driving a
convertible really as fun as Jones expected it to be? How
much will he enjoy driving it in the winter? How worried
should he be about sun exposure? Fortunately, individual
consumers are not alone when faced with these uncertainties.
With the rise of the Internet and social media, more than ever
before, consumers can learn from the experience of others.
Indeed, online product reviews provide a specific form of
vicarious experience that has become ubiquitous. In the
fast-growing market of electronic business-to-consumer
commerce (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009), they have become
a market force in their own right, successfully mediating
online purchasing activity (e.g., Dellarocas, 2003).
Numerous investigations have demonstrated how product
reviews and ratings can affect book sales (Chevalier &
Mayzlin, 2006) and box office revenues (Duan, Gu, &
Whinston, 2008; Liu, 2006) or boost growth in preferences
for certain types of beers (Clemons, Gao, & Hitt, 2006). To
the best of our knowledge, most studies examining the link
between product reviews and sales figures have analyzed
large-scale panel data (e.g., Chen, Wu, & Yoon, 2004; Che-
valier & Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas, Zhang, & Awad, 2007;
Duan et al., 2008). Thus, previous research on online product
reviews has predominantly taken the seller’s perspective.
The consumer perspective and the question of how con-
sumers process online product ratings have received less at-
tention. This study helps to fill this gap by taking
advantage of recent findings from behavioral decision mak-
ing and demonstrating how they pertain to online product re-
views. It also contributes to the growing literature on online
decision making (Darley, Blankson, & Luethge, 2010; Punj,
2012) that addresses, in particular, the uncertainty associated
with the lack of direct experience with a product or with sales
staff (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2003), as well as the in-
formation search required prior to making a selection
(Horrigan, 2008; Peterson & Merino, 2003).
Parallels between risky choice and online product
reviews
Although choice between consumer products is not identical
with choice between monetary gambles, there are similarities
between the two: A single online consumer rating can be
conceived as a potential future state of satisfaction after the
purchase of the product. Thus, when a consumer seeks to
buy a particular product, she may assume that her future
satisfaction equals the satisfaction of the person who
previously purchased the product and provided the rating.
If there are many similar ratings of the product, she can
assume that she will be as happy as all previous buyers.
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However, if variance occurs among raters, she will be uncer-
tain as to which of the potential satisfaction levels will apply
to her. Under the simplifying assumption that she has no
additional information, she will have to assume that each
individual rating in the full set of ratings (one by each rater)
has the same likelihood of matching her future satisfaction
level. It follows that the set of consumer ratings for a product,
when aggregated by rating categories, can be understood as a
gamble over states of satisfaction, where the relative frequen-
cies of rating categories indicate the probability of future
states of satisfaction.
This investigation seeks to use the resemblance between
these two choice situations to create a bridge between the
two fields of research. To this end, we provide an example
of how the literature on risky choice can inform research
on online consumer choice. Specifically, we capitalize on
two dimensions that play an important role in both online
product reviews and recent investigations of risky and
uncertain choice: format of information presentation and dis-
tributional characteristics.
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) sites like Amazon.com
display the overall mean of the available consumer ratings as a
number of stars. In addition, they present a summary bar plot
and a list of individual ratings. Formally, both formats present
identical distributional information, but they differ substan-
tially in the way users experience that information. Summary
bar plots present complete information in one descriptive
format. Individual ratings, in contrast, require the user to
sequentially search through the ratings to acquire representa-
tive information. The distinction between summary bar plots
and individual ratings can be mapped onto a distinction
between two formats of information representation that has
received much attention in recent investigations of risky choice
involving monetary gambles. The distinction, detailed in the
succeeding texts, is that between decisions from experience
and decisions from description (Hertwig, Barron, Weber,
& Erev, 2004). Numerous studies have demonstrated that
these two kinds of formats and decisions can result in
systematic and predictable differences in choices, the
description–experience gap (for reviews, refer to Hertwig
& Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010).
The second parallel between research on risky choice and
online product reviews is the bimodal nature of the outcome
distribution. Risky choice is often studied using two-
outcome gambles (Holt & Laury, 2002; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). In many cases, these two-outcome gambles
comprise a probable outcome and a complementary (rela-
tively) rare event (Erev et al., 2010). Analyzing ratings from
Amazon.com, Hu, Zhang, and Pavlou (2009) found that most
distributions of online product ratings follow a J-shaped1 pat-
tern: many very positive ratings, few very negative ratings,
and hardly any ratings in between. Hu et al. (2009) suggested
two selection biases to explain this distribution. First, people
who give a product a low valuation are less likely to purchase
it and therefore less likely to submit a rating relative to cus-
tomers who actually purchased the product. Furthermore,
among the purchasers, those who arrive at an extreme—either
positive or negative—valuation of a product are more likely to
express their views than are those with less extreme valuations,
leading to a bimodal distribution (with the positive mode being
more frequent than the negative one). The resulting J-shaped
distribution can be conceived of as an extension of a two-
outcome risky gamble containing a rare event.
In what follows, we briefly introduce relevant findings
from recent research on the description–experience gap. We
then explore how these findings can be brought to bear on
consumer choices, based on “experienced” and “described”
product reviews.
The description–experience gap
In most studies of risky choice, people are provided with a
summary description of the risky options. The options’ out-
comes and associated probabilities are either conveyed visu-
ally (e.g., by a pie chart or frequency distribution) or
described using numbers in text. An example of a summary
description is as follows:
Option A: Receive $4 with probability of .8, $0 otherwise.
or
Option B: Receive $3 for sure.
When outcomes and chances are presented in this descrip-
tion format, the majority of people choose option B (e.g.,
Hertwig et al., 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), even
though option A has the higher expected value (A, $3.2 vs
B, $3). This phenomenon has often been explained as a con-
sequence of the propensity to overweight rare events; that is,
people choose as if they overweight the small probability of
winning nothing in gamble A (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Another way to learn about the outcomes and their likeli-
hoods is to experience those outcomes iteratively over a
series of samples. For example, an onlooker witnessing the
outcomes sampled from options A and B may see the follow-
ing distribution of associated payoff schedules:
Option A: $0, $4, $4, $0, $4, $4, and $4
Option B: $3, $3, $3, $3, $3, $3, and $3
In the laboratory version of this sampling paradigm, par-
ticipants can experience as many outcomes as they wish
without the associated monetary consequences, before then
deciding to terminate the exploration period and make a final
choice. When gamble outcomes are presented in this experi-
ence format, people predominantly choose option A
(Hertwig et al., 2004; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009;
but refer to Hills, Noguchi, & Gibbert, 2013). This reversal
of preference implies that when decisions are based on
1The term “J-shaped” has two possible meanings: Sometimes, it is used to re-
fer to a unimodal power-law distribution (e.g., Anderson & Schooler, 1991;
Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Sparr, 2012; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007), in which few
objects have extreme values and most objects have small to medium values;
sometimes, it is used to refer to a bimodal distribution (refer to Vokó et al.,
1999; Witteman et al., 1994). The latter meaning is the one used here.
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experience, people choose as if rare events received less
weight than what they deserve in light of their objective
probabilities. The description–experience gap in choice has
been replicated across a wide range of studies (for reviews,
refer to Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010).
Why are rare events underweighted in experienced-based
choices? Several reasons have been proposed (Hertwig &
Erev, 2009). The two most important ones that pertain to on-
line reviews are limited search and recency. Time constraints
limit a person’s ability to explore infinitely. Furthermore,
there is evidence that people may be content with only small
amounts of information, as small samples amplify the differ-
ence between options, thus easing choice difficulty (Hertwig
& Pleskac, 2010). However, small samples also bear the risk
that the decision maker is not informed about the existence of
rare events or that the rare event is represented less often than
expected (refer to Hertwig et al., 2004).
Another, though less powerful, factor is recency (com-
pare, e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Rakow, Demes, & Newell,
2008; Ungemach et al., 2009). Outcomes occurring later in
the sampling sequence seem to have more impact than earlier
samples (Hertwig et al., 2004). This could be caused by
memory limitations (e.g., Murdock, 1962) or be the outcome
of an information updating process (Hogarth & Einhorn,
1992). As a consequence of recency, a decision maker who
performed sampling extensively may nevertheless rely on a
functionally small sample. When the functional sample size
is constrained to recent samples, rare events are unlikely to
be incorporated in the person’s final assessment of the option.
Does the description–experience gap generalize to choices
based on online product reviews?
In summary, the situation in which people make product
choices based on online product reviews has much in com-
mon with the various formats in which risky decision making
has been studied. First and most importantly, in both choice
situations, people make choices over probability distributions
of outcomes—monetary rewards in studies on risky choice
and levels of satisfaction in online consumer choice. Second,
the distributions of outcomes in both situations are bimodal,
with one mode being rare—usually the extreme negative
mode in online product ratings. Third, the formats of infor-
mation presentation used either display summary presenta-
tions of the outcomes (ratings) or require self-paced
sequential search.
Despite these parallels between online consumer choice
and risky choice, the two research fields have remained
largely unconnected. We explore one possible link by testing
whether behavioral effects documented for abstract monetary
gambles generalize to choices between consumer products
based on consumer ratings. The potential synergies for both
domains are promising. To summarize, the rich experimental
and theoretical literature on risky choice can serve as a
starting point to overcome the lack of experimental work
on individual consumer choice. Online consumer choice, in
turn, represents an increasingly germane real-world choice
scenario that can be used to test the generality of the effects
found with monetary gambles. The description–experience
gap has often been demonstrated using two-outcome
gambles, rendering this investigation an extension not only
in terms of the type of outcome but also in terms of the pay-
off distributions’ complexity.
Does a description–experience gap also exist in choices
based on online product ratings? To answer this question,
we conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants
chose between two products (e.g., camcorders) solely on
the basis of product ratings. We varied the presentation of
these ratings between a full summary (description format)
and one requiring participants to search through a series of
individual ratings (experience format). We examined the ex-
tent to which these description-based versus experience-
based formats triggered systematically different choice
proportions, mirroring those found in investigations of risky
choice. In other words, we examined whether the experience
format, relative to the description format, resulted in people
choosing as if they underweighted rare (extreme) ratings
relative to their objective probabilities. Moreover, we exam-
ined the extent to which two cognitive mechanisms observed
as contributing to the description–experience gap in risky
choice, limited search and recency, also operate in choice
based on consumer ratings. Specifically, we predicted that
avid searchers are more likely to have experienced rare prod-
uct ratings than frugal searchers and are therefore less likely
to choose as if they underweight rare ratings. In accordance
with Hertwig and Pleskac’s (2010) finding, we further
predicted that frugal searchers will judge their decision to
be easier than avid searchers, irrespective of the information
experienced. Finally, we predicted that ratings experienced
later in the sampling sequence will have more impact than
those experienced earlier (recency effect).
METHOD
Participants
We collected data from 63 participants (43 female partici-
pants). The mean age was 27 years. Participants were rewarded
by either course credit or a fixed payment of Confoederatio
Helvetica franc (CHF) 15 (~$15.00) and also received a mon-
etary bonus based on the outcomes of their choices. Specifi-
cally, a random draw was taken out of each chosen rating
distribution, and the resulting value of the rating (the number
of stars) was multiplied by CHF 0.05. On average, participants
earned a bonus of CHF 3.56 (~$3.5).
Procedure and material
Participants made 10 hypothetical choices between pairs of
consumer products, once in the description format and once
in the experience format. For each choice, product images
were presented next to each other on the computer screen.
We collected product images from several e-commerce sites
to cover a wide range of applications and price ranges (e.g.,
laptops, restaurant dinners, pairs of shoes, coffee makers,
etc.). The respective consumer ratings were displayed below
each product (either in a summary plot or as individual rat-
ings). Apart from consumer ratings, no further information
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was provided. Participants were instructed to select the pro-
duct that appealed most to them given the distribution of rat-
ings. To encourage people to pay attention to the ratings, the
two pictures in each category were selected to be visually
indistinguishable in terms of price, technical specifications,
and quality. Participants indicated their final decision by a
keyboard press.
Each participant chose twice between each pair of prod-
ucts—once in the description format and once in the experi-
ence format. To control for order effects, we randomized the
order of the format and (right versus left) placement of prod-
ucts. Participants were not told that they were making the
same decision twice (once in a description and once in an
experience format), and the order of the two presentation for-
mats was counterbalanced.2 To further minimize the influ-
ence of prior experience, we asked participants to complete
a secondary task3 that took approximately 20min between
the two formats.
Figure 1 shows screenshots of the description and
experience rating formats. As on the majority of e-commerce
sites, ratings were displayed as stars. In the description for-
mat, the distribution of ratings was represented by a bar plot
designed to resemble the summary format used on Amazon.
com, in terms of color, style, and information presented (e.g.,
bars and counts in the description format). Each bar plot
consisted of a total of 100 ratings. The total number of rat-
ings of each star value was specified next to the bars. Partic-
ipants were free to study the bar plot for as long as they
wanted before making a final decision. In the experience for-
mat, participants sampled consumer ratings sequentially.
They pressed a blue or a green key to choose one or
the other option and were shown a randomly sampled
consumer rating for that product, displayed as a number
of stars. There were no constraints in terms of time,
number of samples, or sampling sequence. The ratings
were randomly drawn with replacement from the under-
lying hidden distribution of ratings, which was identical
to that presented in the description format. Participants
indicated when they were ready to stop sampling. Once
sampling was terminated, they were asked to make their
final choice.
Figure 2 displays an example pair of the distributions
employed. In every pair of options, one was clearly unimodal
(A). The other option (B) was bimodal and followed the J-
shaped pattern described in Hu et al. (2009). These distribu-
tions allowed us to study the psychological impact of rare
ratings (refer to APPENDIX B for a full table of the choice
problems used). For example, based on the complete distri-
bution of ratings in Figure 2, option A has the higher mean
rating. However, assuming the rare ratings at the most nega-
tive end of option B has little or no impact—because they are
not sampled, undersampled, or not recently sampled—then,
option B will have the higher experienced mean and may
thus be preferred over option A. For all pairs of distributions,
it holds that not choosing the higher objective mean (HOM)
is consistent with underweighting rare product ratings. Put
differently, one option always represented the (objectively)
higher mean rating; the other option represented the (objec-
tively) higher median rating.
In addition to sampling and choice data, we collected
information on the perceived difficulty of a choice. Specifi-
cally, participants rated the difficulty of each choice on a
scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult).
RESULTS
Two of the 10 distribution pairs were incorrectly specified in
our automated protocol for a substantial part of the data
collection. The following results are therefore based on only
eight of the 10 product choices per format.
2The order in which participants worked through the two formats did not af-
fect either choice proportions (description, t61 = 0.93; p= .355; experience,
t61 = 1.34; p= .185) or average sample sizes (t61 = 1.52, p= .133).
3The secondary task was the automated operation span task developed by
Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, and Engle (2005). We chose this task for two rea-
sons. First, it is a rather long task (~20min), making carry-over effects from
one format to the other relatively unlikely. Second, one previous study has
reported a relationship between working memory capacity and sample size
(Rakow et al., 2008). We investigated whether this finding could be repli-
cated using a similar working memory task. However, we found no relation-
ships between operation span, as follows: (i) sample size (r= .04); (ii) switch
rate (r=!.07, refer to Hills & Hertwig, 2010); or (iii) subsample size
(r=!.02).
Figure 1. Screenshot of the description (A) and experience (B) rating formats. In the description format, a full table of 100 ratings is
displayed, one below each product. In the experience format, ratings are presented individually below each product as it is sampled. The
occurrences of individual ratings are determined by the underlying distributions (identical to those in the description format) and the search
behavior of the participant.
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Is there a description–experience gap in choice based on
consumer ratings?
The description and experience rating formats resulted in
substantially different choices in relation to the products’ ob-
jective mean rating. Figure 3 shows that the probability of
choosing the product with the HOM rating was about 13 per-
centage points lower when the choice was based on experi-
ence (M= 65.5%, SD= 19.3%) as opposed to description
(M= 78.4%, SD= 24%). Thus, even though participants
saw the same product options in the experience and descrip-
tion formats, which were both based on the same underlying
distributions, the participants chose the HOM option less
often when their decisions were based on the experience
format, t(62) = 3.66, p< .001, d = . 59.4
This behavior is consistent with people in experience-based
risky choice choosing as if rare events receive less weight than
what they deserve according to their objective probability
(Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Hertwig et al., 2004). The description–
experience gap thus appears to generalize from the domain of
monetary gambles to the domain of online consumer choice
based on product ratings. Next, we examine to what extent
the gap can be explained in terms of small samples and recency.
Small samples
Probably, the most important factor in the gap between the
description and experience formats is limited search in the
experience format (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Small samples
reduce the likelihood of encountering rare ratings (be they
positive or negative) and thereby reduce their impact.5 The
average sample size per decision problem varied between
18 and 24 (Figure 4), with a mean of 20.67 (SD = 2.46).
These numbers are similar to but slightly larger than the
sample sizes reported in other computer-based studies of
decisions from experience (e.g., Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010;
Hertwig et al., 2004). One possible reason for this small in-
crease in sample size is the absence of sure options, which
are usually explored less extensively (Lejarraga, Hertwig,
Figure 3. Description-experience gap. Overall proportions of people
choosing the higher objective mean separately for description and
experience format of consumer ratings are displayed. Lines and
numbers represent the decision proportions for the eight problems
analyzed. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
4Mixed-effects analyses revealed that the inclusion of a fixed problem factor
did not improve the prediction of choices in either the experience or the de-
scription format (likelihood-ratio test; experience, X27 = 7.45, p= .38; de-
scription, X27 = 12.63, p= .08).
5The likelihood of experiencing a rating can be understood in terms of the
proportion of people that observe the rating less frequently than expected
or not at all. Thus defined, a reduced likelihood can be qualified via the shape
of the sampling distribution: A right-skewed sampling distribution implies a
higher proportion of people experiencing a rating less often than the ex-
pected value, and vice versa.The sampling distribution for the number of oc-
currences of any outcome is governed by a binomial distribution and its
skewness is calculated as 1!2pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
n*p* 1!pð Þ
p . This term is positive (right skewed)
for all p< .5 and increases with smaller ps and smaller ns. Hence, smaller
sample sizes reduce the likelihood of experiencing rare ratings.
Figure 2. Pair of distributions of consumer ratings. In this example, Distribution A is superior in terms of the mean star rating and therefore
more likely to be chosen in the absence of underweighting of rare events. Underweighting rare events, in contrast, should result in favoring
Option B (J-shaped distribution).
Figure 4. Sample size per decision problem.
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& Gonzalez, 2012). Critically, the observed sample sizes are
sufficiently small to render it possible for small sample size
to have a direct impact on choice. For illustration, with 20
draws spread across both products, the chances of experienc-
ing each of five possible star ratings in both options (the
maximum per option in this study), assuming an equal distri-
bution of ratings (each rating has a likelihood of 20%), are
about one in five. Thus, small sample sizes could easily influ-
ence choice.
Indeed, small samples had a direct impact on the final
choice. Taking more samples increased the likelihood that
participants would choose the option with the HOM rating
(the correlation between mean individual sample size and
the proportion of HOM mean choices was r= .47, p< .001).
A mediation analysis showed that the reduced sampling of rare
ratings was sufficient to explain the fewer choices favoring the
HOM ratings (APPENDIX A). Thus, consistent with our pre-
dictions, one explanation for the description–experience gap is
that participants were content with relatively small samples of
ratings in the experience format, thus either missing the rare
ratings or experiencing them less frequently than expected.
This led participants in experience-based formats to make
choices as if they were underweighting rare ratings.
Why do people content themselves with relatively small
samples of information that is essentially free? One possible
explanation is the amplification effect (Hertwig & Pleskac,
2010): Small samples amplify the perceived difference
between the expected mean earnings associated with the
payoff distributions, thus making the options more distinct
and choice easier. The same argument applies to distribu-
tions of consumer ratings. Consistent with the amplification
effect, we found that our participants’ evaluations of choice
difficulty were substantially correlated with sample size
(subject level: r = .39, p = .002). Specifically, avid searchers
judged decisions to be more difficult than did frugal
searchers. However, a within-participant comparison be-
tween the experience and description formats revealed that
choice difficulty for frugal searchers was not attenuated as
has been observed by Hertwig and Pleskac (2010). Follow-
ing the original Hertwig and Pleskac analysis, we analyzed
perceived difficulty as a function of a median split on sam-
ple size and the different formats. Frugal searchers judged
their experience-based choices to be as easy as those made
in the description format, t(30) = 1.59, p= .12. Avid searchers,
in contrast, judged their experience-based choices to be signif-
icantly more difficult than those made in the description
format, t(31) = 4.57, p< .001. However, the interaction failed
to reach significance, F(1,120) = 0.4, p= .85. Overall, drawing
higher numbers of samples nevertheless appeared to be
associated with decreased ease of making decisions.
Of course, this analysis ignores some important information.
It glosses over the stratified nature of the data and neglects the
mediating role of actual difficulty (i.e., the difference in experi-
enced means between problems). If the amplification effect
works as proposed, then higher levels of search should be asso-
ciated with increased perceived difficulty, and this association
should, in turn, be mediated by the actual difficulty. Alterna-
tively, if difficulty is a mere expression of effort, then taking
more or fewer samples should remain related to perceived
difficulty even after the inclusion of actual difficulty. To address
this issue, we performed a mixed-effects analysis6 predicting
the perceived difficulty by sample size and, in the second step,
the final Cohen’s d based on the experienced outcomes of a
given problem as an indicator of actual difficulty. To account
for dependent measurements, we included two random inter-
cepts for participants and problems.
Consistent with the amplification effect, we found sam-
ple size to be highly associated with perceived difficulty
(b = .57, p< .001). Importantly, this association was only
moderately reduced by the inclusion of actual difficulty
(partial effect: b = .49, p< .001). Thus, the effort of sam-
pling appears to contribute to the perception of difficulty.
However, the pattern of partial mediation is completed by sig-
nificant associations both between sample size and actual diffi-
culty (b=!.29, p< .001), with larger sample sizes being
related to smaller differences, and between actual difficulty
and perceived difficulty (b=!.16, p< .001; Baron & Kenny,
1986; refer also to APPENDIX A). Thus, in addition to the
influence of effort, small samples rendered choices easy.
The influence of recency on consumer choice
In past research, recency has not consistently been observed to
affect decisions from experience (refer to Hertwig & Erev,
2009). Did it affect our participants’ product choices? We
based our analysis on the initial and final samples taken from
each option. Sample means were computed for both options’
initial and final sampling periods (Figure 5) and compared
with respect to their ability to predict the final choices.
Out of 96 cases where the initial and final sampling period
suggested different options to be better, participants chose
the option that had the higher mean in the most recent sam-
pling period in 72 (74%) cases (sign test, p< 0.001). More-
over, a mixed-effects analysis using the means within the
first samples and last samples also revealed a much higher
impact for the mean difference in the last samples (odds
ratio= 17.27, p< .001) than that for the mean difference in
the first samples (odds ratio = 2.31, p< .001).7 Recency thus
appears to have played an important role in product choice
based on online consumer ratings.
DISCUSSION
Social information in the form of consumer ratings is a
driving factor behind online consumer choice. We
6Mixed-effects analyses were performed using the R packages lme4 and
lmerTest. Degrees of freedom for the Gaussian linear models were estimated
using Satterthwaite’s approximation, the default method in lmerTest. For
better comparison, all predictors were standardized.
7This analysis was based on 296 of 504 decisions in which the participants
switched at least twice between the options. We also tested whether this ef-
fect was moderated by differences in the number of samples in the first sam-
ples (average length = 12.4) and last samples (average length = 9). However,
the inclusion of two variables representing the number of samples left the ef-
fects unchanged and did not result in improved model fit, X2(2) = 4.44,
p= .11.
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investigated the extent to which recent findings in re-
search on decisions from experience in the domain of
monetary gambles generalize to choice based on online
consumer ratings. Our results suggest that the domain of
online consumer choice may be subject to some of the
same information-format dependence as observed in risky
choice. There is a profound difference between making
choices based on a summary “descriptive” format of
online consumer ratings and making choices based on se-
quential sampling from individual consumer ratings, even
when the underlying distributions of the ratings are the
same (Hertwig & Erev, 2009).
Our results further demonstrate that factors previously
proposed to contribute to the description–experience gap
may apply more generally. Specifically, we observed three
contributors to the description–experience gap in choice
based on online consumer ratings: First, people perceived
choices to be easier when they took smaller samples (refer
to Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). Second, small sample sizes
reduced the likelihood of participants experiencing rare
information, leading them to make choices as if they
underweighted rare ratings. Third, participants were clearly
influenced by the recency of sampled information
(Hertwig et al., 2004)—again, leading them to make
choices as if they underweighted rare ratings. In sum, the
full set of core findings on the description–experience
gap persisted in a (hypothetical) online consumer choice
scenario in which the outcome distributions were more
complex than in previous investigations of the
description–experience gap. This not only opens up many
new directions for future research but also has specific im-
plications for e-commerce.
In particular, the format dependence of the impact of
infrequent ratings is of great importance for e-commerce.
As noted by Hu et al. (2009), the majority of consumer
rating distributions are J-shaped, with many favorable rat-
ings and few unfavorable ones. Our findings indicate that
this will lead people to have lower expectations of con-
sumer goods when looking at summary description-based
formats than when perusing individual ratings or entries
(but refer to Ert, 2005). Administrators of e-commerce
sites can potentially use these findings to foster more
informed consumer choice and consumer satisfaction by
making sure that consumers always have access to full
summary descriptions. Further, the observed recency ef-
fect illustrates the relevance of presentation order of con-
sumer ratings. Finally, our findings are relevant for the
growing problem of separating truthful from fabricated
reviews (Streitfeld, 2013). If fake ratings are both extreme
and rare, then the use of the experience format would
naturally undermine their influence in much the same
way as a trimmed mean reduces the influence of strategic
scoring in sports competitions (refer to Bamberger, Erev,
Kimmel, & Oref-Chen, 2005).
Further, there is a rich set of findings in research on deci-
sions from experience involving risky choice that appears
relevant to research on the psychological impact of online
product reviews. For instance, it has been demonstrated that
the amount of information search substantially varies with
factors such as the decision maker’s affective state (Frey,
Hertwig, & Rieskamp, 2014), the value of the options
(Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008), the choice domain
(i.e., gain versus loss; Lejarraga et al., 2012), and the
influence of prior sampling from larger or smaller set
sizes (Hills et al., 2013). Another important finding is
that the way people search for information in terms of
switching between options (or distribution of ratings)
foreshadows the decision strategies that people appear
to use (Hills & Hertwig, 2010)—providing another
potential explanation for the description–experience
gap. Specifically, it has been shown that people who
often switch between options in the sampling period do
not maximize the mean outcome but rather tend to
choose an option that is better “most of the time.”
Finally, in light of the inconsistency of previous findings
on recency effects (e.g., Rakow et al., 2008; Ungemach
et al., 2009), the pronounced recency effect observed
here suggests problem complexity (e.g., number of
distinct outcomes/ratings) as a potential moderator of
recency in experience-based choice.
Of course, we should emphasize that this first investiga-
tion does not reflect the true complexity of e-commerce sites.
Most importantly, the majority of sites (e.g., Amazon.com,
Tripadvisor.com, etc.) allow consumers to peruse ratings in
combination with written reviews. These range from largely
uninformative brief statements (“great book”) to reviews pro-
viding valuable assessments of a product and its properties.
Our investigation cannot account for this or for other sources
of information (e.g., ratings of the helpfulness of a review,
full profiles of reviewers, and total number of ratings). All
of these dimensions can and should be addressed in subse-
quent studies.
Last but not least, we should emphasize that our study—
based on hypothetical product reviews and incentivized, but
ultimately hypothetical, choices between pairs of consumer
products—cannot approximate the rich motivational struc-
ture of actual consumer choice. The goals of people buying
consumer products of the type used here (e.g., camcorders)
will differ from those of our participants. First, a consumer
may focus on a single product (rather than two or more
Figure 5. Illustration of first samples and last samples. First samples include all samples prior to the second switch, and last samples include
all samples beyond the second to last switch.
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products) and is likely to compare products along numerous
potentially incommensurable dimensions. Second, as a con-
sumer typically purchases only one, say, camcorder, he or
she may aim to minimize the maximum loss (the purchase
of a “lemon”) or to satisfy an aspiration level for each
purchase. In contrast, in our study implementing 10 choices,
a bad outcome in one choice can be compensated by a good
outcome in another; hence, the participant can aggregate
theriskoverchoicesbracketedtogether(Read,Loewenstein,&
Rabin, 1999). Therefore, the robustness of the present results
should next be tested in settings with real product ratings,
real consumer products, and real choices. Notwithstanding
these issues, however, it is worth noting that the
description–experience gap obtained in monetary gambles,
and replicated here, has also been found in (hypothetical)
choices in which people relied on a minimax heuristic
(thus avoiding the worst possible outcome), namely, in
choices between drugs with different uncertain side
effects (Lejarraga, Pachur, Frey, & Hertwig, 2014).
Furthermore, individual choice problems in a collection
of problems are often played as if they were faced in
isolation (Wulff, Hills, & Hertwig, 2014). These results
raise the possibility that the gap between choices in the
laboratory and consumer choices is perhaps smaller than
it might first appear.
The aim of this article has been to relate two hitherto
unrelated lines of research on human choice, namely,
online consumer choice and risky choice between mone-
tary gambles. The literature on risky choice has produced
a large body of experimental findings and theoretical
explanations. We found that some key findings on the
description–experience gap in risky choice generalize to
online consumer choice. This raises the promising and
fruitful possibility that other effects observed in research
on experience-based and description-based risky choice
may also generalize to consumer choice. If so, human
choice across different domains may, to some extent,
follow the same regularities.
APPENDIX A
The impact of sample size on higher objective mean (HOM)
choices was predicted to be mediated by experiencing versus
not experiencing rare events. To test this prediction, we
performed a mediation analysis on the trial level with the
percentage of possible distinct ratings experienced as the
mediator. Specifically, we specified a mixed-effects model via
the lmer and glmer functions in the R package lme4, with random
subject intercepts and standardized variables. We found that
sample size significantly predicted HOM (odds ratio=1.32,
p= .011) and the percentage of distinct ratings experienced
(β = .53, p< .001), with higher sample sizes leading to more
HOM and the observation of more distinct ratings (Figure A1).
Thus, two of the necessary conditions in Baron and Kenny’s
steps for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986) are fulfilled. The
third condition postulates that the size of the direct effect of the
independent variable (sample size) on the dependent variable
(HOM) either drops substantially after the inclusion of the medi-
ator (partial mediation) or vanishes completely (full mediation).
We found the latter. The effect of sample size on HOM vanished
entirely (odds ratio=1.02, p= .865) when we controlled for the
percentage of distinct ratings experienced. Thus, the effect of
sample size on HOM was fully mediated by the percentage of
distinct ratings experienced.
Table B1. Choice problems (P) employed in our investigation
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Stars L H L H L H L H L H L H L H L H L H L H
1 .2 .65 .35 .05 .05 .25 .1 .6 .3
2 .05 .9 .25 .65 .05 .1 .6 .05 .05
3 .05 .7 .05 .05 .7 .05 .6 .35 .05
4 .9 .05 .15 .05 .8
5 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05
6 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05
7 .1 .1 .85 .75
8 .25 .65 .55 .05 .05
9 .55 .15 .05 .8 .1 .05 .15 .85
10 .65 .3 .05 .05 .65 .05 .3 .25 .15 .65
Note: Entries to left and right of the shaded lines denote the relative frequencies/probabilities of the 1 to 10 star values. Problems 3 and 7 were miscoded for the
first 13 of the 63 participants; the numbers displayed correspond to the problems seen by the remaining 50 participants. In order to remedy this mistake, we
restricted the analyses to the other eight problems.
APPENDIX B
Figure A1. Mediation analysis. “Full” indicates the effect of sample
size on higher objective mean (HOM) choices without controlling
for percentage of distinct ratings experienced, whereas “Partial”
indicates the effect when the mediator is accounted for.
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! Risikokommunikation
Dieser Artikel gibt eine Einführung in das „Description-Experience Gap“ –
der Beobachtung eines systematischen Unterschieds in Risikoentschei-
dungen aufgrund symbolischer Beschreibungen bzw. sequentieller Er-
fahrungen. Die „Kluft“ wird besonders deutlich bei seltenen Ereignissen,
die zu viel Gewicht (Beschreibung) bzw. zu wenig Gewicht (Erfahrung)
erhalten können. Ursachen und Implikationen werden diskutiert.
........................................................
1. Das „Gewicht“ seltener
Ereignisse
........................................................
In den Jahren nach 2007 rang die Welt
mit der Gefahr einer Kernschmelze des
internationalen Finanzsystems. Mehrere
extreme Ereignisse, von denen jedes für
sich genommen sehr unwahrscheinlich
schien – der Zusammenbruch der U.S.
Bank Lehman Brothers, der drohende
Bankrott großer Banken (z. B. Hypo Real
Estate), großer Finanzdienstleister (z. B.
AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) und gan-
zer Staaten –, folgten in schneller Abfolge
aufeinander. Was als eine Krise des inter-
nationalen Finanzsystems begann, wurde
schnell zu einer Weltwirtschaftskrise, in
deren Folge globale Unternehmen in
Schieflage gerieten, Staatsbudgets aus
dem Ruder liefen und die Arbeitslosigkeit
in vielen Ländern rasant anstieg. Warum
war die Welt auf die Möglichkeit dieser
Ereignisse so schlecht vorbereitet? Eine
Erklärung lautet, dass die Risikomanage-
mentmodelle mit ihrer auf der Normal-
verteilungshypothese aufbauenden Logik
in jenen Welten scheitern, die systema-
tisch von der Gauß-Funktion abweichen
(z. B. „fat tails“-Verteilungen). In Welten,
in denen selten doch nicht so selten ist
wie theoretisch angenommen, unter-
schätzen diese Modelle die Häufigkeit
seltener, extremer Verluste (vgl. Taleb,
2007).
Das so angeblich optimierte Risikoma-
nagement ist aber sicher nicht das alleini-
ge Glied in der Ursachenkette. Auch die
individuellen Marktteilnehmer haben
sich offensichtlich nicht genügend auf
das Risiko extremer ökonomischer Ereig-
nisse eingestellt – zum Beispiel all jene
Besitzer einer Immobilie, die im Verlauf
der Krise ihre Kredite nicht mehr bedie-
nen konnten und sich mit einer Zwangs-
versteigerung konfrontiert sahen. Warum
aber haben viele Akteure durchweg die
Möglichkeit seltener, extremer Ereignisse
unterschätzt oder gar völlig ignoriert?
Können psychologische Theorien und
Befunde – letztere gewonnen in Verhal-
tensexperimenten zu Entscheidungen
unter Risiko und Unsicherheit – diese
mutmaßliche Achtlosigkeit gegenüber
seltenen, aber schwerwiegenden Ereignis-
sen erklären? Auf den ersten Blick nicht.
Zahlreiche Studien der Entscheidungs-
forschung scheinen eher eine gegenteilige
Tendenz zu belegen: Die Wahrscheinlich-
keit seltener Ereignisse wird häufig über-
schätzt. Zum Beispiel werden relativ sel-
tene Risiken, wie die einer Lebensmittel-
vergiftung oder Lungenkrebs infolge von
Nikotingenuss, im Schnitt viel zu hoch
eingeschätzt (vgl. Lichtenstein et al., 1978;
Viscusi, 2002). Mediale Berichterstattung,
die dazu neigt, seltenen, aber dramati-
schen Krankheiten und Todesursachen
(z. B. BSE und die Creutzfeld-Jakob-
Krankheit) unverhältnismäßig viel Be-
achtung zu schenken, spielt bei dieser
Tendenz zur Überschätzung sicher eine
Rolle (vgl. Renn, 2014). Aber selbst wenn
seltene Risiken nicht geschätzt werden
müssen, sondern explizit quantifiziert
sind, wird unwahrscheinlichen Ereignis-
sen mehr psychologisches Gewicht beige-
messen als ihnen, gemessen an ihrer ob-
jektiven Wahrscheinlichkeit, zustünde.
Dies ist zumindest eine der zentralen An-
nahmen in der Cumulative Prospect-
Theorie (vgl. Tversky/Kahneman, 1992),
der einflussreichsten deskriptiven Theo-
rie des Entscheidens unter Risiko. Mithil-
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Wähle zwischen
A: 3 €    mit Sicherheit
oder
B: 32 € mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 10%
0 € mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 90%
Abb. 1: Eine typische beschreibungsbasierte
Lotterie mit zwei Optionen
fe der Annahme einer nichtlinearen
Wahrscheinlichkeitsgewichtungsfunktion,
die einen umgekehrt S-förmigen Verlauf
nimmt und nach der seltene Ereignisse
„übergewichtet“ und Ereignisse mit mitt-
leren und hohen Wahrscheinlichkeiten
„untergewichtet“ werden, erklärt sie Ver-
haltensanomalien, die die Erwartungs-
nutzentheorie vor Probleme stellt (z. B.
gleichzeitige Risikofreude und Risikoaver-
sion in Gestalt von Lottospielen und Er-
werb von Versicherungen).
Warum also handeln Menschen, die nach
weithin akzeptierter Sichtweise dazu nei-
gen, geringe Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu
überschätzen oder diesen, sobald sie ex-
pliziert werden, zu viel Gewicht einzu-
räumen, als ob sie die Möglichkeit selte-
ner katastrophaler Ereignisse nicht ernst
genug nähmen? Um dieses scheinbare
Paradox zu verstehen, hilft eine Unter-
scheidung, die seit etwa einer Dekade in
der Entscheidungsforschung zunehmend
Beachtung findet: Über die Wahrschein-
lichkeit eines unsicheren Ereignisses
kann man – sehr vereinfacht – auf zwei
grundsätzlich unterschiedlichen Wegen
Kenntnis erlangen: durch die symboli-
sche Beschreibung seiner Wahrschein-
lichkeit oder durch die sequentielle Er-
fahrung des Auftretens bzw. Nichtauftre-
tens des Ereignisses (vgl. Hertwig et al.,
2004). Die Annahme der Überbewertung
seltener Ereignisse lässt außer Acht, dass
eine Vielzahl von Entscheidungen nicht
auf expliziten und beschriebenen Infor-
mationen über Wahrscheinlichkeiten be-
ruhen. In diesen Fällen, die nicht die Aus-
nahme, sondern eher die Regel darstellen,
können Menschen häufig nichts anderes
tun, als sich auf ihre Erfahrungen zu ver-
lassen.
Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, Erkenntnisse
der psychologischen Forschung zur
„Kluft“ zwischen erfahrungs- und be-
schreibungsbasierten Risikoentscheidun-
gen zu erläutern und Konsequenzen für
das unternehmerische Risikomanage-
ment zu diskutieren. Im nächsten Ab-
schnitt beschreiben wir hierzu die
Grundlagen erfahrungs- und beschrei-
bungsbasierter Risikoentscheidungen. In
Abschnitt 3 stellen wir die experimentelle
Methodik vor, die verwendet wird, um
diese systematische Kluft zwischen den
beiden Formaten zu untersuchen. An-
schließend umreißen wir in Abschnitt 4
zwei wesentliche Erklärungen für den
Unterschied zwischen den beiden Klassen
von Entscheidungen. Zum Abschluss ver-
anschaulichen wir in Abschnitt 5 anhand
zweier Beispiele im Bereich Konsumen-
ten- und Investitionsentscheidungen







Entscheidungsforscher, gleichgültig ob in
der Psychologie oder der Ökonomie, un-
tersuchen die Frage, wie Menschen mit
Risiko umgehen, häufig mit dem Werk-
zeug monetärer Lotterien. Die Lotterie,
so die Annahme, ist das perfekte Double
für reale Entscheidungssituationen. Ge-
nau wie Lotterien sind die realen Optio-
nen, zwischen denen es zu entscheiden
gilt, nichts anderes als Wahrscheinlich-
keitsverteilungen über n mögliche mone-
täre (und/oder nicht-monetäre) Ausgän-
ge. Daher unterstellen Entscheidungsfor-
scher, wenn sie Personen dabei zusehen,
wie sie sich zwischen Lotterien entschei-
den, wie diese sich entscheiden würden,
wenn es um die Wahl zwischen verschie-
denen Investitionsfonds, Partnern oder
Karrierewegen ginge. Man kann diese für
die Entscheidungsforschung so zweck-
dienliche Annahme aus vielen Gründen
kritisieren. Ein wichtiger Kritikpunkt ist
allerdings dieser: Selbst wenn man die
Rollenzuschreibung, wonach die Auswahl
zwischen Lotterien das Sinnbild für
Wahlentscheidungen schlechthin ist, ak-
zeptieren würde, ist ein Aspekt besonders
fragwürdig: Lotterien im Labor bestehen
im Regelfall aus zwei oder mehreren Op-
tionen und jede Option ist vollständig
expliziert, das heißt, die möglichen mo-
netären Ereignisse und dazugehörigen
Wahrscheinlichkeiten werden vollständig
beschrieben. Abb. 1 illustriert eine einfa-
che und vollständig beschriebene Lotterie
mit zwei Optionen: Eine der Optionen ist
ein sicheres Ereignis (3 € mit Sicherheit),
die andere Option offeriert eine relativ
beträchtliche Summe von 32 € mit einer
geringen Wahrscheinlichkeit von 10 %
oder das Ereignis 0 € mit einer Wahr-
scheinlichkeit von 90 %.
Den Luxus, die Konsequenzen und
Wahrscheinlichkeiten der Entscheidungs-
optionen auf einem Silbertablett darge-
boten zu bekommen, gibt es aber nur sel-
ten außerhalb des Labors. Das bedeutet
jedoch nicht, dass reale Entscheidungen
notwendigerweise ohne eine Vorstellung
von den zugrunde liegenden möglichen
Ereignissen und Wahrscheinlichkeiten
getroffen würden. Nicht selten stehen Er-
fahrungen – die eigenen oder die anderer
Personen – in ähnlichen Situationen zur
Verfügung. Und manchmal kann man
auch die Entscheidungsoptionen erst ex-
plorieren, bevor die Entscheidung getrof-
fen wird. Wein, den man beim Erzeuger
kauft, kann man zum Beispiel vorher
probieren. Oder man kann die Erfahrung
anderer mit einem Hotel, einem Sport-
studio oder einer Kinderkrippe zu Rate
ziehen, bevor man sich für ein Angebot
entscheidet. Entscheidungen, die auf Ba-
sis begrenzter und abzählbarer Erfahrun-
gen mit einer Option getroffen werden,
nennen wir erfahrungsbasierte Ent-
scheidungen (Decisions from experien-
ce). Im Gegensatz dazu nennen wir Ent-
scheidungen, für die eine vollständige Be-
schreibung der möglichen Ereignisse und
ihrer Wahrscheinlichkeiten vorliegt, be-
schreibungsbasierte Entscheidungen
(Decisions from description). Beschrei-
bungen können symbolische oder gra-
phische Form annehmen.
Die Analyse beschreibungs- und erfah-
rungsbasierter Entscheidungen existierte
lange unabhängig voneinander. Erst in
den letzten zehn Jahren hat sich dies
grundlegend geändert. Die Initialzün-
dung lieferte die Entdeckung eines syste-
matischen und gravierenden Unter-
schieds in den Entscheidungen, die auf
der Grundlage von Beschreibung und Er-
fahrung getroffen werden: die „Kluft“
zwischen beschreibungs- und erfah-
rungsbasierten Entscheidungen (Des-
cription-Experience Gap; vgl. Hertwig/
Erev, 2009).
........................................................




Wie kann man das in Abb. 1 dargestellte
Entscheidungsparadigma in ein erfah-
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Abb. 2: Schematische Darstellung des Sampling-Paradigmas zur Untersuchung von entschei-
dungsbasierten Risikowahlen
rungsbasiertes Paradigma übersetzen,
und zwar so, dass beide Situationen, zu-
mindest im Prinzip, die gleichen Infor-
mationen zur Verfügung stellen? Ent-
scheidungsforscher bedienen sich dazu
der folgenden Anordnung: Versuchsper-
sonen sehen zwei (oder mehr) Kästchen
auf einem Computerbildschirm. Diese
repräsentieren zwei zu Beginn völlig un-
bekannte Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilun-
gen. Das Klicken auf die Kästchen löst je-
weils eine Zufallsziehung eines mög-
lichen Ereignisses gemäß der zugrunde
liegenden Verteilung aus. Basierend auf
dieser Anordnung kann man drei Para-
digmen unterscheiden. Im Sampling-Pa-
radigma (Abb. 2; vgl.Hertwig et al., 2004)
können Versuchspersonen so viele Zu-
fallsziehungen auslösen, wie sie möchten,
bevor sie die Exploration der Verteilun-
gen beenden. Dann werden sie gebeten,
sich zu entscheiden, auf welche Option
sie setzen wollen. Diese letzte Wahl wird
am Ende des Experiments ausgespielt
und das Ergebnis bestimmt den monetä-
ren Gewinn oder Verlust der Person.
Das Sampling-Paradigma stellt eine
Umwelt dar, in der die Suche nach Infor-
mation möglich ist, ohne dass die zufällig
gezogenen Ereignisse bereits zu materiel-
len Gewinnen oder Verlusten führen. Das
heißt, die Informationssuche zieht keine
Kosten nach sich (mit Ausnahme von
Opportunitätskosten). Daher könnte
man die Verteilungen sorgfältig explorie-
ren, bevor man eine Entscheidung trifft
– so wie man sich beispielsweise sehr ge-
nau die Speisekarten von zwei teuren
Gourmettempeln anschaut, bevor man
sich für einen entscheidet. Im Sampling-
Paradigma ist jener Zielkonflikt suspen-
diert, der unvermeidlich in Umwelten
auftritt, in denen man sich zwischen un-
bekannten Optionen entscheiden muss:
Soll man auf das Lernen neuer Informa-
tionen und langfristige Gewinnmaximie-
rung setzen oder auf die Maximierung
des Gewinns, basierend auf der Grundla-
ge bekannter Informationen (explorati-
on-exploitation tradeoff; vgl. Gupta et
al., 2006). Das Sampling-Paradigma lässt
sich jedoch schnell in ein Paradigma ver-
ändern, in dem dieser Zielkonflikt unver-
meidbar ist. Das Partial-Feedback-Para-
digma folgt der gleichen Logik wie das
Sampling-Paradigma, mit dem einzigen
Unterschied, dass nun jede Zufallszie-
hung (und deren Gesamtanzahl wird
jetzt fixiert) bereits zum monetären End-
ergebnis beiträgt (d. h. dieses reduziert
oder erhöht). Das dritte und letzte Para-
digma ist das Feedback-Paradigma. Es
ist so strukturiert wie das Partial-Feed-
back-Paradigma, nur dass jetzt nach jeder
Zufallsziehung Informationen darüber
gegeben werden, welcher Gewinn oder
Verlust eingetreten wäre, wenn die andere
Option gewählt worden wäre.
Bei der vergleichenden Analyse von be-
schreibungs- und erfahrungsbasierten
Entscheidungen stehen diese drei Para-
digmen und die folgende Frage im Fokus:
Findet man unter Beschreibung (vgl.
Abb. 1) und Erfahrung ein ähnliches
oder systematisch unterschiedliches Ent-
scheidungsverhalten? Abb. 3 illustriert
beispielhaft die Antwort, die in einer
Vielzahl von Studien gefunden wurde.
Erfahrungs- und beschreibungsbasierte
Formate führen nicht zu identischem
Verhalten. Der Unterschied wird beson-
ders deutlich, wenn eine Entscheidung
zwischen einer riskanten Option, die ent-
weder einen relativ hohen Gewinn oder
hohen Verlust mit geringer Wahrschein-
lichkeit (< 20 %; das seltene Ereignis)
bietet, und einer sicheren Option, welche
mit Sicherheit nur einen moderaten Ge-
winn oder Verlust garantiert, ansteht. Vor
diese Wahl gestellt, fällt in allen drei er-
fahrungsbasierten Paradigmen die Wahl
der Mehrheit auf die riskante Option, so-
fern das seltene Ereignis unattraktiv ist,
aber auf die sichere Option, sofern das
seltene Ereignis attraktiv ist (vgl. Abb. 3).
Bei beschreibungsbasierten Entscheidun-
gen findet sich die nahezu umgekehrte
Mehrheitspräferenz. Insgesamt lässt sich
der Unterschied so zusammenfassen: In
erfahrungsbasierten Situationen ent-
scheiden sich Menschen so, als ob der
Einfluss der seltenen Ereignisse unterge-
wichtet würde (relativ zu den objektiven
Wahrscheinlichkeiten), während bei be-
schreibungsbasierten Entscheidungen ihr
Einfluss übergewichtet zu sein scheint.
........................................................





Es gibt mehrere Faktoren, die verant-
wortlich für den Unterschied zwischen
Erfahrung und Beschreibung sind. Die
wichtigsten sind die frugale Informa-
tionssuche und die Art und Weise, wie
die verfügbare Information verarbeitet
wird. Beide Faktoren werden im Folgen-
den näher erläutert.
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Abb. 3: Prozentsatz von Wahlen der mit Risiko behafteten Option in sechs verschiedenen Lotterien und als Funktion der vier experimentellen Para-
digmen (entnommen aus Hertwig/Erev, 2009, S. 519)
Abb. 4: Verteilung der Stichprobengrößen im
Sampling-Paradigma (Ergebnisse aus 21 un-
abhängigen Datensätzen, basierend auf einer
laufenden Metaanalyse von Dirk U. Wulff und
Ralph Hertwig)
Frugale Suche
Das Sampling-Paradigma (vgl. Abb. 2)
stellt es jeder Person frei, die Optionen
sorgfältig zu explorieren (d. h. Zufalls-
stichproben zu ziehen). Im Durchschnitt
findet man allerdings, dass die Anzahl
der Ziehungen erstaunlich begrenzt ist.
Abb. 4 zeigt die Ergebnisse einer Meta-
analyse von über 10.000 Entscheidungen,
die von über 1.000 Versuchspersonen
stammen. Der Median der Stichproben-
größe in der Metaanalyse liegt sehr nahe
an dem Median, der bereits in der ersten
Untersuchung mit dem Sample-Paradig-
ma beobachtet wurde (Median = 15; vgl.
Hertwig et al., 2004). Im Durchschnitt
zeigen sich Versuchspersonen mit relativ
wenigen Ziehungen zufrieden und treffen
bereits nach etwa 7 ± 2 Beobachtungen
pro Option eine Entscheidung.
Welche Konsequenzen hat diese relativ
frugale Exploration? Stichprobenbasierte
Schätzungen über die Wahrscheinlich-
keit, mit der Ereignisse auftreten, sind
mit einem Schätzfehler behaftet. Dieser
Schätzfehler wird, ceteris paribus, desto
grösser, je kleiner die Stichprobe ist. Im
Extremfall könnte eine kleine Stichpro-
bengröße sogar bedeuten, dass ein selte-
nes Ereignis darin überhaupt nicht zuta-
ge tritt und in der Entscheidung unbe-
rücksichtigt bleiben muss. Unterstellt
man zum Bespiel ein seltenes Ereignis
mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 10 %,
dann beträgt die „Gefahr“, dass das Ereig-
nis in einer Stichprobe von sieben Zie-
hungen überhaupt nicht erscheint, beina-
he 50 %. Aber selbst wenn das Ereignis
auftritt, kann eine kleine Stichprobe die
Häufigkeit dieses Ereignisses trotzdem
„unterrepräsentieren“. Das hängt mit
einer Besonderheit des zugrunde liegen-
den stochastischen Prozesses zusammen.
Die Verteilung der Häufigkeiten eines Er-
eignisses, beschrieben durch die Binomi-
alverteilung, ist für kleine Wahrschein-
lichkeiten (das Ereignis ist selten) und
kleine Stichproben schief. Dies bedeutet,
dass im Aggregat kleine Erfahrungsstich-
proben zu Entscheidungen führen kön-
nen, in denen es mehr Leute gibt, die
dem seltenen Ereignis zu wenig Gewicht
beimessen, als Leute, die ihm zu viel Ge-
wicht beimessen (im Hinblick auf seine
objektive Wahrscheinlichkeit) – entweder
weil es überhaupt nicht beobachtet wur-
de oder weil es durch das Bullauge einer
kleinen Stichprobe noch seltener er-
scheint, als es objektiv ist.
Warum verlassen sich Menschen auf klei-
ne Stichproben? Bevor dieses Verhalten
zu schnell als „irrational“ abgehakt wird,
sei Folgendes angemerkt. Die Analyse
einer Computersimulation mit 1.000
(zufällig generierten) Lotterieproblemen
zeigte, dass ein Agent mit lediglich sieben
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Abb. 5: Beschreibungsbasierte (A) vs. erfahrungsbasierte (B) Konsumentenbewertungen
(entnommen aus Wulff et al., 2014)
Ziehungen aus jeder Option (14 insge-
samt) im Schnitt bereits eine 81 %ige
Chance hat, die Option mit dem höheren
Erwartungswert zu erkennen. Danach
nimmt der Zugewinn an Information
durch weitere Ziehungen schnell ab (vgl.
Hertwig/Pleskac, 2010). Die Nutzung fru-
galer Stichproben könnte also auch in der
richtigen Intuition begründet sein, dass
wenige Ziehungen bereits einen großen
Informationsgehalt haben und der mar-
ginale Zugewinn weiterer Ziehungen
schnell immer kleiner wird. Menschen
können eine solche intuitive Kosten-Nut-
zen-Abwägung treffen. Darauf deutet die
Beobachtung hin, dass eine deutliche
Steigerung des monetären Anreizes, die
attraktivere Option zu erkennen, auch zu
deutlich mehr Exploration führt (vgl.
Hau et al., 2008). Dies ist aber bei Weitem
nicht der einzige Faktor, der die Länge
der Informationssuche und damit die
Kluft zwischen erfahrungs- und beschrei-
bungsbasierten Entscheidungen beein-
flusst.Weitere Faktoren sind beispielswei-
se die Anwesenheit „wachsamer“ Emotio-
nen (wie z. B. Furcht), das Aspirationsni-
veau einer Person sowie das Alter (und
damit die abnehmenden kognitiven Ka-
pazitäten; vgl.Hertwig, im Druck).
Informationsverarbeitung
Neben der frugalen Suche gibt es einen
zweiten Faktor, der gleichfalls zu einer
augenscheinlichen „Untergewichtung“
seltener Ereignisse in erfahrungsbasierten
Entscheidungen beiträgt. In beschrei-
bungsbasierten Entscheidungen stehen
alle Informationen gleichzeitig zur Verfü-
gung (vgl. Abb. 1). Erfahrungsbasierte
Informationen reihen sich entlang einer
Zeitschiene auf (vgl. Abb. 2). Dieser For-
matunterschied ermöglicht eine andere
Integration der Information, womöglich
bedingt er sie sogar (vgl. Hertwig, im
Druck). Zum Zeitpunkt der Entschei-
dung müssen beispielsweise die einzelnen
Ziehungen oder eine komprimierte Form
davon aus dem Gedächtnis abgerufen
werden. Häufig materialisiert sich hier
der sogenannte Recency-Effekt: Jüngst
(recent) gesammelte Informationen er-
halten ein höheres Gewicht in der Ent-
scheidung als länger zurückliegende In-
formationen. Dies könnte zum einen mit
durch die Funktionsweise unseres Ge-
dächtnisses verursacht sein: Länger zu-
rückliegende Ereignisse werden in der
Regel schlechter erinnert als jüngere Er-
eignisse. Zum anderen könnte der Recen-
cy-Effekt eine adaptive Reaktion auf Um-
welten sein, die häufig nicht-stationär
und kompetitiv sind. Unabhängig von
seiner Verursachung führt der Recency-
Effekt zu einer „Unterrepräsentation“ sel-
tener Ereignisse (siehe Binomialvertei-
lung), da die ohnehin schon kleine Stich-
probe (siehe oben) sich durch diesen Ge-
dächtnisfilter Recency noch weiter ver-
engt.
Die Liste der psychologischen Faktoren,
die die Kluft zwischen beschreibungs-
und erfahrungsbasierten Entscheidungen
forcieren, ließe sich noch fortsetzen und
auch auf das Partial-Feedback-Paradigma
und Feedback-Paradigma ausdehnen
(vgl. de Palma et al., im Druck). Die Liste
umfasst emotionale und motivationale
Voraussetzungen des Entscheidenden,
nicht zuletzt aber auch den Einfluss von
Suchstrategien. Nicht nur die Menge der
gesammelten Information, sondern auch
die Suchstrategie (d. h. die Art und Wei-
se, wie nach ihr gesucht wird) scheint un-
sere Entscheidungen zu determinieren
(vgl.Hills/Hertwig, 2010).
........................................................
5. Welche praktischen Implika-




Viele Entscheidungen erlauben nur er-
fahrungsbasierte Entscheidungen, weil
die Handlungsalternativen sich nicht in
Gestalt tabellierter Konsequenzen und
assoziierter Wahrscheinlichkeiten präsen-
tieren. In Zeiten von Big Data und Ein-
kaufen im Internet stehen uns allerdings
immer häufiger Beschreibungen in Form
von aggregierten Erfahrungen anderer
zur Verfügung. Routine ist dies beispiels-
weise bereits im Bereich des electronic
commerce. Online-Plattformen wie zum
Beispiel Amazon oder Ebay offerieren Be-
wertungstools. Nach dem Erwerb eines
Produkts können Konsumenten quanti-
tative Bewertungen beispielsweise in
Form von Sternen abgeben. Diese Bewer-
tungen wiederum helfen anderen poten-
ziellen Kunden, die Qualität des Produkts
(des Anbieters) einzuschätzen. Häufig
spiegelt sich in den Bewertungen ein he-
terogenes Meinungsbild, was es nahelegt,
diese Urteile in ein Gesamtbild zu inte-
grieren. Dafür stehen dem Interessierten
oft sowohl die individuellen Urteile als
auch eine aggregierte Gesamtschau zur
Verfügung. Auf Amazon.com zum Bei-
spiel werden alle Bewertungen in Form
eines Balkendiagramms komprimiert
(ähnlich wie in Abb. 5, A). Dieses kann
dann die Grundlage einer beschreibungs-
basierten Produktentscheidung sein. Al-
ternativ kann man sequentiell die Liste
mit den einzelnen Bewertungen durch-
blättern und sich eine Meinung bilden
(Abb. 5, B). Diese sequentiellen „Ziehun-
gen“ können dann die Grundlage einer
erfahrungsbasierten Entscheidung sein.
Führen Balkendiagramm und die se-
quentielle Exposition mit individuellen
Bewertungen zu identischen Entschei-
dungen? Die verfügbare Evidenz deutet
darauf hin, dass Produktentscheidungen
auf der Grundlage von Beschreibung
bzw. sequentieller Erfahrung die gleichen
systematischen Unterschiede aufweisen
wie Wahlentscheidungen in Glücksspie-
len: Seltene Ereignisse (hier sehr positive
oder negative Bewertungen) erhalten
durch frugale Suche und Recency-Effekt
zu wenig Gewicht in erfahrungsbasierten
Entscheidungen (vgl.Wulff et al., 2014).
Ist eines der beiden Informationsformate
das offensichtlich bessere? Oder anders
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gefragt: Sollte man nicht immer das be-
schreibungsbasierte Format präferieren,
weil es eher vollständige und unverzerrte
Information bietet als unsere (begrenzte)
Erfahrung? Dass der Sachverhalt nicht so
einfach liegt, belegt ein klassischer Be-
fund der Forschung zu Anlegerpräferen-
zen: Relativ sichere Anlagen – wie zum
Beispiel Rentenpapiere – werden trotz
schlechterer, langfristiger Renditeerwar-
tungen oft dem Erwerb von Aktien vor-
gezogen. Der Grund dafür scheint in der
psychologischen Überbewertung des
kurzfristig hohen Verlustpotentials der
Aktien zu liegen (siehe Equity Premium
Puzzle; vgl. Bernatzi/Thaler, 1995). Genau
an jenem Punkt könnten erfahrungsba-
sierte Informationsformate von Vorteil
sein. Eine aktuelle Studie fand, dass – im
Vergleich zur graphischen Beschreibung
des Risikos – ein Risiko-Tool, das auf der
Präsentation sequentieller Ereignisse be-
ruht und Anlegern die Möglichkeit gibt,
Schritt für Schritt Erfahrungen mit der
stochastischen Struktur von Aktienprei-
sen und Renditen zu simulieren, zu mehr
Risikobereitschaft und gleichzeitig zu ge-
naueren Einschätzungen des Erwartungs-
werts und der Wahrscheinlichkeit eines
Verlustes führte (vgl. Kaufmann et al.,
2013). Eine größere Risikobereitschaft ist
natürlich nicht a priori gut und die An-
fangsbeispiele legen davon Zeugnis ab.
Dennoch ist folgende Überlegung be-
deutsam: „The use of experience sam-
pling in financial simulations may be a
fruitful strategy for banks to improve the
quality of the information they provide
about their investment products to ensu-
re that clients understand both the risks
they take and the amount of risk they are
prepared to take“ (Kaufmann et al., 2013,
S. 336).
Ähnlich der Entscheidung für die richtige
Investitionsanlage hängen viele unter-
nehmerische Entscheidungen von der
Kenntnis und Bewertung von Wahr-
scheinlichkeiten und dem Ausmaß der
möglichen Konsequenzen einer Entschei-
dung ab. Damit drängen sich Implikatio-
nen der Kluft zwischen beschreibungs-
und erfahrungsbasierten Entscheidungen
auch für Risikomanagement in Organisa-
tionen auf. Viele Alltagsrisiken wie auch
Risiken des unternehmerischen Handelns
entziehen sich einer einfachen Risikoana-
lyse. Wahrscheinlichkeiten können oft
nicht oder nicht genau quantifiziert wer-
den, weil die in Frage stehenden Ereignis-
se nicht tabelliert wurden (die Risiken
waren nicht als solche erkennbar), singu-
lär sind oder die Stichprobe vergleichba-
rer Ereignisse sehr klein ist. In Fällen, in
denen keine quantifizierten Größen vor-
liegen, scheint es naheliegend, dass Ent-
scheidungsträger auch ihre persönlichen
Erfahrungsstichproben zu Rate ziehen. In
diesen Stichproben sind seltene Ereignis-
se – und dies liegt in der Natur der Sache –
in der Regel unterrepräsentiert und wer-
den in erfahrungsbasierten Urteilen ver-
mutlich zu wenig Gewicht erfahren.
Allerdings gilt auch dies: Ist ein seltenes
Ereignis gerade kürzlich aufgetreten, wird
dieses Risiko in erfahrungsbasierten Ur-
teilen für einen gewissen Zeitraum ver-
mutlich zu viel Gewicht erfahren.
Aber selbst wenn das Risikomanagement
unternehmerische Chancen und Risiken
identifiziert, tabelliert und quantifiziert,
stellt sich die Frage, wie sich beschrei-
bungs- und erfahrungsbasierte Beurtei-
lungen zueinander verhalten. Schenken
Entscheidungsträger ausschließlich be-
schreibungsbasierten Analysen von fest-
gestellten Risiken Glauben oder werden
diese auch durch die Filter der persön-
lichen Erfahrungen neubewertet oder gar
„verdrängt“? Erste Ergebnisse im Kontext
von Warnhinweisen deuten darauf hin,
dass bei seltenen Risiken die wiederholte
Erfahrung, dass ein Risiko (bislang) nicht
eingetreten ist, dazu führen kann, dass es
möglicherweise nicht ernst genug ge-
nommen wird – ein Verhalten, das insbe-
sondere auch im unternehmerischen Ri-
sikomanagement zu folgenschweren
Fehleinschätzungen führen kann. Zum
Beispiel findet man, dass Patienten ein
Medikament mit einer schwerwiegenden,
aber seltenen Nebenwirkung auch dann
noch einnehmen, wenn vor den Neben-
wirkungen gewarnt und das Medikament
schlussendlich vom Markt genommen
wurde. Die bislang guten Erfahrungen
mit dem Medikament vermitteln ein fal-
sches Gefühl der Sicherheit (vgl. Barron
et al., 2008). Zweifellos muss die zukünf-
tige Forschung die interessante Interak-
tion zwischen Erfahrung und Beschrei-
bung in der Bewertung von Risiken wei-
ter ausloten und entschlüsseln.
Schlussendlich sei noch die folgende
Überlegung erlaubt: Die Beschreibung
der Wahrscheinlichkeit seltener Ereignis-
se führt eher zu deren Übergewichtung,
wohingegen die Erfahrung der Wahr-
scheinlichkeit seltener Ereignisse eher de-
ren Untergewichtung zur Folge hat. Da-
her stellt sich die Frage, ob gute Risiko-
kommunikation – auch im Umfeld un-
ternehmerischer Entscheidungen – darin
bestehen könnte und sollte, den Ent-
scheidungsträgern beide Formate zur
Verfügung zu stellen. Neben den aggre-
gierten, tabellierten Risiken könnte man
„experience sampling“ als Methode ver-
wenden, um – ähnlich wie bei Investigati-
onsentscheidungen (vgl. Kaufmann et al.,
2013, S. 336) – Risiken verständlich zu
kommunizieren und die Erfahrung eines




Bei einer Vielzahl unserer Entscheidun-
gen spielen seltene, aber folgenschwere
Ereignisse eine wichtige Rolle. Die bislang
etablierte Sichtweise war, dass seltene Er-
eignisse in Risikowahlen zu viel Gewicht
erfahren (gemessen an ihrer objektiven
Wahrscheinlichkeit). Diese Sichtweise ist
nicht falsch, aber ihr Gültigkeitsbereich
ist augenscheinlich begrenzter als bislang
vermutet. Der Schlüssel dazu liegt in einer
in jüngster Zeit viel beachteten Beobach-
tung, dem Description-Experience Gap
(vgl. Hertwig/Erev, 2009). Der Ausgangs-
punkt der Forschung zu dieser Kluft ist
dieser: Symbolische Informationen über
Risiken in Form einer Wahrscheinlichkeit
oder einer Aussage begegnen uns allerorts
in unserem privaten und professionellen
Umfeld. Warnhinweise auf Zigarettenpa-
ckungen kommunizieren symbolisch das
Risiko des Rauchens, wenngleich in nicht-
quantifizierter Form: „Raucher sterben
früher“ oder „Rauchen verursacht töd-
lichen Lungenkrebs.“ Mediziner kommu-
nizieren die Vorteile und die Risiken von
Krebsscreening-Verfahren in Form von
deskriptiven statistischen Informationen.
Die formalisierte Risikoberichterstattung
in Organisationen tut das gleiche, wenn
sie den Entscheidungsträgern Risikobe-
richte als Entscheidungsgrundlage zur
Verfügung stellt. Neben der symbolischen
Beschreibung von Risiken erfahren Men-
schen Risiken aber häufig auch durch den
Filter ihrer persönlichen Erfahrung. Dem
(Risiko-)Controlling kommt in diesem
Kontext die Aufgabe zu, die Risikobewer-
tung und damit Entscheidungen zu ver-
sachlichen.
Entscheidend ist Folgendes: Viele Unter-
suchungen zu der Frage, wie Menschen
im Angesicht von Risiko und Unsicher-
heit Entscheidungen treffen, zeigen, dass
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die Vermittlung von relativ unwahr-
scheinlichen Risiken mittels symbolischer
Darstellungen dazu führen kann, dass
diesen mehr Gewicht eingeräumt wird
als ihnen in Anbetracht ihrer objektiven
Wahrscheinlichkeit zusteht. Sobald aber
für die Reaktion auf seltene Risiken nicht
nur die symbolischen Informationen,
sondern auch die eigene Erfahrung he-
rangezogen wird, werden sie relativ ange-
messen eingeschätzt – zumindest dann,
wenn die Erfahrungsstichprobe sehr groß
ist. Bei Ereignissen, die so selten sind,
dass sie selbst in einer großen Erfah-
rungsstichprobe nicht auftreten – zum
Beispiel eine Weltwirtschaftskrise oder
der äußerst seltene Ausbruch eines Vul-
kans –, neigt unsere begrenzte Erfahrung
dazu, das Risiko zu gering zu gewichten.
Beschreibung und Erfahrung eines Risi-
kos sind also nicht einfach nur die zwei
Seiten derselben Medaille.
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Summary
This article gives an introduction into
the description-experience gap – the
observation of a systematic difference
in risky choice based on symbolic de-
scriptions versus sequential experi-
ence. The gap is particularly pro-
nounced with rare events. Rare events
appear to receive too much (descrip-
tion) and too little (experience)
weight, respectively. Reasons are dis-
cussed and implications presented.
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